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Bosnian Muslims, Serbs Sign Accord; All Sides To Meet

AU1609114193 Paris AFP in English 1105 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Geneva, Sept 16 (AFP)—Leaders from the three sides in the Bosnian conflict will meet on Tuesday [21 September] in Sarajevo to try to finalize a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina being negotiated in Geneva, an official announcement said Thursday.

The announcement was made after Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic signed a ceasefire agreement with the head of the Bosnian Serb assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, representing Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

The accord called for a "prompt cessation of all hostilities and military conflicts" between Moslems and Serbs, the release of prisoners and the dismantling of detention camps.

Serb-Muslim Talks Resume

LD1609093993 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0847 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Geneva, 16 Sep (TANJUG)—Negotiations between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims resumed in the Palace of Nations in Geneva this morning under a veil of extreme secrecy and with the cochairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia as mediators. The negotiations, which began at about 2330 last night, are being attended by: Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the republic of Srpska parliament, and foreign minister Aleksa Buha, on the Serbian side, and by [Bosnian President] Alija Izetbegovic and Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic on the Muslim side.

The first round of the negotiations ended at about 0200 and was resumed at 0930.

According to well informed sources close to both delegations, the negotiations are focusing on a joint declaration designed to regulate overall Serb-Muslim relations. Once there is an agreement on the document, the way will be paved for resolving controversial territorial issues between the two sides as part of implementing the plan. This concerns the dispute over the territories in eastern Bosnia, Bosnian Krajina, and the River Neretva valley.

The well informed diplomatic circles maintain, however, that the Muslim side is insisting on resolving territorial issues as a priority, thus, in fact, setting conditions for signing the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The two cochairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, see the document as a bridge for bringing the views of the two sides closer together. If the document, like the one agreed upon by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the Bosnian Muslims, two days ago, is signed today, obstacles will be removed for signing a general Geneva accord.

It has been hinted here that the three national leaders from Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, could be expected in Geneva as early as sometime this week.

The two cochairmen are making efforts to have the Geneva package signed as soon as possible as a condition for starting to implement the plan. According to estimates, about 50,000 NATO and U.S. forces will be involved in its implementation.

The secret meeting between the representatives of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims was convened suddenly after Owen and Stoltenberg cancelled their visit to Skopje yesterday.

Yesterday afternoon, the two cochairmen met Krajisnik and Buha in Podgorica from where they flew to Geneva on board a UN Protection Forces plane.

Cochairmen Hold Meeting

LD1609011793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2350 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Geneva, Sept 15 (TANJUG)—A secret meeting began in Geneva late on Wednesday [15 September] between international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, and the Bosnian Serb and Moslem delegations.

Owen and Stoltenberg arrived in Geneva on Wednesday evening, together with Bosnian Serb parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik and foreign minister Aleksa Buha. Before arriving in Geneva, they met with the Serb republic's representatives in the Montenegrin capital of Podgorica.

The two mediators declined to make statement at the Geneva airport, but confirmed that they would attend a "private meeting" in which also Alija Izetbegovic is to participate.

Bosnian Moslem leader Izetbegovic and his Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic arrived in the Pallais of Nations around 11:30 P.M.

According to unofficial sources, the meeting will be devoted to territorial disputes between the Serb and Moslem side. It is believed that Owen and Stoltenberg, following the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement signed on Tuesday, are trying to bring the Serb and Moslem positions closer and call a final round of Bosnia peace talks.

It is uncertain whether the surprise meeting will continue on Thursday.

Montenegro's Bulatovic Arrives, Meets Berisha

AU1509151693 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report by Zamira Koleci on visit by Montenegrin delegation led by President Bulatovic]

[Text] Today a highest-level delegation from Montenegro arrived in our country. The delegation is led by President Bulatovic. The delegation was welcomed at the Han i Hotit border crossing by Bashkim Kopliku, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. The delegation made a stopover at Ishull i Lezhes, during which Kopliku and Bulatovic discussed future relations between the two countries. We must be good neighbors, stated the Montenegrin President, who went on to term the visit as a positive step for the friendship between the two countries.

Mr. Kopliku stressed among other things that the peoples cannot feel calm as long as there is no calm in the Balkan region.

At 1200 hours President Bulatovic had a meeting with his Albanian counterpart, Sali Berisha. Their meeting was also attended by the foreign ministers of the two countries. Following the meeting, which lasted about two hours, the heads of state of Albania and Montenegro met the press:

[Begin Berisha recording]: Ladies and gentlemen, we have had a long and [word indistinct] discussion with President Bulatovic. This is the first visit of the Montenegrin President in Albania and I am very pleased with this visit. I wish to stress that our two peoples and countries, which have deep historical ties, have seen both good and bad days in their history, like all neighbors. One thing is certain, however: That the Albanians and Montenegrins have common virtues, which induces them to respect and honor each other.

Montenegro being our northern neighbor, we have paid special attention to our relations with that country. We have noted that President Bulatovic and the Montenegrin Government have adopted a more realistic stand with regard to the Balkan crisis. We have no intention whatsoever of creating any problems between the two countries. I believe that relations between neighbors are determined, firstly, by the principle of good-neighborliness and, secondly, by their dedication and determination to respect universal values. It is precisely these two factors that have determined and continue to determine Albania's position toward her neighbors.

We discussed with Mr. Bulatovic various decisions adopted by international institutions and the possibility of increasing cooperation and exchanges between our two countries. I believe that this dialogue will continue and will lead to increased cooperation in various fields in the interest of the two countries and peoples. We discussed the embargo [passage indistinct] Our views on the crisis in Bosnia and the situation in Kosova differ, but this does not prevent us from cooperating in those fields in which our views coincide. [end Berisha recording]

In his statement, Mr. Bulatovic said: I would like to thank President Berisha once again for the invitation to visit Albania and, particularly, I would like to thank him for the substance of the discussion that we conducted. We are conscious of the problems and the challenges presented by the times in which we are living. We are glad to see in Mr. Berisha a person who is sincerely committed to the solution of the problems confronting our region by democratic means and through political dialogue. I am glad to say that Albania and Montenegro are now much closer, not in the geographical sense, but in that Albania's great democratic achievements have made it possible for our citizens to communicate with each other directly without any obstacles and that the national minorities can become bridges that will strengthen our cooperation.

There are problems and questions on which we were unable to find a common language. They will require further dialogue. However, what is important is that Albania and Montenegro have made a valuable contribution to stability in the Balkan region.

This afternoon, Prime Minister Meksi will receive the Montenegrin President, Mr. Bulatovic, and the members of his delegation, in a separate meeting.

TANJUG Reports on Meeting

LD1509183993 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1513 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, 15 Sep (TANJUG)—Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Albanian President Sali Berisha had talks in Tirana today. The talks, which lasted over an hour, were described by both sides as comprehensive.

President Bulatovic said he was pleased to have met someone who was sincere in finding ways to resolve all existing regional problems by democratic means and through political dialogue.

"I am pleased," Bulatovic said, "that Montenegro and Albania are now closer—not in the geographical sense but because democratic liberties in Albania and its great achievements enabled our citizens to communicate freely and that the national minorities have become bridges for cooperation. All those issues for which we failed to find common ground will be a challenge when we meet again in the future. What is important is that in this way Albania and Montenegro will contribute to stability throughout the Balkan peninsula," Bulatovic said.

Berisha expressed satisfaction with the Montenegrin president's visit to Tirana and stressed that both presidents had identical stands on the Balkans crisis. "Our views concerning the crisis in Bosnia, and also the crisis in Kosovo, are not the same, but this should not be seen as an obstacle to cooperation in spheres where our views are different," said Berisha.

The Albanian president said they also "discussed the international community's sanctions against Yugoslavia. Albania's stand is well-known, we will honor the embargo, but we feel morally offended as Montenegro is not responsible for what is going in the region," Berisha said, and went on to say: "I believe that the establishment of dialogue is very important and I hope that concrete cooperation will follow in various fields, in the interests of both sides," Berisha said.

President Bulatovic arrived on his official visit to Albania shortly after 1200. He was accorded a ceremonial welcome including the highest state honors in the square outside the Presidential Palace in Tirana. The Montenegrin state delegation was cordially welcomed all the way from the border crossing of Bozaj to the Albanian capital. In larger towns, large groups of Albanians welcomed the high-ranking guests. Bulatovic arrived in Tirana accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Mihailo Ljesar and Foreign Affairs Minister Miodrag Lekic.

Following the talks in the Presidential Palace, the head of state hosted an official lunch in honor of the Montenegrin delegation. This afternoon, President Bulatovic met Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, while at the same time Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister Ljesar was talking with Albanian Parliament Speaker Peter Arbnori.

Today's meeting between Presidents Bulatovic and Berisha was the first contact between the highest representatives of Montenegro and Albania since 1949.

Meksi Receives Bulatovic

AU1509193493 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Today, a highest-level delegation from Montenegro arrived in our country. [passage omitted] This afternoon the delegation met Aleksander Meksi, the Albanian prime minister. The talks centered on the first steps of cooperation between the two countries to their mutual interest. The leaders of the two delegations, Meksi and Bulatovic, stressed the need for cooperation and coexistence between Albania and Montenegro, as neighboring countries with traditional trade links. The discussions covered cooperation in the fields of transportation, trade, the utilization of roads linking both countries and, particularly, the use of the railroad that, as Mr. Meksi stressed, gave rise to high hopes when it was first inaugurated some years ago. He also mentioned the importance of a project to regulate the waters of Lake Shkoder and the Buna River, as being of mutual importance. Another field discussed was that of tourism and the possibility of joint investments.

The Albanian prime minister expressed his belief that the development of dialogue between the two sides, which must continue, would be beneficial to the development of the existing potential for cooperation.

The Montenegrin side expressed its opinions on the possibility of intensifying contacts between the governments of the two countries to define and coordinate the direction of their cooperation in various fields. The possibility of a further meeting between the heads of government in Montenegro was also discussed. In conclusion, Mr. Bulatovic reiterated his country's desire to resume cooperation in the interest of the two countries and peoples.

After a meeting with Pjeter Arbnori, chairman of the Albanian parliament, the delegation will leave Albania tonight.

Arbnori, Bulatovic Meet

AU1609084993 Tirana ATA in English 0819 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 16 (ATA)—In his meeting with the president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, on September 16, the speaker of the Albanian Parliament Pjeter Arbnori said: We wish the establishment of good relations with Montenegro. In our history there have also been disagreements, but neighbours should find a common language to solve them. It is also better to discuss problems of the Albanians residing in Montenegro and former Yugoslavia regarding the observation of their rights and demands. Any improvement in their situation would also bring about improvement in bilateral relations.

The Montenegrin president, Momir Bulatovic valued as very positive his talks with President Berisha and Premier Meksi. (?He stressed) the desire for understanding between the Montenegrin and Albanian peoples and for the solution of problems through dialogue. Speaking of the Albanians' position in Montenegro, he said that they have integrated into the political and economic life, have their own parties, are represented in the parliament and have schools in the Albanian language.

President Bulatovic appreciated Mr. Arbnori's proposal for the development of parliamentary relations as a factor for the creation of a climate of understanding in the region.

Government To Increase Teachers' Pay 1 October

AU1609083993 Tirana ATA in English 0823 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 16 (ATA)—The school year in some schools of Tirana began with a one day strike by teachers who demanded a salary increase. The representatives of the independent education trade unions discussed the teachers' demands with government officials who agreed to raise all teachers by one category on the salary scale beginning October 1.

The parties also discussed other problems of the educational system such as working conditions, work norms, job classifications, and the collective contract for teachers.

Meksi Briefs NATO Delegation on Reforms

AU1509155593 Tirana ATA in English 0836 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 15 (ATA)—Mr. (?Gerard Gon), head of a visiting NATO economic delegation, in meeting on September 14, with Premier Meksi, declared that "The economic situation in Albania looks promising, and we believe you will be successful in your efforts." Albania, he added, has greater chances than the other eastern European countries for progress in its transition to a market economy.

Premier Meksi replied that a majority of the Albanian people support the democratic government and said that "We thank all international organizations and western European countries, as well as the USA for the aid they have rendered to Albania during this period of transition." Premier Meksi expressed appreciation for NATO's ongoing contribution to Albania and voiced his belief that NATO will soon admit Albania into its fold.

The NATO economic delegation members met with Albanian senior officials, deputies, and economists to be briefed on the specifics of the economic reforms in Albania, their legal basis, and the support of these reforms by the people.

Ministry Discusses Wheat Purchase Report

AU1409202293 Sofia BTA in English 1507 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 14 (BTA)—The state mills have failed to purchase the quota of 1.6 million tonnes of bread wheat to secure this country's bread balance. The main reason for this is the rapid rise of wheat prices from about 2,100 leva/t to over 3,000 leva/t., on the other hand, producers are holding back between 500,000 and 600,000 tonnes of bread wheat, according to a report of experts of the Agricultural Ministry presented to the collegium of the ministry today. The experts claim that the fodder balance will also not be achieved mainly because of the low maize yield this year and expect the price of bread wheat to reach 4,500 leva/t in April-May next year and the price of bread to soar to 15 leva/kg.

The report proposes to cancel taxes on the import of bread wheat and fodder grain to settle the market. It also proposes to allocate funds from the national budget and to compensate part of the expenditures for transporting wheat to non-producing regions from the "Wheat" Fund. To this end it proposes for the money raised in selling American maize to be deposited in this fund.

The collegium of the Ministry of Agriculture decided to set up a group of experts to work out a stand on the problems raised in the report, Mr. Georgi Khinchev, spokesman of the ministry, told the press. This stand should set forth a comprehensive state wheat policy, he explained. The members of the collegium stressed the need for an act on trade in wheat.

Higher Tobacco Purchase Prices Discussed

AU1409204093 Sofia BTA in English 1729 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 14 (BTA)—Strings of high-quality oriental tobacco were burnt today at a rally in the village of Benkovski (southern Bulgaria), the local BTA correspondent reported. This extreme act is an expression of the desperation of tobacco producers in the region brought over the low purchase prices of tobacco, the mayor of the village told BTA. The relay hunger strike of tobacco producers is continuing for a second day now. The strikers have received the support of tobacco producers across the municipality. If the government does not accept the demand for a two-fold increase in purchase prices as soon as possible, the strikers threaten to raise a tent camp in downtown Kurdzhali and Sofia. Tobacco is grown in the southern parts of this country in which ethnic Turks prevail.

A meeting was held today in parliament on the initiative of the parliamentary group of the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms and Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev. It was attended by experts of the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture, of the Union of Tobacco Producers and by representatives of the trade unions.

At the meeting it was decided to adopt explicitly stated criteria for raising purchase prices, Deputy Prime Minister Matinchev told journalists after the meeting. The participants also agreed to propose a revision of the policy on customs duties and import concessions on cigarettes in order to protect the interests of the local producers. According to Mr. Matinchev, we cannot expect a 100 percent rise in tobacco purchase prices as demanded by producers. A realistic increase should not exceed 40 percent, according to experts.

The talks will continue next week when the long-deferred problem of the organizational restructuring of the state-run Bulgartabak monopolist will be discussed, Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev said.

Trade Union Forecasts 15 Percent Inflation

AU1509173893 Sofia BTA in English 1354 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 15 (BTA)—Experts of the Confederation of the Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (KNSB), one of the largest trade union amalgamations in this country, say inflation will top 15 percent in the fourth quarter of 1993, which is 2 to 2.5 times above the third quarter level. However, the confederation leaders do not intend to demand full compensations, since the current economic situation makes it impossible.

KNSB Executive Secretary Georgi Georgiev told a briefing today these predictions were made in view of the rise of electricity prices, which brought about a 10, 15 or 20 percent rise in the prices of staple foods: Bread, eggs and others. Besides, persistent pressure for and discussions of a further increase in the prices of energy sources as of September 1 or October 1 generated inflation expectations among producers and traders, who started raising the prices of goods and services before such a rise.

The inadequate compensation mechanism calls for a new round of negotiations among government, employers and trade unions, Mr. Georgiev said. By the end of this year people will be offered some 6 or 7 percent instead of full compensation for the actual inflation rate.

IMF Envoy Dahl Views Embargo Effect

AU1509165993 Sofia BTA in English 1415 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report by Nacho Khalachev: "Bulgaria Makes Progress, Yugoembargo a Serious Setback"]

[Text] Sofia, September 15 (BTA)—Bulgaria's economic development this year can be viewed with mixed feelings, according to Mr. Gregory Dahl, resident representative of the International Monetary Fund in Bulgaria, who gave a news conference here today.

Inflation is expected to fall short of projections made in early 1993, Mr. Dahl said. The exchange rate of the lev against the dollar is remarkably stable which is a kind of confidence vote. The drop in production in the public sector seems to be coming to a halt and recovery is in the offing. The tourist season is a success which suggests tourism has a potential.

In addition, the government approved a draft document on bad debts which is very positive, Mr. Dahl said.

At the same time, the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro has had an extremely adverse effect on the Bulgarian economy. We expected a growth in exports but this is hardly likely, given sanctions enforcement and the difficulties faced by the Western economies.

The IMF was disappointed at the drop in budget revenues, Mr. Dahl said. This will probably be high on the agenda of the talks between representatives of the IMF and Bulgaria in Washington next week.

Mr. Dahl stressed the IMF would go on insisting on a lower budget deficit. At Bulgaria's talks with its creditor banks, however, the IMF will insist on an agreement that will be within Bulgaria's powers.

Bulgaria's losses due to the Yugoembargo arouse sympathy, according to Mr. Dahl, but unfortunately the United Nations has not worked out a compensation mechanism.

Mr. Dahl recalled that Bulgaria received some 600 million dollars from the IMF in two years, the biggest foreign financial assistance extended to it.

Summing up his ten-month stay in this country, Mr. Dahl said he was impressed with the energy Bulgarians show in overcoming difficulties. In his view this is a guarantee for success though the Bulgarian horizon still is overcast.

Commentary on Yordanov Removal From SDS

AU1409135693 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Sep 93 p 6

[Commentary by Georgi Asyov: "Semi-Expulsion"]

[Text] It was not one of the best days for Bulgarian democracy when Aleksandur Yordanov was half-expelled from the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. Now that the SDS has eliminated the deputy chairmen's posts, power in its National Coordinating Council is now dangerously concentrated in the hands of two individuals: Filip Dimitrov and the sly plotter Ivan Kurtev, whose voice we will start hearing from now on. Furthermore, despite the fact that Yordanov was one of the strategists behind the failures suffered by the democratic forces in Bulgaria, his lack of principle and simple pragmatism are preferable to Dimitrov's talent for intrigues and scandal and the extremism of those who stand behind him.

With Yordanov's removal, the former prime minister won a battle, but not the war. It is still unclear which of the two tendencies will gain the ascendancy in the SDS: whether it will turn into a blue [right-wing democratic] party led by Dimitrov, or whether it will be absorbed by Stefan Savov's formation, which now derives its power not only from anticommunist emotions, but also from the real interests of the small group that received compensation from the property restitution. In any event, it would be better for the country if two strong organizations—the Democratic Party and Radical Democratic Party—emerge from the disintegrating SDS than for a single powerful party to appear, with a rigidly controlled structure and a pronounced right-wing radical piety.

President Havel Discusses Domestic Issues

AU1509163393 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 11 Sep 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Jitka Goetzova; place and date not given: "I Do Not Want To Be the Nation's Adored Leader; President Vaclav Havel's Exclusive Interview for RUDE PRAVO"]

[Text] [Goetzova] You have always spoken out against the principle of collective guilt. But recently you signed the Law on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and on Resistance Against It, which, even according to the [German] paper DER GENERAL-ANZEIGER, establishes the principle of collective guilt. Do you not object to the law's article stating that "the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, its leadership and members, are responsible for the system of government in its country in the years 1948-1989, particularly for the systematic destruction of the traditional values of European civilization, for the conscious violation of human rights and freedoms, and for the moral and economic decline accompanied by judicial crimes and terror against advocates of different opinions"?

[Havel] First of all, the article you mentioned does not refer to guilt, which must logically be followed by punishment, but to responsibility, which, in this context, cannot but be understood as political and moral responsibility. On the other hand, the principle of collective guilt means the assumption of true guilt, which must inevitably be followed by a punishment, with this guilt being derived from affiliation to some generally defined community. Second, the term collective guilt usually implies an affiliation that has not been chosen voluntarily. Membership in the Communist Party, however, was a matter of individual choice. For these two reasons I reject the claim that the article in question establishes the principle of collective guilt. Of course, this article does not give a true picture of the whole multifaceted reality, does not differentiate between motives for party membership, between degrees of responsibility, and between the extent of consequences that many people who subsequently became involved in the struggle against the totalitarian system had drawn from their membership. This is a declarative article and I admit that I would rather see this sentence in the law's preamble. After mature consideration, however, I arrived at the opinion that this is not a sufficient reason not to sign this law.

I understand the law on the illegality of the communist regime as a clear signal that one era has ended and a new one has begun. I was always of the opinion that this must be said clearly and that, in the interest of the hygiene of further development, we must look the past straight in the eye. I have long been an advocate of such a signal, but I believed that it should rather take the form of a proclamation, from which individual legislative acts would be derived. It was particularly the left that had prevented the adoption of such a proclamation. One might say, with a bit of exaggeration, that he who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind. Let me add one more thing: Do you know anyone who has after November [1989] openly admitted his responsibility for the crimes of communism and who has drawn from it personal consequences? I do not, everyone has only been making all kinds of excuses. These people have been literally asking for the adoption of such a law one day.

[Goetzova] Some time ago Professor Jicinsky, in an article in RUDE PRAVO, pointed to a certain contradiction in your actions. After you signed the law on the illegality of the communist regime, he wrote about you: "By signing this dubious and peculiar law without any hesitation, he greatly devalued his moral credit." In your opinion, is it at all possible for a politician always to abide by his high moral principles in the specific political practice?

[Havel] Had it been the essential feature of politics that he who devotes himself to it must automatically give up his moral principles, I would not devote myself to politics. I consider the idea that politics is dirty by its nature immensely dangerous. A politician simply has a somewhat different type of responsibility than an ordinary citizen. It happens to him often, for example, that he must assert his principles not by choosing the best solution but by choosing out of all the solutions that are available to him the least harmful one. I think that precisely Zdenek Jicinsky could tell us a great deal about it. He himself had given me more than one lecture on this at one time.

[Goetzova] Article 3 of the aforementioned law stipulates that resistance to the past regime was legitimate, just, morally justified, and worthy of respect. This respect is being shown to Vaclav Benda, for example, to you, and some others, while Petr Uhl and Ladislav Lis are being treated very disrespectfully in this regard. How do you personally interpret this article?

[Havel] I respect Uhl's and Lis' resistance as much as I do Benda's.

[Goetzova] Do you make them feel this sufficiently? Do you give any consideration to what they think now and do you try to understand them?

[Havel] I think that they know this very well. If our views on some issue differ, we talk about it, which, incidentally, we have always done. We do, admittedly, see one another less frequently now.

[Goetzova] When you returned from your vacation in Greece, you made a much lonelier impression at the airport than ever before on similar occasions. You do not even top the list of the most popular politicians any longer. Do you have the feeling that the media and political circles conspire against you—to invoke a now popular theory? How do you explain a certain cooling off in the public's attitude toward you, as the president of the republic? Do you ever feel lonely at the Castle?

[Havel] I wanted very much to be able to return from vacation as a normal citizen, inasmuch as possible, quietly, without arousing attention. I am glad that my efforts were crowned with success. I do not have the feeling that anyone conspires against me. If I attract less attention than formerly, it is quite logical and it even is a sign of a positive development. It is not my ambition to be the nation's adored leader. If anyone perceived me as such at one time, it was a product of the revolutionary situation, not the product of my endeavor. Democracy in our country is stabilizing, the division of powers is becoming firmly established, and it is only good if the people do not see the president on their screens every day and if the president does not decide on everything. All those who would like to see me more often and who would want me to have a greater influence will have to get used to this. I definitely do not suffer from loneliness. Rather, from time to time I take refuge in it, to be able to think something through, to read or to write something.

[Goetzova] One of the favorite activities of small political parties at present is to "make themselves more visible." Given the fact that the weight of the presidential office within the constitutional system has declined, compared with the recent past, are you not tempted to make yourself somehow "more visible," too?

[Havel] I have no need to make myself more visible. I only feel the need to work toward good causes and to serve them. Whether I am to be seen in this is not what matters most.

[Goetzova] Did you reflect during your vacation on changing the concept of relations with the FRG, as you had suggested before the vacation?

[Havel] I did not intend to come up with any new concept of relations with the FRG or any other country. I only wanted to study various materials pertaining to these relations and to reflect upon them in the broader historical and geopolitical context.

[Goetzova] There has been much discussion of late in our country about intelligence services and their role in a democratic state. What is your stand on this issue?

[Havel] Every sovereign state needs certain intelligence services. Our problem lies in that we are looking for their new identity, function, position, method of work, and method of supervision. It can take a long time before all this is completed and stabilized.

[Goetzova] While meeting [chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party] Milos Zeman, you suggested that you would cooperate also with a government with a different perspective on the economic reform. Which of the views of the present opposition politicians are close to you?

[Havel] One of the basic constitutional duties of the president is to secure continuity of power in the event of a change of government. It would be a profound miscomprehension of the presidential post if the president wanted to step down every time that someone else wins [the elections] than he would like to see winning. Therefore, the president must cooperate with every government that emerges legitimately from free elections. It sometimes happens (though not very often) that I agree with the opposition. If you want an example, let me mention, for instance, the idea to establish the office of ombudsman.

[Goetzova] Are relations between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic half a year after the federation's partition developing according to your ideas? Do you not think that, in lieu of forming a specific alliance, the two republics are drifting further and further apart?

[Havel] The political orientation of the ruling teams is different in many ways. However, that should not be a reason for us not to have friendly relations. It seems to me that we do have them and that they could be even better if we succeeded in finally resolving some issues that are still disputed, such as the division of the federal property and the problem of our border.

[Goetzova] In the essay "Power of the Powerless," you start your analysis of the Husak era with the greengrocer's fear of posting an official slogan in the shop window. In his book "Philosophy and the Politics of Kitsch," the philosopher Petr Rezek labeled this analytical method of yours as "bacteriological world view" and, in the postscript in one of the parts of the book, which is omitted in the most widely distributed edition, he called on the publisher not to publish it, should you ever become president. "I am afraid," he added. Do you know why a post-November [1989] philosopher or greengrocer should be afraid?

[Havel] I am greatly surprised that Petr Rezek, of all people, should be afraid of me. I know him as a very unconventional philosopher who is not afraid of facing the rest of the world singlehandedly. When he is afraid of me, it speaks more against him than against myself. As for the greengrocer, he can surely be afraid of a great many things, but fear of being persecuted for his political views is not one of them.

[Goetzova] Excuse me, but I know several cases of people who have had to leave their position or job. One always finds some reason for this. Do people not write to you about such cases?

[Havel] There is a cardinal difference between persecution by state power and persecution by some individual, even a highly placed one. Even in the most democratic of democracies it can happen that someone is persecuted by someone. The important thing is that the person being persecuted can defend himself or appeal to independent institutions.

[Goetzova] In 1976 you convincingly explained, and illustrated by your own example, that you had the chance to see the world as it really is "from below," so to speak. [sentence as published] According to your own words, this helped you to beware of various potential illusions or mystifications. What is it that helps you to see the reality of the world today, when you view it from the Castle, that is, "from above"?

[Havel] I incessantly speak with a great many different people who, unlike Petr Rezek, are not in the least afraid of telling me what they think. And additional thousands of people write to the Castle every month about their most diverse concerns. If the president is not a complete dunce, he can know far more about the actual state of society than a great many other people.

[Goetzova] Nevertheless, do you not think that you should be appearing among the people more often, to have the chance to say and hear some things face to face?

[Havel] I am doing it already.

[Goetzova] To what extent are you ready today, similarly as in the time of dissent, to stand up for truth, whatever the consequences?

[Havel] In cases where the truth is incontestable, in my opinion, and with respect to which it is appropriate for the head of state to assume a position, I stand up for truth in the same way as I always did.

[Goetzova] From time to time journalists discover some disagreements between you and the executive branch, which are then presently denied by both sides. Would it not strengthen your authority if you conceded their existence?

[Havel] If some discords appear between me and some politicians of the government coalition, I prefer explaining them on the spot, not via the media. It does not serve the political stability and credibility of a state if the impression arises that politicians are not capable of reaching agreement and therefore constantly turn to the public with their often petty disagreements. I am not, and never have been, a friend of closed-door politics, but I consider absurd and perverse the idea that all that is not scanned by television cameras is an example of closed-door politics. This is not to say that if consensus is not found on a matter of principle, it should be concealed from the public. However, so far there has not been any such case between myself and the coalition and I hope that it will never occur. Another matter is that different politicians have different temperaments, use different language, have different styles, emphasize different aspects of phenomena, and differ one from the other in their natural dispositions and interests. This matter is absolutely natural and, so I believe, it is not being concealed from the public.

[Goetzova] You were one of the initiators of the repatriation of Volhynian Czechs [from the former Soviet Union]. The mayor of Ceska Lipa K. Engel (Civic Democratic Party) has said that "not all of them are genuine." At the same time he voiced the fear that the district of Ceska Lipa [where most members of the community found their new home] might become a place of transshipment for weapons, drugs, and the like. These statements have infuriated the Volhynian Czechs. Why did you not publicly stand up for our compatriots?

[Havel] Others stood up for them. I cannot react to every stupidity because, in that case, my voice would lose any weight.

[Goetzova] But many Volhynian Czechs still cannot feel at home in the Czech Republic. They are having many problems with housing, with finding work, and with social security. Are you going to help them?

[Havel] When I will be called upon to help, and when it will be within my potential to help, I will naturally do so.

[Goetzova] You tend to pass over affairs, instances of corruption, and transgressions involving those in power on the ground that journalists should be involved in disclosing them. How do you explain that the scandals that journalists uncover and describe in great detail do not automatically lead to the resignation of the persons involved, as is customary elsewhere in the advanced world?

[Havel] I do not think that it is the task of newspapers to bring down politicians. The task of newspapers is to seek the truth and say it. If they find anything that casts doubt on some politician, it is their duty to write about it. But investigating the matter and drawing consequences from it is up to different institutions. A situation in which journalists could directly bring down anyone would have little in common with a state based on the rule of law and with democracy. Another matter is that all these things still work rather poorly in our country. Journalists sometimes present their speculations as ascertained facts and operate with insufficiently founded accusations. The consequence is either that someone is ousted from public life only because he has bad press or, quite the reverse, that no significance at all is attributed to newspaper findings and revelations. Both are bad. Newspapers should publish only things that have been thoroughly verified and the institutions of the democratic state or political bodies should respond to newspaper findings with all the seriousness that these findings deserve.

[Goetzova] Are you really convinced that the freedom of the press is on such a level that everything that journalists uncover finds its way into the media?

[Havel] As far as I know, newspapers are in the hands of journalists and it is, therefore, up to them what they print. It is conceivable that someone from the outside may be pressuring them not to publish this or that, and I would not be surprised if this were the case. But, again, it is up to the journalists whether they succumb to a possible pressure or not.

[Goetzova] You have informed the public about your personal assets and you advocate the adoption of a law that would make this incumbent upon all constitutional officials. Should this law also pertain to politicians' income? And should the financing of political parties not be made transparent as well?

[Havel] I do not dare assess which officials should be obliged to disclose the sources of their income or their property in general, to what extent they should do so, and in which form. I only know that there should be some law regulating those things. Such a law would unquestionably clear the air. In a situation characterized by such an unprecedented transformation of proprietary relations, the very suspicion that some state officials might be exploiting this in their own favor should be eliminated in this way. This legal provision should be part of a law on conflicts of interest. As a matter of fact, I cannot imagine a law on conflicts of interest that would not contain this provision. I would like to say one more thing about this: I would not object in the least if an entrepreneurial genius became a parliamentary deputy, for example. The presence of geniuses would certainly do no harm to our parliament. I would object very strongly, however, if someone became a successful entrepreneur only because he is a parliamentary deputy.

[Goetzova] Your former collaborator Jan Bednar has published [in Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 3 September] an extensive critical essay about you. Would you acknowledge that he might be right in some regard?

[Havel] First of all, I must say that I cannot get rid of the feeling that the article was written by some other Jan Bednar than the one I know. Everything that is claimed by the Bednar who wrote the article runs totally counter to what used to be said by the Bednar I know. Whether the Bednar who wrote that article is right on some points is really hard for me to assess because the gist of his assertions is that I have a bad character and that I am not suited for the presidency. Such things should really be assessed by someone else.

[Goetzova] Has fame not gone to your head?

[Havel] I had a cogent reply ready to that question but my spokesman, Mr. Spacek, did not recommend that I say that. Which bears out that I am not surrounded only by yes-men, as the Bednar who wrote the article contends.

[Goetzova] What is the cause of the decline of the citizens' confidence in the president, in your opinion?

[Havel] There are surely many different reasons for that. A certain role among them is played, unquestionably, also by the fact that, from time to time, he says unpopular things.

Defense Minister Discusses Military Intelligence

AU1509170593 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Sep p 2

[Interview with Defense Minister Antonin Baudys by Jaroslav Kmenta; place and date not given: "Secret Services Were Cleansed, Baudys Says"]

[Text] Prague—Defense Minister Antonin Baudys stated that according to his sources no one is preparing any hostile actions against the Czech Republic. "The intelligence services collect information on, among other things, whether foreign armies conduct exercises that could signal a preparation in progress for hostile actions aimed against us. Thank the Lord, no one is preparing any such actions" the defense minister said in an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES.

[Kmenta] What are the tasks, other than the aforementioned, of the military espionage units [rozvedka]?

[Baudys] In peacetime, it must obtain information on foreign armies, their hardware, morale, training, and that in the so-called regions of special interest—above all, in Central Europe. If mobilization is announced, military espionage units activate their forward troops.

[Kmenta] How many of these espionage unit forward troops does the Czech Republic have at its disposal?

[Baudys] There are not many. It is an elite unit one battalion strong.

[Kmenta] With which countries does our intelligence [zpravodajstvi] cooperate?

[Baudys] We have very good relations with Germany, Poland, Austria, Great Britain, the United States, and France. They are our key partners.

[Kmenta] Have there been any instances of these countries using information from the Czech military intelligence service?

[Baudys] Of course, I cannot specify which information was used but anybody looking at the map of Europe can see that the Czech Republic is precisely in the center of Europe and therefore can be a suitable site for a certain monitoring or collection of important data.

[Kmenta] What will you say about the personnel of the military espionage units?

[Baudys] By 1 August, 51 percent of former staff had left the espionage units. There are completely new people in the leading posts. All our military air attaches abroad have been replaced. The post of a military air attache is a diplomatic appointment. This open intelligence source assesses exclusively military information in the country of appointment. Of the total of 30 positions of military air attaches, 11 were abolished in concordance with the new orientation of the republic. Of the 107 employees who were stationed abroad in 1989, only 49 are abroad now. Most of them are new people.

[Kmenta] In addition to the espionage units, there is in the Army the Military Defense Intelligence (VOZ), the so-called counterespionage. How did this unit get through the post-November [1989] changes?

[Baudys] The Military Defense Intelligence, the former Military Counterespionage, employed 930 professional soldiers. This year, however, a dramatic cleansing took place here. Of the 930 employees, only 73 worked in the

VOZ on 1 January [as published]. A new stage in the reorganization was launched on 1 September. The VOZ collects and analyzes information protecting the ministry and the Army against the operation of foreign intelligence services, deters potential criminal activities in the Army (sale of information, damage to computer systems) and, of course, guards against classified information leaks from the Defense Ministry and the Army.

Foreign Minister Interviewed on Regional Issues

AU1509115693 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 14 Sep 93 p 10

[Interview with Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec by Ivan Scipiades; place and date not given: "Interview With Czech Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec on NATO and Visegrad—Confidence Is More Useful Than Demands and Threats"]

[Text] For the Czech Republic, which enjoys a security almost like that of Switzerland, NATO membership is not as urgent as for the other Central European countries. Czech Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec, who held talks with his Hungarian counterpart in Budapest last weekend, says that it is only the angle of the view that is different at the shores of the Vltava and the Danube; the tone in Hungary is only stronger because of the elections in 1994. In connection with the Visegrad [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland] cooperation, Zieleniec warns the participants lest they want to use this group as a means to their own regional politics. If Visegrad only deals with those issues that are in the interest of all four countries, then the democratic government changes will not shake it, he said, referring to the Polish elections at the weekend. Otherwise, even the daily political changes will cause a problem, Zieleniec says.

[Scipiades] After Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's visit at the beginning of September, when he talked to the Hungarian prime minister on the occasion of the Budapest meeting of the European conservative party leaders, the Hungarian readers may again ask whether the Czech view on NATO membership is also different from that of the other Central European countries and the Czechs do not want to act together with the Visegrad group on this issue, either. Are the differences of view indeed so big?

[Zieleniec] In my view, they are not. I feel that if we want to see differences by any means, then we will see them. The issue of membership in NATO is perfectly clear. If you look at the program of the four coalition parties, the Prague government's program, and the foreign policy concept accepted by our parliament, and if you analyze our steps, you can see that Czech foreign policy is explicitly directed toward integration with the West. Joining the European security structures, including NATO is also clearly declared in this. It is natural that Hungary is having a much more lively debate on this at the moment than we are. The reason is very simple, it is enough to look at the map and see that the region of the former Soviet Union is on one side and the area of the former Yugoslavia on the other. The issue of security can be perceived as present in public debates. This does not mean that our two states have a different approach, only the angle of view is different. In a geopolitical sense, Poland's position is also slightly different from that of the Czech Republic. However, I clearly state that I cannot imagine Hungary and Poland joining NATO and the Czech Republic not doing so.

[Scipiades] It is not the intention to join that is doubted. However, after the meeting of the Czech and Hungarian prime ministers, talking to journalists, Klaus appeared to be worried about the possible existence of some kind of cooperation between Poland and Hungary concerning NATO. As if Prague would not like such coordination.

[Zieleniec] This is only your guess-work. I am talking about the line taken by the whole Czech government coalition, which is also laid down in official documents. It is these that must be looked at and one must not speculate on sentence fragments of statements made in special circumstances.

[Scipiaes] The Czech Republic is not close to any sources of tension, it is not bordered by the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, rather, its situation can even be compared to that of Switzerland, which means that it can feel to be safe regardless of whether it is a member of NATO—on the other hand, NATO membership would cost much because the armed forces would have to be modernized. Is this why Prague does not want to urge membership in NATO?

[Zieleniec] This is a mistaken conclusion. The security of this region is important for all the states in the area. I was only talking about the nuances that can be perceived in public debates and the reasons for the slight differences. It also has to be taken into consideration that the elections are getting closer in Hungary, therefore, the statements are louder and more pointed. We had the same situation before the elections last year.

[Scipiades] So these minor differences do not disturb joint action by Prague and Budapest on the issue of NATO membership?

[Zileleniec] We do not have to work together on every issue. The point is to cooperate in such a way that helps us achieve the goal. An alliance—this is what we are talking about in connection with NATO—is a special type of relationship. This is a much more important relationship than economic, trade, or any other. It means that, in a certain situation, the citizens of one country enter an armed fight for the interests of another country. They might die for the interests of another country. This is a very important obligation. This is why I am not convinced that joining NATO is a matter of signing a piece of paper. Building relations of alliance is a long process because a confidential relationship has to be established in which both sides are convinced that their values are identical and they are prepared to fight for these values. For this reason, we are convinced that this kind of alliance can be established through creating the necessary links between the states and the armies; in other words, it is more useful to establish confidence than to knock on the door, or to make demands of threats (for example, if NATO does not accept us, then we will form another NATO).

[Scipiades] According to one of the information sheets issued on your talks in Budapest, you made statements that appear to be more in favor of the Visegrad cooperation than Klaus is.

[Zieleniec] I do not understand why journalists always have to search for differences of views—it is not only the Hungarian journalists who do this, the Czechs are the same. No two people are the same. Everyone has a different way of expressing himself. As for Visegrad, this group was created in a state of the common position of feeling threatened because the Soviet Union still existed then. Now that the danger is no longer so great, we have to find something on which we can base our cooperation. Something that is our common interest. The free trade zone that also has a political aspect is typically one of these. Trade links are the best point of connection on which political integration can be based. What we must not do is to include such things in the cooperation that are only in the interest of one country rather than all four, or that are part of bilateral relations like the Slovak-Hungarian problems. These have to be solved on a bilateral basis. This or that country cannot see Visegrad as a means to its regional politics in a particular issue. As soon as we begin to deal with our own particular or bilateral problems, we will destroy Visegrad. Therefore, we have to develop it with patience and we must not demand more from Visegrad than what it can give, and we must not get offended if someone does not want to include some kind of problem in the cooperation because it is not found to be a common interest. If we keep getting offended and keep trying to find out why a particular country does not want something, then we will never come to an agreement and we will indeed be the area of quarrels already seen as such by the West sometimes. This is not true though, there are very many things that we can do together.

[Scipiades] If the left wing wins at the Polish elections at the weekend or it returns to power in some form, will this endanger the Visegrad cooperation? Such views do exist.

[Zieleniec] It depends on what problems Visegrad is dealing with. If a government decides that a particular problem is not a common issue, then it can withdraw from the cooperation. However, there will be very many common problems as long as these countries have democratic systems. I do not believe that the free trade zone will cease to be a common interest whatever the result of the elections are in any country of the Visegrad group. However, if we want much more from Visegrad, then all such changes—not only elections but any daily political change—will cause problems.

Politicians React to Statement by Klaus

AU1409174593 Prague CTK in English 1707 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 11 (CTK)—The deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), Libor Kudlacek, said today that he could see nothing bad in the natural effort of political parties to make themselves visible and to submit their proposals to solve all-society problems.

But it is necessary to discern between the content of the effort and its form because the latter must be maximally decent and correct, said Kudlacek in today's regular television programme on events of the past week.

He was reacting to Premier Vaclav Klaus' statement at a press conference of his Civic Democratic Party (ODS) on Thursday [9 September]. He expressed serious concern about the situation on the domestic political scene and denounced the assertion of partial interests to the detriment of the interests of the whole.

Jan Kasal, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL), said that the premier was reacting to the situation as it had developed over the past few days when individual parties were trying to assert in solving specific problems those parts of their election programmes which they believe should be asserted.

Igor Nemec (ODS), minister without portfolio and head of the Government Office, said that the problem mentioned by Klaus did not rest that much in differences of opinions, but it is rather linked to the need for partnership relations between the government coalition parties.

The coalition comprises the ODS, the ODA, the KDU-CSL and the Christian Democratic Party (KDS).

Jan Krycer, chairman of the parliamentary Self-Governing Movement for Moravia and Silesia (HSDMS, 14 out of a total of 200 seats in the parliament), said that Klaus' words targeted rather the coalition, not all political parties and movements.

The coalition is capable of reaching consensus at the moment when it opposes the non-government parties in the parliament, he said.

Krycer pointed out that the interests of the coalition parties and the interests of citizens as a whole were not identical.

The coalition parties are currently solving a number of urgent problems, including transformation of the Prosecutor General's Office into a State Attorney's Office, possible dismissal of Prosecutor General Jiri Setina, who had stated inaccurate and incomplete data to obtain a communal apartment, restitution of church property, and many others.

Parliament Rejects Customs Law Amendment

LD1509142493 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] The Chamber of Deputies rejected an amendment to the customs law at its 12th session today. Hence, the original legal measure is still in force. This means that the deputies are not subjected to any customs checks when crossing the state border.

The deputies accepted the resignation of Karel Kuehnl, member of the Czech Television Council, who has been appointed ambassador of the Czech Republic to Great Britain.

The deputies also accepted the resignation of Daniel Korte, chairman of the Czech Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, and the resignation of (Jaroslav Pochman), member of the Czech Radio Council.

KDS Signs Cooperation Agreement With KAN

LD1509165793 Prague CTK in English 1624 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sept 15 (CTK)—The coalition Christian Democratic Party (KDS) signed a partnership agreement on cooperation with the Club of Committed Non-Party Members (KAN) today.

The KDS considered this move extraordinary, not only because it values the political significance of the KAN very highly but also because the agreement concludes the two parties' talks which began in 1990, KDS Chairman Vaclav Benda told journalists after the signing.

KAN Deputy Chairman Jiri Machac said that the movement has been seeking the unification of right-leaning political forces in the Czech Republic since 1990, and its long-lasting efforts at finding a mediator culminated with the conclusion of this agreement.

KDS Deputy Chairman Miroslav Tyl said that the document provided for tight cooperation of both political parties on all levels. Benda added that the two parties have also agreed to closely cooperate in the municipal elections scheduled for next year as well as in senatorial elections.

The KDS has similar partnership agreements with several other political movements, Benda said, adding that the agreement signed today changed nothing in the KDS' tight cooperation with the ruling Civic Democratic Party and within the ODS-KDS coalition.

Moravcik Interviewed on Visegrad, NATO

AU1309202693 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Sep 93 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik by Leopold Moravcik; place and date not given: "It Is Necessary To Meet and Hold Discussions"]

[Text] A symposium of ministers of foreign affairs and defense from the Central European region dedicated to problems of security was held in Vienna on Tuesday and Wednesday [7 and 8 September]. Slovakia was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik, who granted PRAVDA an interview upon his return from Vienna.

[Leopold Moravcik] Minister, with what ideas did you depart for Vienna and with what findings and feelings, have you returned?

[Jozef Moravcik] I did not expect much from this symposium because it did not have a firm agenda; only a topic. The objective was to meet at a relatively high level and freely discuss the problems of Central Europe. But whereas originally I had been rather skeptical about this undertaking, after the first part I changed my opinion somewhat. The symposium confirmed that it is necessary to meet, to discuss problems openly, and to exchange viewpoints, all of which contributes to a rapprochement of views. I was surprised by the highly sophisticated course of the entire event and I appreciate the fact that individual countries were raising issues of a primarily long-term nature. People who think in terms of longer-term perspectives are able to rise above existing petty problems. That is why I greatly appreciate the speech made by Hungarian Minister [of Foreign Affairs] Jeszenszky, in which he emphasized specifically those longer-term perspectives. Our present problems assume a completely different dimension, because their solution is inevitable precisely in order to attain those long-term objectives [sentence as published].

[Leopold Moravcik] The media devoted considerable attention to Professor Brzezinski's speech, particularly to his proposal to set up a "Euro-Atlantic coalition." Is this to be a substitute for NATO?

[Jozef Moravcik] Professor Brzezinski did not participate in the symposium itself, only in a working lunch at which he presented his theses. As regards his proposal, I see in it a certain possibility of creating in some countries a specific regime vis-a-vis NATO, that is, a certain transitional stage on the road toward full membership.

[Leopold Moravcik] Interesting in this regard is the recent statement by Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka that, if NATO does not clarify its attitude toward the countries of Eastern and Central Europe soon, these countries will have to consider another alternative of their defense. Are Suchocka's concepts in agreement with what Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined?

[Jozef Moravcik] For the time being we do not precisely know what the Polish prime minister meant by the creation of some other alternative, for no one has analyzed her words in detail yet. In my opinion, she wanted, above all, to clearly accentuate the political interest in becoming integrated into the zone of stability and prosperity and to strongly appeal to NATO to really start consistently and more responsibly analyzing the situation in the wake of the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. I see in her statement predominantly this aspect, which resounded also at the symposium.

[Leopold Moravcik] Until recently, fears of a possible Russian reaction represented a great obstacle to the integration of former Warsaw Pact states into NATO. During his recent visit to Poland and the Czech Republic, President Yeltsin expressed agreement with these countries' integration into NATO. Have also the chances of the Slovak Republic changed after Yeltsin's statements?

[Jozef Moravcik] A similar statement—though not publicly, but during the official talks—was made by the Russian president also with regard to Slovakia. As far as the Slovak Republic is concerned, it can be said unequivocally, and we stressed this also at the symposium, that, the same as the other countries, also Slovakia has a clearly defined orientation as regards NATO membership. So far, none of the countries of this pact has suggested to us a different approach. If Chancellor Kohl's recent statement in Budapest [where he mentioned only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as candidates for NATO membership] ended up on a different note, I must refer to an article by German Defense Minister Ruehe, in which he gave consideration to the integration of the entire Visegrad Four [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland]. Also my talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinkel pointed unequivocally in this direction.

[Leopold Moravcik] Nevertheless, in several recent statements or newspaper articles discussing the admission of new members into NATO, there was no mention of the Slovak Republic. Is this a case of ignorance of geography or do the authors of these statements and articles know more than we do?

[Jozef Moravcik] I must say unequivocally that no one from the official representatives of member countries or from the NATO headquarters has ever stated that a different approach would be applied to Slovakia than to other member countries of the Visegrad Four. Of course, viewpoints expressed in the press must not leave us indifferent. That is why we have worked out a certain plan for our rapprochement with NATO. Several events that we would like to organize, alone or in cooperation with NATO, are part of this plan.

Moravcik Receives Dutch Foreign Minister

LD1509140493 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Jozef Moravcik met Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Kooijmans of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Bratislava today. Peter Kooijmans is on an official visit in the Slovak republic. The two officials discussed international issues of common interest to their countries and the state of bilateral relations. The ministers expressed their resolve to support the process of European integration by respecting the principles of democracy, freedom, human rights, and other relevant norms of international law.

Today, the Dutch guest is expected to meet the parliament speaker, prime minister, and members of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak republic. Ivo Kunsch has more details.

[Kunsch] Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik and his Dutch counterpart Peter Kooijmans discussed international issues of common interest to their countries and the state of bilateral relations. The two ministers expressed their resolve to support the process of European integration by respecting the principles of democracy and freedom and observing human rights.

The two partners agreed to meet regularly to exchange their views on the development of mutual relations and the fulfillment of bilateral agreements. The ministers will cooperate in implementing disarmament agreements and consult issues related to the control of conventional weapons and disarmament. They plan to cooperate in implementing the existing agreements, like for instance the Agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna document of 1992, and the Open Skies Agreement.

Ministers Moravcik and Kooijmans are satisfied with the cooperation between the two countries in the framework of the Dutch bilateral program of assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

At a meeting with members of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Minister Kooijmans talked about the principles of Holland's foreign assistance to Slovakia. It will be carried out in two levels. The first one is economic, and the second one is a number of planned projects with the aim to set up democratic institutions for building a law-abiding state in Slovakia.

Let me say in this connection that an agreement between the Associations of Judges of Slovakia and Holland was signed yesterday.

Courses will be organized for our judges at which they will be retrained with the aim of helping to build a law-abiding state in Slovakia. In the foreseeable future, the Kingdom of Netherlands intends to open its embassy in Bratislava which will speed up the process of cooperation.

Kovac, Kooijmans Meet

LD1509213493 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] In Bratislava today Slovak President Michal Kovac received Peter Kooijmans, minister of foreign affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Michal Kovac assured the Dutch minister that it is the Slovak Republic's irreversible wish to become a member of the EC, the Western European Union, and NATO.

With regard to [national] minorities, Michal Kovac stressed that on the basis of recommendations from the Council of Europe, Slovakia is ready to meet all those demands made by the minorities which are not based on irredentism and which would not alter Slovakia's territorial integrity. Any hints at a change of borders are taken by the president as dangerous.

Following the talks with Michal Kovac, the Dutch foreign minister left from Bratislava.

Joint Declaration Signed

LD1509215393 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik and his Dutch counterpart, Peter Kooijmans, signed a joint declaration in Bratislava today. Both parties state their interest in further developing Slovak-Dutch cooperation in many areas.

Peter Kooijmans has ended his two-day visit to Slovakia. He met with President Michal Kovac, Speaker of parliament Ivan Gasparovic, and Premier Meciar.

Reporter Faces Imprisonment if Guilty of Meciar Libel

AU1509145193 Prague CTK in English 1740 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava/Kosice Sep 13 (CTK)—Karel Hirman, CTK's Kosice reporter, faces up to two years of imprisonment if found guilty of the libel charge which Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar is filing against him for allegedly distorting the premier's Sep 3 speech on Romanies.

Slovak Deputy Prosecutor General Ludovit Krupa told CTK today that Meciar's lawsuit, received on Friday [10 September], requested an investigation into whether there was a case to answer for the crime of libel according to Article 206. The prosecutor general had given the affair to the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Kosice to decide.

Krupa said that if a case was found to exist, then charges would be pressed against Hirman. If the Prosecutor's Office does not find that a crime was committed, Meciar has the option of filing a suit in a civil court for reasons of protection of personal dignity, but this then has nothing to do with the Prosecutor's Office, he said.

In an interview today for Slovak Radio's Radio East regional broadcast, Meciar repeated what he said on Saturday in an interview for the regional newspaper LUC, that two weeks before his Sep 3 speech, Slovak organs had been told that an information campaign to harm the country's reputation abroad was about to start.

The worst thing is that two weeks before the attack on the rabbi in Bratislava by skinheads shouting anti-Jewish slogans and before the CTK affair broke out, we were warned to expect another attack from the media, Meciar said today.

He said it exceeded the limits of freedom and democracy, when an editor put words in the mouth of a premier which he had never said, adding that it amounted to libeling a head of state. If he does this with the aim of damaging the name of the state, then I have to defend myself, not because of Meciar, but because of the state, Meciar said. At the end of the interview he stressed that he did not intend to tolerate things which harmed the state.

HZDS Official Denies Existence of Factions

AU1509135693 Prague CTK in English 1701 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Bratislava Sep 13 (CTK)—There are no factions within the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), but there is always the possibility that certain opinion platforms could crystalise in the future, said chairman of the party's deputies' club Ivan Laluha in an interview with Slovak Radio today.

The HZDS, he said could unite civil and democratic nationally oriented streams in a cooperative effort advantageous to Slovakia. He said the HZDS could remain in the form of a movement up until the elections, although it was problematic when the elections will be.

Laluha justified his participation in the international congress Slovakia Today and in the Future - A Call for Social Democracy, organised this weekend by the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), by his interest in problems faced by social-democratically oriented parties and movements.

Laluha said that regarding the mature transformational system, it is unclear whether a political system along the lines of that in the USA—that is, two large political parties to the right and to the left—will develop in Slovakia, or whether the classic European tripartite will be reproduced—three conservative, liberal and social democratic parties. He said he believed that developments in Slovakia were moving in the direction of the second possibility.

As a governing movement, he said the HZDS must often deviate pragmatically from its original programme so that after the building of the market system, it would be able to return to social factors, he said.

Antall To Receive Medical Treatment

LD1509153093 Budapest MTI in English 1353 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 15 (MTI)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall will receive medical treatment in Hungary, says a communique from the prime minister's press office on Wednesday.

The communique responds to a report in the Hungarian daily NEPSZABADSAG on Wednesday, quoting an article by Tibor Fenyi, the Budapest correspondent for Vienna paper DIE PRESSE, in which Fenyi supposed Antall would "probably" be treated in Germany.

A statement by Professor Gyorgy Nemeth, head of the medical team treating Antall, was publicized on September 9. The statement read, "In the opinion of the medical team, continuously checking the prime minister's condition (non-Hodgkin lymphoma), in the coming months, Jozsef Antall will be absent from work on scheduled periods of 4-5 days due to treatment."

Goncz Receives Chinese Vice Premier Zou Ziahua

LD1509142893 Budapest MTI in English 1326 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 15 (MTI)—Hungary's economy seeks to stand on several legs, and the Pacific region, including China, may have an important role in that, said Hungarian president Arpad Goncz at talks with Chinese Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua on Wednesday.

Goncz welcomed China's participation in Hungarian projects, like founding JVs [joint ventures] and investing capital, and called for an expansion of the Chinese presence in those fields. He said Hungary's economy was capable of meeting China's orders and was ready to take part in Chinese modernization by supplying goods and sharing experience.

Zou said China attached great importance to developing economic ties with Hungary, with his visit aimed at expanding cooperation and concluding concrete business agreements.

Boross, Zou Discuss Issues

LD1509152393 Budapest MTI in English 1404 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 15 (MTI)—Hungarian Interior Minister Peter Boross met Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jiahua in parliament on Wednesday and forwarded greetings from Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. Both sides attached great importance to developing economic ties based on mutual advantage. They signed an air traffic agreement.

Hungarian Finance Minister Ivan Szabo, also present at the talks, along with China's ambassador to Hungary, expressed the hope that the two countries would soon sign an animal health agreement.

The boost in bilateral economic ties could be seen in trade for the first six months this year, which reached nearly $62 million, or the same as the total trade for 1992. In the past three years, Chinese state-owned companies have invested nearly $30 million in Hungary.

Finally, Boross and Zou surveyed security issues for east-central Europe and stressed the importance of stability.

Parliament Speaker, Zou Meet

LD1509133293 Budapest MTI in English 1212 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 15 (MTI)—Hungarian Parliament Speaker Gyorgy Szabad met Chinese Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua and his delegation on Wednesday.

Szabad told the guests that Hungary monitored with great attention the transformation in China, in the course of which traditions were blended with modernization.

Zou said, beyond intensifying friendship between the two nations, the visit was aimed at developing economic, trading, technological and scientific cooperation, based on equality and mutual advantage.

He spoke appreciatively of the progress of the Hungarian transformation. Also present at the talks was Hungarian Finance Minister Ivan szabo.

Zou Comments

LD1609045593 Budapest MTI in English 1850 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 15 (MTI)—Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Zou Jiahua described his visit to Hungary as successful, speaking to journalists tonight, and told them China expected a major upswing in trade with Hungary in the next few years.

Although recent accounting changes brought a drop in turnover, this trend has reversed. In the first half of 1993, two-way trade was larger than in the same period last year, Zou Jiahua added. Different styles of development need not mean cool relations. China respects the choice of the Hungarian people, said Zou.

The Chinese economy is growing at a rapid but uneven pace, he went on, making direct state intervention unavoidable. Right now, China had to lay emphasis on developing its energy and transport systems. The economy is being transformed and the private sector is gaining ground in some fields, for instance the catering and other service industries. The central government, however, has these processes under firm control, he concluded.

Zou Jiahua will leave Hungary on Thursday morning.

Goncz Warns of Election Period Economic Collapse

LD1509142793 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] [Announcer] Arpad Goncz opened the General Assembly of the National Federation of Hungarian Industrialists. The president of the republic said that economic issues should be divorced from politics, because if this is not achieved, the Hungarian economy could collapse during the six months of the election campaign. Andras Svaby has the details;

[Svaby] In his opening speech, Arpad Goncz emphasized that the tasks of the state in the economy have to be separated. According to the president of the republic, the priority of the state is to guarantee conditions for the industry to get to the market. As he said, the eastern markets have to be reconquered, all the more, because Hungarian products, which are impossible to sell anywhere else, perhaps, are still needed in the East. New markets also have to be opened up in Latin America and the Far East, Arpad Goncz said.

In his opinion, it can not be excluded that the election campaign will be wild and fierce but, he added, the economic sector somehow has to be, by all means, separated from politics. If this is not achieved, said the president of the republic, during the six months of the election campaign, the economy could be totally crippled.

Gabor Szeles, chairman of the Federation of Industrialists, talked about the relation between the organization and the ministries. Relations are particularly bad with the Trade and Industry Ministry and State Property Agency. The federation, he said, made several proposals on how to create a modern market structure and they dealt with privatization a great deal also, however, their hard work always ended up in the waste paper basket, the ministries did not want their studies. According to Gabor Szeles, only a miracle, or perhaps expertise can save the Hungarian economy.

Jeszenszky: Consulates Needed in Romania

LD1409231793 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1830 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by unidentified correspondent in unidentified office; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] There are always great expectations before Romanian-Hungarian meetings. The expectation is greatest among the Hungarians in Transylvania, for it is their existence that is at stake to some extent, when the politicians decide on the two countries' bilateral relations. Was it historical or political necessity that brought about this meeting?

[Jeszenszky] The starting point must be not only that Romania is our second largest neighbor but also that the second largest Hungarian community lives in Romania. Thus, in our bilateral relations, the Hungarians in Romania, in and outside Transylvania, are an extraordinarily important element. Naturally, it is not the only element. Interstate relations have very important economic and cultural aspects. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] I quote from Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's interview in NEPSZABADSAG today. In it he dismisses the reopening of the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj, which had been closed and remained so despite constant requests for its reopening, by saying that there are not so many Hungarian citizens in Romania, there are not so many travelling there for them to need this consulate. On the other hand, there are not so many Germans travelling there either, but still the German Consulate has been opened in Sibiu.

[Jeszenszky] Even less Americans travel regularly to Romania but nonetheless, as far as I know, the opening of an American mission in Cluj-Napoca is on the agenda. [passage omitted]

I think that these reasons, not only prior to 1989 but for decades earlier, justified the need for consulates in Cluj-Napoca and in other Romanian and Transylvanian towns, are even stronger today. Thus, opposition to this is an artificially created fear, I do not even know whether it is really shared by many people and if we take seriously our wish to ease existing political tensions through economic relations, which is a very legitimate and good intention, then it is not only one chief consulate, the Cluj one that we need, but many consulates.

Therefore, I also see promising things in Foreign Minister Melescanu's statement, by the way, this statement in NEPSZABADSAG is also a promising one in that we should open consulates elsewhere. I think that it is very important, that in the traditional capital and in the center of economic life and geographical focus of Transylvania, there should be missions. However, I do not see any obstacle, indeed I see it as desirable, that wherever there is significant Hungarian interest, or in regions where the residents of Hungary have relatives, there should be some kind of Hungarian mission. [passage omitted]

Chances of Minority Government, Premature Elections

AU1509110993 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Sep 93 p 6

[Editorial by Lajos Bodnar: "Minority Cabinet?"]

[Text] The public does not have to be scared of a hot autumn because the coalition's parliamentary majority is melting fast, even at room temperature. Almost every week, one or two government party deputies announce that they would like to sit in another parliamentary group. Even at the highest level, the possibility of minority government and premature elections is being considered.

The coalition's reliable support, namely the leadership of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] has also quickly reacted to the seemingly irreversible process by saying that they accept all the responsibilities of a minority government. Naturally, when the majority is reduced to two in a parliament, it is time to assess the situation. The deputy chairman of the KDNP was not late in stating that his party takes Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's statement seriously when he says that he is not willing to govern in minority. In an interview over the weekend, Finance Minister Ivan Szabo said that the coalition partner's statement was part of the election campaign. However, let us quickly add that we could search in vain for the coalition's second violinist part in the constitutional musical score. If, as he promised, Jozsef Antall resigns from the government, which finds itself in the minority, or he comes to the same decision because of increasingly frequent medical treatments, governmental responsibility will not be left to his coalition partners as some kind of ancestral property, neither to the KDNP, nor the smallholders-36 group. The Constitution is clear: The government's mandate expires when the prime minister resigns. New cards must be dealt.

It is true that the Cabinet will formally remain in office until the new government is formed. However, it would be, at best, a caretaker government rather than a minority government. It would have significantly limited rights, and would act as some kind of key-keeper, a "responsible guardian" of the executive power. It can manage the affairs but not deal with big politics. Of the sweet burdens of governmental responsibility, it cannot, for example, freely make regulations nor sign international agreements. This unfortunate situation will not come about if the majority of deputies, in order to prevent a government crisis, successfully use the institution of constructive no-confidence. In this case, when the government is defeated, the parliament can at the same time elect a new prime minister.

Although anything is possible in politics, within the current chaotic parliamentary conditions, no one can really know when the government will lapse into minority status. What we definitely cannot know is what the prime minister would see as being in minority. The mere fact that the proportion of coalition deputies falls below 50 percent does not automatically increase the power of the opposition. There are many independents who hesitate and loyalists who have been expelled from a parliamentary group. In addition, for want of anything better, Csurka's faction, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP], can also act as a safety valve. Rumors that the opposition has won too much with the recent place changes of deputies also has some basis. It is not in the opposition's interest to force a spectacular overturn of the government at the end of the session. This would immediately mean premature elections. Thus, many say, the opposition would let the 1994 budget pass through Parliament (by staying away or abstaining), although it would not vote for it. This, as we know, is a vote of confidence in, at best, a moral sense, rather than in a political sense.

According to others, early elections would not cause a big trauma for the opposition, society, or the economy. For this reason, at least two versions of the political scenario are being prepared in the workshops of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], one for long-term and one for the short- term. The idea of minority government is no longer alien to many members of the Cabinet. They think that this might still bring returns in the election campaign because we do not have a media law. It still seems possible to ensure a parliamentary majority through occasional political deals. It is true that the MIEP believes it can be the decisive factor in parliamentary voting in the few months left. The SZDSZ-FIDESZ duo probably will not accept any more delegates from the other parties, therefore, paradoxically, it will help the sinking flagship of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF].

Therefore, minority government has a chance. It must however be taken into consideration that, in addition to causing numerical changes, a reduction in the majority will also have serious consequences that could affect the coalition's political make-up. It cannot be in anyone's interest for chaos to rule.

[President] Arpad Goncz is meeting the chairman of the National Elections Committee in the next few days. This might not be by accident. It is the sole right of the president of the republic to call elections. The political situation and momentary condition of the parliamentary majority cannot be ignored if a wise decision is to be made.

It is time to coordinate the constitutional scenarios. Until then we should keep the voting ballots dry!

Walesa Vows To Dissolve Parliament if SLD Wins

AU1609101293 Warsaw PAP in English 2057 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 15—President Lech Walesa, responding today to the opinions of listeners of the RMF Krakow radio station that he would have to dissolve parliament and force his own solutions if the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) wins the September 19 parliamentary elections, said:

"Do you think that I am naive and that I would expose Poland to any danger? I will bring victory to Poland, together with you, just listen to me a bit. I cannot say anything more. Keep calm. Nobody is threatened by anybody. Walesa has his eyes wide open."

Asked whether, in case the left wins the elections, he should not subordinate himself to the election results, Walesa said: "If I do so, you will have to put a tank next to your house because this house will be burnt down." The president added that he holds everything together with what is left of his strength and the circumstances in which Poland found itself are very difficult and dangerous.

Asked what actions he would take in the face of the destabilization of the country, the president said: "If the communists make mistakes today they will be brutally and ruthlessly squared up with. Let them go ahead and publicize their ideas, if they want, let them win so that they can suffer a defeat as great as it can ever be."

Referring to the ceremony of repatriating the ashes of General Wladyslaw Sikorski to Poland, Walesa said: "I implemented the will of the deceased and I did what should have been done. We have our national heroes at home at last. In connection with that we hear about a Polish little hell once again ..."

"I ask whether as a nation we are guilty of that. I think that we are and we are not. We happen to live in such conditions. The geopolitical location of Poland led to the fact that we have been betrayed, sold up ... Those who are more clever have to restrict this hell and I have a request to the intelligentsia and intellectuals: Build the nation in a patriotic manner, begin to educate the nation on a big scale.

"We have to get rid of everything that geopolitics imposed on us because otherwise we will be losing a lot, destroying a lot. All great Polish heroes, like Kosciuszko or Pilsudski, have been called traitors, and we are not allowed to do that. We are incapable of fighting for our leaders. How feebly we are fighting for Katyn and a full explanation of Sikorski's death. So many other things are being done wrong," said the president.

Promises To Accept Results

LD1609135793 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1005 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] [Announcer] In an interview given to the Polish Radio Third Program, President Lech Walesa, among other things, replied to a question of his possible refusal to accept the election results.

[Begin recording] [Walesa] It cannot be like this, I must respect democracy. On the other hand, I will refuse to accept any victory other than that of pluralism, democracy, a free market economy. If someone wants to change anything in this respect, then I will not recognize him and I will fight against him.

[Correspondent] So the acceptance [of the election results] may be a temporary one?

[Walesa] I must respect democracy, because I am a democrat. But the programmatic implementation is a different matter; I will not let anyone abandon our reforms, or what I have been struggling for 25 years for. I shall be resolute in this respect. [end recording]

[Announcer] These were excerpts of the interview which President Lech Walesa gave to the Polish Radio Third Program.

Envoy: Russian View of NATO Membership 'Misunderstood'

LD1509205993 Warsaw PAP in English 2027 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 15—Russian Ambassador to Poland Yuriy Kashlev said on Wednesday [15 September] that the declaration of the Russian side on Poland's possible NATO membership was "oversimplified and misunderstood" by the mass media.

Addressing journalists in Warsaw, Kashlev said that it cannot be said that President Yeltsin "agreed" to Poland's NATO membership because Poland is a sovereign state and Warsaw's decisions are not made in Moscow any more.

Kashlev explained that the Polish-Russian declaration refers to Poland's joining NATO in a longer perspective, under the general process of European integration and it makes it clear that this is not against the interests of other states.

He admitted that he was surprised hearing some Polish politicians talk about joining NATO as soon as possible because this needs considerable financial outlays and overcoming the differences in armaments. "If the West finds that this process can be sped up, it is up to Poland and NATO." However he expressed the opinion that it will not happen very soon.

KPN Calls on Right To Unite Against Communists

LD1509185893 Warsaw PAP in English 1729 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 15—The Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) appealed to leaders of rightist and centre-of-right parties to unite their efforts since there is a possibility of the electoral victory of post-communists, Deputy Chairman of the Confederation Krzysztof Krol told a press conference in Warsaw on Wednesday [15 September].

The KPN forwarded the appeal to the Christian National Union (ZCHN), Conservative Party (PK), Centre Alliance (PC), the Movement for the Republic of Poland (RDR), the Movement for the Third Republic of Poland (RTR), the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL) and the Peasant-Christian Party (SLCH) and asked them to call on their electorate to vote on only one chosen party of the above mentioned. "If you do not reach such an agreement, we appeal to sympathizers of those parties to vote on the KPN," KPN representatives said.

KPN leader Leszek Moczulski warned that the victory of post-communists will mean a come-back to the previous system, to rule of minority over majority.

Wages Up 2.4 Percent, Prices Up 2.3 Percent

LD1509184693 Warsaw PAP in English 1714 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 15—The average monthly pay in the six sectors of national economy amounted to slightly over 4 million zlotys (200 USD) in August and grew by 2.4 per cent in comparison to July 1993, the Central Statistical Office (GUS) reported Wednesday.

simultaneously, the prices of consumer goods and services increased by 2.3 per cent, GUS said.

Also the prices of U.S. dollars grew considerably last month. According to GUS the devaluation of the zloty introduced in August had no great effect on the average monthly exchange rate of the dollar.

The average exchange rate in the NBP central bank amounted in August to 18,538 zlotys to a dollar and was higher by 3 per cent as compared to July.

Data released by GUS indicate that the number of the registered jobless grew last month by 0.6 per cent and amounted to 2,829,600. The rate of unemployment reached 15.2 per cent and was higher by 1.3 per cent in August than in July.

Suchocka Unhappy With Manner of Hodysz Dismissal

LD1509205393 Warsaw PAP in English 1904 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Wasaw Sept. 15—Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka on Wednesday [15 September] expressed her disapproval of the way and time of taking the decision on the dismissal of head of the Gdansk branch of the State Protection Office (UOP) Adam Hodysz following a meeting with Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski devoted to the explanation of the issue.

Prime minister's press secretary Zdobyslaw Milewski quoted the prime minister as saying after the meeting that "nothing can undermine Major Hodysz's merits for the opposition in its fight for democracy in Poland in the 70s and 80s."

Adam Hodysz was dismissed on September 3 by UOP head Jerzy Konieczno following President Lech Walesa's request made to the Interior Ministry.

According to the Interior Ministry, however, the president only expressed his opinion on the case and did not exert any pressure on the UOP head who took the decision independently and with a consent of Milczanowski. On Wednesday Milczanowski restated that the president's opinion had not been a decisive factor in taking the related decision.

Milczanowski explained to the prime minister that Hodysz was dismissed because of professional errors he had committed and stated that such decisions belong to the powers of the UOP head.

At a briefing for journalists in the Interior Ministry, Milczanowski announced that the prime minister had taken cognizance of his explanations related to the Hodysz affair and that he had not heard her disapproval.

Milczanowski expressed the opinion that reasons of personnel decisions in the UOP must not be subject to public discussion. He also announced that heads of the Interior Ministry recognized that Hodysz would be more useful as UOP representative in Moscow in the rank of deputy director of the UOP investigative board. According to Milczanowski, Hodysz has already been offered this post.

Justice Minister Discusses Kuklinski, Katyn

WS1609090893 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 0530 GMT 16 Sep

[Report by Malgorzata Zietkiewicz from the "Panorama" newscast—first paragraph is announcer-read introduction]

[Text] Justice Minister Jan Piatkowski did not rule out the possibility of bringing Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski to justice. If Kuklinski comes to Poland on 17 September, the law will be applied to him. It is not perfect but everybody must be judged on its basis, said the justice minister at a press conference.

[Zietkiewicz] According to the minister, Kuklinski is not interested in either returning or in clarifying his legal position. So far he has not submitted a request for safe-conduct, which would enable him to make efforts to annul his 25-year prison sentence. The law cannot be temporarily suspended, even for Kuklinski, Jan Piatkowski added. The minister once again returned to the investigation of the Katyn crime. The issue concerns his decision for the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office to initiate a separate investigation of the case, which has caused much controversy. The minister announced bringing action before journalistic disciplinary boards against those commentators, as he called them, who had accused him of electioneering by taking advantage of the Katyn case. He also spoke about pending cases against 30 former Sejm deputies and senators. The Prosecutor's Office has not yet compiled indictments with regard to eight of them, while the remaining 22 are awaiting court dates for their trials.

Thousands of Poles Pay Tribute to Sikorski

AU1609101493 Warsaw PAP in English 1804 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 15—Thousands of Poles today paid tribute to General Wladyslaw Sikorski, Poland's wartime commander-in-chief and prime minister of the Polish government in exile, whose mortal remains were laid in state at the Royal Castle in Warsaw on Tuesday night [14 September]. Soldiers, veterans and scouts kept guard at the coffin.

Elderly people, some of them remembering the general, dominated among those who came to honor the Polish wartime leader. Also children and students bid farewell to the General. Students of the primary school named after Sikorski laid a splendid wreath and sang a song in honor of their patron. Almost all visitors signed a book of condolences displaced in an adjacent room.

The remains of Gen. Sikorski were brought back to Poland on Tuesday from the cemetery of Polish pilots at Newark, central England, and will be laid to rest on Sept. 17 in the crypt of the Wawel Cathedral in Krakow, the burial-place of Poland's monarchs and prominent leaders.

Meanwhile, Jerzy Bukowski from the Veterans' Association criticised in Krakow the way in which Gen. Sikorski was brought back to Poland. A historic moment to identify and examine the mortal remains of the wartime premier has been wasted, Bukowski stressed, adding that it might have helped to solve the secret of the general's death. He also said that the Polish side should have participated in Sikorski's exhumation.

Gen. Sikorski died in a plane crash at Gibraltar in July 1943 in suspicious circumstances. The British Government continues to refuse, however, to release secret documents relating to its 1943 investigations into the crash.

Lufthansa Passengers Still Hospitalized After Crash

LD1509131593 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Lufthansa spokesman (Josef Grendel) has high praise for the Polish rescue action following yesterday's crash of its aircraft at Warsaw's Okecie airport.

In his view, the fire service worked especially efficiently. The rescue operations resulted in the miracle of there being no more fatalities. If you look at the plane you could say that virtually no one should have survived. Polish fire service units deserve special praises, (Grendel) said.

We have learned that 55 victims of yesterday's crash are still in hospitals in Warsaw. One person is in serious condition but there is no danger to that person's life.

Meanwhile a plane on a regular flight from Frankfurt landed at Warsaw Okecie airport with families and next of kin of those who suffered in the catastrophe.

Melescanu Interviewed on Bilateral Relations

AU1509140193 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Sep 93 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Pal Lederer in Bucharest; date not given: "Two People Are Needed To Dance A Tango"]

[Text] Dialogue is the only way of settling the problems in the Hungarian-Romanian relations—Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said in an exclusive interview he granted to NEPSZABADSAG. It transpired from his words that, in the course of Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's first official visit in Romania beginning tomorrow, Bucharest would be ready to discuss any controversial issue; however, in the course of the interview with Teodor Melescanu, it also transpired that we can count on difficult talks and hard bargaining: Romanian diplomacy sticks to its demand for a border clause, and it seems that it is trying to avoid firm responsibility on the issue of guaranteeing national minority rights, and it categorically excludes the issue of reopening the Hungarian Consulate in Kolozsvar [Cluj].

[Lederer] European countries, also those that are not neighbors, regularly hold high-level political consultations. In your opinion, is it normal that this is the first official meeting between the Hungarian and Romanian foreign ministers since the change in the regime?

[Melescanu] Of course, we would have preferred to hold such a meeting much earlier, but there is a Romanian proverb that says it is always better later than never.

[Lederer] Why is the meeting being held now?

[Melescanu] I think there were a lot of factors that have had a positive effect on organizing this meeting. In any case, on our part, we have always been ready for contacts with the Hungarian side on all levels, including the highest level. Obviously, there are many problems in our bilateral relations, but we think that dialogue is the only way to solve them.

[Lederer] This is a natural endeavor, but it is also understandable that it is only worth negotiating when we have something to talk about.

[Melescanu] We must first talk to each other in order to find out whether there is something to talk about. Only this way can we see whether there is a chance or not.

[Lederer] What do you expect from this visit? Do you expect any tangible results?

[Melescanu] First of all, we are planning to sign very important economic agreements on mutual support and protection of investments and avoiding double taxation. Secondly, we hope we will also be able to talk about the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral treaty and see whether we can advance in the issues that are still unsolved. Thirdly, we have a memorandum that includes practically all the issues of both mutual and individual interest. We would also like to review these issues with Mr. Jeszenszky.

The Basic Treaty

[Lederer] The border clause is a known sensitive issue of this bilateral treaty. Do you stick to this clause and, according to your concept, what would this clause look like?

[Melescanu] This question can also be asked differently. There are border clauses in most treaties signed so far, including the recently ratified Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty. For us, the question is whether we will renounce our demand to include such a clause in the bilateral treaty. Our answer to this is no, because this has already become kind of a norm among the countries in this region and I think that if we renounced it, compared with the treaty with Ukraine for example, this would be something that Romanians would find very difficult to accept. We do not have preconceptions and obsessions regarding the specific formulation, but the basic thought is that the two sides have no mutual territorial demands.

[Lederer] You mentioned the Hungarian-Ukrainian treaty. Would this formula be acceptable for Romania?

[Melescanu] Yes, I think it would. Of course, such clauses must be interpreted in the context of the treaty. However, at the first hearing, I would say yes. The aforementioned basic concept should be included in the treaty.

[Lederer] Do you seriously think that any considerable political force in Hungary could come up with territorial demands from any of our neighbors?

[Melescanu] No, I do not believe in such a possibility and I think many people share this opinion. However, the inclusion of such a clause is not a matter of individual interpretation. We should make a legal stipulation even if we are convinced that this is the situation, especially because there have been such declarations. Such a clause also has psychological value for Romanian society. If we had a very clear legal stipulation, it would be impossible to interpret many actions initiated by the Hungarian authorities as hidden manifestations of territorial demands.

[Lederer] I think that you are hinting that there are voices in Hungary insisting on territorial issues; these are obviously the most extremist voices and, obviously, there are extremists in Romania also.

[Melescanu] Yes. In fact, this is one of the basic problems, because our extremist forces make use of the lack of this clause to argue in favor of the danger of Hungarian irredentism, territorial demands, and other such things. Such a clause would deprive these forces of their arguments, forces that are basing their ideology and actions on the idea of Hungarian irredentism.

[Lederer] Is it possible to couple the issue of the border clause with a similar clause guaranteeing the national minority rights?

[Melescanu] Of course, even if there was not much in common between the two. Each side had its own interests in the course of the negotiations. At a certain point, these interests must be brought together and packaged, so that we can find solutions to them.

However, in this case, I personally think that there is a connection between the territorial issue and the minority issue. Thus, I basically think this treaty should declare a basic principle for the two countries, namely that, in our concept, the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania and of the Romanian minority in Hungary can be solved without a border modification.

The Minorities

[Lederer] I think that Hungary is justified in firmly demanding that this basic treaty clearly stipulate the rights of national minorities.

[Melescanu] I respect your opinion. I interpret this as your own position. I can assure you that we are open to any discussion and we want to reach a solution on this issue too.

[Lederer] I think that the vote on accepting Romania into the Council of Europe will be an important stage in the process of implementing Romania's efforts of European integration. What do you expect from this vote? Do you fear that some countries might vote against it and that Hungary would use its vote to blackmail Romania, as certain Romanian circles....

[Melescanu] I understand, Funar's attempts....

[Lederer] .... claimed in connection with the Jeszenszky-visit?

[Melescanu] It would be an exaggeration to talk about blackmail or pressure. This is not what is characterizing European dialogue today. In the course of my talks with Hungarian colleagues, I have always experienced a civilized and correct attitude. I hope that Hungary will join the other countries that will vote in favor of Romania's acceptance in the Council of Europe. This vote and Romania's acceptance in the Council of Europe is not a final point in the process of Romanian democratization and the improvement of the minorities' situation. This is a starting point to make sure that this process develops in accordance with the requirements of the Council of Europe.

[Lederer] The so-called Council of Europe fact-finders' report urges Romania to sign the Charter on national minorities and to legislate certain laws, for example on national minority education and the use of dual nameplates. Is the Romanian Government accepting these demands?

[Melescanu] Of course. In its exchange of letters with Mrs Lalumiere, the Romanian Government gave assurances that it would take the necessary steps in this direction, in the aforementioned issue and other issues. I would like your newspaper to also write that we continue with the democratization of the Romanian society, irrespective of whether the Council of Europe accepts us or not. However, our acceptance would facilitate and accelerate the matter.

[Lederer] I would return to the issue of the basic treaty. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] wants to participate in working out this treaty. Do you regard this as a justified desire?

[Melescanu] The desire of the RMDSZ to participate in this is natural but, according to international diplomatic rules, the RMDSZ representatives cannot participate in the talks directly. I think that the formula we are trying to use, namely to hold regular consultations with the RMDSZ in the course of the negotiations, could answer certain questions and problems that I find to be justified. If they accept my invitation, I hope we will hold another such meeting very soon, perhaps immediately after Mr. Jeszenszky's departure.

[Lederer] Please correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that the RMDSZ is regarded as a Christmas-tree decoration in the Romanian system of democratic institutions.

[Melescanu] I do not share your opinion. The RMDSZ has 39 representatives and senators in the Romanian Parliament. Without complimenting them, I can say that their representatives and senators are among the most professional people in the Romanian Parliament. The RMDSZ cannot be regarded as a decoration at all.

[Lederer] Mr. Melescanu! Romania expressed its openness to the desire of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest to open a diplomatic office in Kolozsvar. This formulation made me laugh. Does it make any difference to you where the United States opens such an office?

[Melescanu] Of course not. Naturally, the United States has the right to choose the location it regards as the most suitable location. We will try to give a positive answer if circumstances make this possible.

The Consulate

[Lederer] I have the same question regarding the Hungarian Consulate in Kolozsvar. Can you give us a concrete timeframe for resolving this issue?

[Melescanu] It would not be correct on my part to indicate a concrete time frame for this. We acknowledged the great interest displayed at every meeting by the Hungarian side in the opening of this consulate. We do not have any reservations in principle regarding the opening of Hungarian consulates in Romania if these consulates fulfill concrete needs and facilitate the atmosphere of understanding between communities, rather than confrontation. So far, we have not been convinced of the Hungarian citizens' need for such a consulate, because a consulate is opened for Hungarian citizens visiting Romania. However, we can naturally discuss this matter. We will review the arguments, the number of visitors and problems with loss of papers, and so on.

However, we must take into consideration the possible effects of opening a consulate in Kolozsvar on the atmosphere prevailing there. We feel that, under the current circumstances, the opening of a consulate in Kolozsvar would lead to confrontation and tensions.

[Lederer] Excuse me, Mr Melescanu, but I am very surprised at your argument. How can the solution to this problem be delayed for so long, a problem that could be solved within 24 hours with a minimum of good will?

[Melescanu] I think we must be realistic. This is the situation in Kolozsvar. I can assure you that there is no lack of good will here. Indeed, the issue could be solved very simply and quickly by us, in 24 hours as you said. For us, the opening of a consulate in Kolozsvar cannot be an end in itself. This must be a measure which we and the Hungarian side are taking in order to develop our relations and strengthen the favorable atmosphere. I repeat, not in order to cause tensions.

[Lederer] Why do you regard this issue as an end in itself?

[Melescanu] It definitely is an end in itself if we take it out of context and the situation prevailing on the ground. As I said, we, like you, also have our extremists, and we cannot disregard them because this would have negative consequences.

[Lederer] I agree that one cannot disregard extremism, but it seems that you are taking this too much into consideration, and you almost shroud yourselves with this.

[Melescanu] This is a very serious accusation. Not only the extremist elements but also quite a few Romanians think that the opening of the consulate would have a negative effect on the situation in Kolozsvar.

[Lederer] The practical message of your answer is nevertheless that one cannot count on any quick advance in this matter.

[Melescanu] Not now and not in Kolozsvar. I do not exclude the possibility that the situation in Kolozsvar will permit a future opening of the sixth Hungarian consulate in Romania.

[Lederer] It emerged at the meeting between Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Romanian President Iliescu that Hungary's neighbors should coordinate their policy regarding Hungary. This is the assumption also in connection with President Iliescu's upcoming visit in Slovakia; some people regard all this as the revival of the Small Entente. What is your opinion about this?

[Melescanu] In my opinion, history never repeats itself, and definitely not in this case, because today's Europe is not the Europe between the two World Wars, when European countries were ruled by dictatorial and fascist regimes—Horthy ruled Hungary, and Antonescu ruled Romania—and when the countries in Europe regarded military alliances as the only guarantee for their defense and prosperity, namely in the opposing military alliances, and thus in opposition to each other. There is not, and there cannot be a realistic basis for such worries.

It is also true that Hungary has an almost identical position toward every neighbor regarding the national minority issue, and this makes these countries also attempt to react in a more united and more coordinated way. Naturally, this endeavor can be manifested at the consultations held on various occasions, when everyone tries to tell how one reacted to this uniform policy. However, this cannot be identified with an alliance policy at all, a policy which, I think, has become completely outworn in Europe.

[Lederer] Without trying to defend the policy of the Hungarian Government, I think that the similarity among the aforementioned countries lies mainly in the fact that a considerable number of ethnic Hungarians are living there, minorities that are struggling with serious—albeit not identical—problems. You will obviously regard it as insolent on my part if I say that, on the occasion of such a consultation, you had better discuss how you could jointly help solve the problems of national minorities living in your countries.

[Melescanu] I do not take this as insolent; on the contrary, we are dealing with this in practice. The main issue of our consultations is to find ways to provide the best possible conditions for the minorities living in our countries. You are the first person of whom I can say that we are now precisely considering joint actions which we can submit to international forums.

NATO Membership

[Lederer] The relations between the Visegrad Group [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland] and NATO and the possible NATO membership of the Visegrad countries has been one of the leading foreign policy subjects of recent weeks. Romania is not included in this proposal package. Does this concern you? Does it disturb you that, in the not too distant future, NATO's borders in South-East Europe might end at Romania?

[Melescanu] The debate regarding the possible NATO membership of the Visegard countries was actually intensified by President Yeltsin's declarations in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, according to which Russia does not oppose these countries' NATO membership. As you said, Romania was not mentioned in this context. We do not need [Russian President] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's permission, or any other person's permission for our foreign policy options. The Central European countries path to NATO—both the Visegrad Group and Romania, as well as Bulgaria—is an objective process, a process that has begun and its development takes time. This is not so much influenced by demands submitted by you or by us, no matter where the permission is coming from; all this is influenced primarily by the decision to be taken by NATO itself. In Romanian, we say that you need two to tango. Analyzing the issue from this viewpoint, namely from the viewpoint of the NATO countries' strategic interests, NATO would probably be most interested in accepting Bulgaria and Romania because, so far, its weakest point has been the fact that its southern wing—Greece and Turkey —have been cut off from the rest of the alliance.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Arrives in Bucharest

AU1509103693 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister, Mr. Geza Jeszenszky, arrived on an official visit to Bucharest today.

During the course of the day, the guest will have a first round of talks with his counterpart, Mr. Teodor Melescanu, and will be received by prime minister, Mr. Nicolae Vacaroiu.

Upon arrival at Otopeni Airport, the head of the Hungarian diplomacy stated his intention to openly broach all existing problems with his partners in the discussions. He affirmed, quote: "We do not seek confrontation, but realistic solutions to all these problems."

The Hungarian minister also expressed the hope that his visit will bring about an improvement in the situation of citizens in both countries. He mentioned that this was not a protocol visit, but was not devoted exclusively to diplomatic issues either.

Melescanu, Jeszenszky Meet

LD1509215093 Budapest MTI in English 1954 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, September 15 (MTI)—Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu told reporters today that Bucharest believed the best way to settle Romanian-Hungarian problems and improve relations would be a presidential and prime ministerial dialogue, with yearly or half-yearly foreign ministerial meetings.

In the first two hours of talks, Melescanu offered solid proposals for improving bilateral relations, Jeszenszky said, going on to stress economic ties and express the hope that both countries would agree on concrete ways to help joint ventures.

The Romanian minister pressed for more urgency with talks on the Hungarian-Romanian Basic Treaty. "There are no insoluble disputes between the two countries. Everything is a matter of time and approach," Melescanu said. He also pressed for more frequent consultations on European issues and the establishment of legal frameworks for economic and cultural cooperation.

Melescanu said Romania would welcome an unambiguous Hungarian statement supporting its admission to the Council of Europe. The minister confirmed Romania's willingness to join the Visegrad group and the Central European Initiative as full members.

Melescanu spoke about Romania's efforts to guarantee minority rights, including establishing a council of national minorities and the provisions for minorities' mother-tongue education in the education law under codification. The minister regretted that the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania had quit the council.

Jeszenszky said the two countries should open consulates in some cities to promote economic cooperation. The Romanian minister was enthusiastic but no actual cities were mentioned in the first round of the talks, mainly made up of Romanian proposals.

Vacariou, Jeszenszky Comment

LD1509223393 Budapest MTI in English 2043 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, September 15 (MTI) - Meeting Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacariou today, the Hungarian foreign minister said that the Hungarian government and the whole Hungarian nation had a vested interest in Romania's prosperity as a democratic state and involvement in European integration.

Vacariou qualified the foreign minister's visit as an important event and welcomed the more frequent exchanges of government delegations and the development of two-way trade. He said high-level visits constituted a sound basis for developing bilateral ties, and expressed the hope that the Hungarian and Romanian prime ministers and presidents would also meet in the near future. He said he hoped the two countries would soon agree on the date of the prime ministerial meeting.

"We have surveyed with the Hungarian foreign minister how the provisions of international agreements on human rights and national minorities, including the Hungarian minority, are implemented, and discussed the Romanian government's difficulties and endeavours in this field," Vacariou said.

The sides examined what measures the two governments should take to improve the situation of their citizens, Jeszenszky added.

"We have stressed the importance of confidence between the two countries and two nations. On this score, I spoke about the measures Hungary has expected from Romania since December 1989, and expressed the hope that these steps would be made. The bills that are on the agenda in Romania may serve this goal," Jeszenszky said.

After the meeting, Foreign Minister Melescanu gave a dinner in the honor of his guest.

Jeszenszky Sees No Border Problems

AU1609080393 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Mr. Geza Jeszenszky, Hungarian foreign minister, has had a round of talks in Bucharest with his Romanian counterpart, Mr. Teodor Melescanu, and was received by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu.

Last night, after the second round of talks with the Romanian foreign minister, the head of Hungarian diplomacy told our reporter that he does not think that the basic treaty should include a clause on borders, because the problem of borders does not exist. [words indistinct] possibilities in connection with an accord on numerous aspects of the economic and cultural areas, and on border crossing issues, Jeszenszky said, emphasizing that he considers substantial progress is needed regarding a big problem: [word indistinct] of the Hungarian minority living in Romania.

[Words indistinct] by starting, quote: "From the known position that Romania acts in conformity with international standards, including those standards stipulated in the CSCE documents, the Copenhagen Declaration, the recommendations by the Council of Europe, which stipulate certain priority (?points) regarding the treatment of minorities.

"If the law on minorities and the law on [word indistinct], which are being prepared, take these international recommendations into consideration, I think that it is really possible to achieve progress," the foreign minister from Budapest said.

[Words indistinct] to mention that it is not the problem of the Hungarian Government to open [words indistinct] the competence of the Romanian authorities, Jeszenszky said that if these principles of the respective laws are observed and if the Hungarian minority has tolerable [words indistinct], there is a chance for this minority to be satisfied, something that will contribute to relations of trust between Romania and Hungary.

During the previous round of talks between the two foreign ministers, bilateral relations and opportunities for economic cooperation were emphasized. The Hungarian guest appreciated the tangible proposals made by his Romanian counterpart in this respect.

Mr. Jeszenszky was also delighted by the fact that a set of documents were presented regarding the 1956 events in Hungary, including information on the abduction by the Russians of former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy from Romania. In connection with the first round of talks, the Hungarian foreign minister said that the beginning and atmosphere of the talks were positive.

In turn, the Romania foreign minister said that there are no problems between Romania and Hungary that cannot be solved. The problem is only when and what solution will be found for these problems. The interest in positive relations between the two countries is not only bilateral, but serves European integration as well.

Cosea Emphasizes Relations With IMF

AU1509091393 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 9 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Mircea Cosea, chairman of the Council for Coordination, Strategy, and Economic Reform: "The IMF: Foe or Friend?"]

[Text] The miserable history that fate has assigned us in the past 50 years emphasized a certain peculiarity of the Romanian temperament, namely the belief in miracles. The trend to escape the crude reality of an existence without satisfaction and prospects, by taking refuge in a kind of fairy tale fatalism, has elicited the belief in a miraculous force capable of coming to the Romania's aid "just in time"—that is, exactly when everything seems to be lost. The Romanians are living in the world of the extraordinary fairy tales they invented for themselves. They believe in the good and the evil, in the implacable victory of the good over the evil, and in the existence of a divine justice that will finally reward the ones who suffered, who were done injustice to, or who were humiliated. The miracle of this divine justice has morally supported generations of Romanians who were submitted to foreign or communist domination. Have we not put our hopes, for years on end, in the miracle of our disposing of communism through the arrival of the Americans? Have we not hoped for the miracle of an independent and sovereign Romania vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union? Have we not hoped for the miracle of a better life after the repayment of our foreign debt? Have we not hoped for the miracle of the disappearance of communism once Ceausescu was gone? Have we not hoped, and maybe still are hoping, for the miracle of an idea by someone like Professor Anghel Rugina or another economist that will take the country out of the crisis in just a couple of months?

The IMF is becoming a kind of miraculous solution for the large majority of the Romanians. After the negotiations that were interrupted last July, the speculations around the IMF have grown in intensity, with the press, radio, and television allotting privileged space to the fate of the negotiations, which some thought to be a failure, others a semi-failure, and others consider to be just interrupted. The opinions are contradictory. There are people in favor of continuing the negotiations and there are people who oppose them; the same situation prevails among those who talk about the absolute need of maintaining cooperation with the IMF and the brutal interference of the IMF in the internal problems of the

Romanian economy. On one hand, there is the opinion of certain people who believe that, without the IMF, Romania will starve and freeze next winter, and, on the other hand, there is the opposite opinion that we can also make it without the IMF.

I believe that the trend to present the IMF as foe or friend is based on the unfortunately widespread concept that the entire economic phenomenon should be viewed in black or white, without nuances. In truth, economy is a field of nuances and trends, in which final, total, or radical assessments do not really have their place. That is why, I believe that the role and importance of Romania's negotiations with the IMF require certain clarifications, which I would sum up as follows:

1. Romania's position vis-a-vis the IMF is not a debatable subject. Romania has a deep-going and long-term interest in having the IMF as partner in the process of transition and reform. I cannot even conceive of somebody underestimating the role which an international financial institution as the IMF can play in the process of the Romanian reform. In the majority of cases, the IMF role in our reform is reduced to just two aspects: The first is the importance of foreign financing and the second is the credibility Romania is acquiring vis-a-vis other creditors or investors. Without underestimating these aspects, one must say that it would be wrong and unfair to reduce the IMF's role to just that. Maybe the most important aspect of our cooperation with the IMF is represented by the constant contacts and consultations we are having with its experts in connection with the many complicated problems of the transition period. The IMF has the great advantage of knowing the experience of all countries undergoing a process of transition and has the ability of summing it all up. Therefore, the IMF has become a true "forum of technical assistance," within which the problems of transitions, once taken out of their strictly national context, acquire greater clarity and precision. Our contact with such an experience can give us not only a good understanding of the stages and goals of transition but can also help us avoid the mistakes made by others before us under similar conditions. Therefore, as I have already said, the IMF should be a partner for Romania in this transition process, not just a stand-by creditor. Of course, such a "partnership" presupposes a substantial increase in the quality of our reform and of the reformers themselves, but I am sure that the effort is worthwhile. One should not ignore the fact that, after the "Latin-American experiences," the IMF has demonstrated an extraordinary ability of adjusting itself to the new conditions of the economies in transition and working out various economic policy sets or models aimed at ensuring the overall stability of an economy in which the market relations are yet at an incipient stage.

2. The relationship with the IMF has nothing to do with what one might call "the policy of interference or imposition" of certain performance criteria. The IMF makes its proposals, while the government is taking its decisions. It is the right of each government to commit itself or not to commit itself to promoting one or another of the economic policy sets suggested by the IMF for the sake of stabilizing the economy as a whole. Therefore, the IMF appears as a catalyzer between the government's political will for reform, on the one hand, and the prevailing real economic conditions, on the other.

The "appraisal" factor is essential in this respect. The government must appraise most competently and responsibly its real ability to engage in a program and schedule of macro-stabilizing policies. The idea that has gained ground with the man in the street, namely that the IMF "imposes or compels," is based on instances when the appraisals made were erroneous and when pledges were made that were impossible to observe. Therefore, the mistakes thus made were justified by presenting the unpopular measures as a result of the conditions stipulated by the agreements signed with the IMF. It is no less true that the IMF is granting loans and, like any other creditor, it is guided by the interest in recovering the loaned moneys. Hence, its normal concern with the establishment of a stable and healthy economic framework that will ensure that the loans are reimbursed.

3. The negotiations that are going to be resumed with the IMF force Romania to adopt a much more elaborate position than during the previous rounds of negotiations. Romania is dutybound to present itself as a true negotiator striving to utilize both the experience of previous years and the better ability of understanding the specific characteristics of the current moment in the evolution of the Romanian economy and society. Consequently, a would-be strategy of these negotiations should take into consideration the following elements:

a) Romania considers the recommendations made by the IMF experts along the road of continuing the reform process and promoting economic recovery as necessary, right, and efficient. Romania agrees with the need to make firm pledges that it will implement certain packages of measures in the sphere of economic, monetary, and fiscal policy, in the sphere of restructuring, and in the field of economic discipline, both in the months left until the end of this year and in the next year.

b) Romania considers that certain important steps in the process of signing this accord, such as the transition to the liberalization of the exchange rate, cannot be conceived as mere elements of the economic policy but rather as parts and parcels of certain packages of measures that condition and succeed each other. The aforementioned case, namely the liberalization of the exchange rate, presupposes such a series of preparatory steps and another series of support and consolidating measures, such as regulating the currency rules, ensuring financial discipline, encouraging the entry of larger quantities of hard currency on our financial markets, discouraging trivial imports, creating monetary reserves, and so forth.

c) In negotiations on that agreement, the IMF should show more and better understanding of the current real economic conditions prevailing in Romania, which has supported the successive impact of three strong reforming, but unpopular, shocks: the elimination of subsidies, the liberalization of prices, and the introduction of the value-added tax, as well as the effects of the embargo imposed against Serbia.

d) Romania's political will to continue and finalize the agreements with the IMF will have to be guaranteed by the immediate achievement of some concrete and palpable results along the line of restructuring and structural adjustment (until the start of the negotiations, we will have to present certain concrete instances of closing down or dissolving various units with negative performance) as well as along the line of privatization, demonopolization, and the promotion of loyal competition.

e) The agreement with the IMF should not be judged and estimated per se, but with regard to the entire ensemble of international financial circuit. With the signing of this accord, Romania must follow an essential strategic target—that is, obtaining the necessary credibility and logistics for our more active penetration on the international market of capital in order to achieve, as soon as possible, the necessary funds—be it loans or investments—for relaunching and modernizing our economy.

Ethnic Hungarian Leader Defends Memorandum

AU1409164193 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 11 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Ana Maria Vintan; place and date not given: "UDMR in the Political Struggle for Self-Determination"]

[Text] [Vintan] Mr. President, who was the initiator of the memorandum [handed over to General Secretary of Council of Europe Catherine Lalumiere, at the end of her visit in Romania, by representatives of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]?

[Marko] UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] members have been calling for the elaboration of a document summing up all the important problems of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania with respect to the juridical framework that currently exists in our country. Actually, the memorandum is not a new document. All the issues included in the memorandum have been raised a number of times during the debates on the draft Constitution.

[Vintan] Still, whose initiative was the elaboration of this old document, as you term it? Was it prepared long ago or was it the result of a last-minute decision occasioned by Lalumiere's visit?

[Marko] No, we had been working for a long time on the document, more exactly on its appendix. That appendix contains figures and statistical data on the history of the Hungarian minority in Romania. We had been working on that document over a number of months. The initiative came from me and the UDMR presidium.

[Vintan] Did your partners within the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] know the contents of the document before it was handed over to Lalumiere?

[Marko] As a member of the CDR Executive Committee, I had notified my colleagues that we had elaborated a document summing up our claims. Our colleagues within CDR did not know the contents of the memorandum. However, we did publish the text of the memorandum in the press [prior to handing it over to Lalumiere], but, I have to admit, it was published in the Hungarian-language press [Bucharest daily ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO]. No one seemed to care.

[Vintan] Both Romanian public opinion and your political partners were surprised in a negative way when they learned about the contents of that document.

[Marko] I would say that later on they exaggerated its importance. They made a connection between Romania's status [requesting membership] within the Council of Europe and our having elaborated the memorandum. I have to admit that to a certain extent there seems to be such a connection, considering that we did address it to Lalumiere, but we merely did it to let the Council of Europe know about the problems we are facing.

I admit that some of the politicians belonging to the CDR made quite sharp statements related to that issue. However, we have never said that we had reached agreement with our political partners regarding the solution of the minority issues. We have identical views on the program related to our democratic institutions, on social issues, but not on ethnic minority issues. The memorandum contains a number of points about which there is serious dissent between us and the other political parties that are members of the CDR.

[Vintan] The memorandum also talks about self-determination. What exactly do you mean by that term?

[Marko] The memorandum uses the term internal self-determination meaning that the Hungarian minority envisions its future within the current Romanian state. That is an acceptable idea, I believe.

[Vintan] If I am not mistaken, you are referring to ethnic and administrative self-determination.

[Marko] The basic idea is that the Hungarian minority, which is quite significant with respect to its number and cultural and spiritual life, should be entitled to decide in certain domains such as certain specific issues and its interior life. This claim of ours is very well known by Romanian public opinion. It refers to an independent education system and to the right to adopt decisions in several other domains as well.

[Vintan] So you are not referring to cultural autonomy, only?

[Marko] No, such a thing would be an invention. I am referring to a kind of self-determination that could be achieved by establishing certain forms of autonomy. We should all discuss the forms of autonomy by means of which such internal self-determination could be achieved.

[Vintan] The memorandum also asserts that not all preconditions for Romania's admission as a full member of the Council of Europe have been met.

[Marko] Yes, we have stated several times that in our opinion the current government—and not Romania, as a country—should find solutions to a number of urgent problems before joining the Council of Europe. Those problems have been left unsolved despite the promises made by the government and the presidency.

That is why we notified the Council of Europe about the fact that the solution of several problems—not merely the ones mentioned in the memorandum, but also certain other future problems—has been suspended. Such perspective issues include a bill on [minority language] education and a bill on [the status of] ethnic minorities.

[Vintan] Are you requesting that Romania should not be accepted as a full member of the Council of Europe unless all those problems are solved?

[Marko] No, we have neither requested that Romania's admission to that European forum should be postponed, nor have we stated that we oppose such a process of integration. However, I believe that by taking certain measures during this period of time preceding Romania's admission, the government could make proof of such political will. If it really has one. In turn, the Council of Europe could subsequently work out a control mechanism by means of which it could check the actual situation.

[Vintan] Pastor [Laszlo] Tokes [UDMR honorary president] has called some UDMR members collaborationists. He referred to [parliament and UDMR leadership members] Gyorgy Frunda, Gyorgy Tokay, and Laszlo Borbely. Were they classified like that because they are less radical than other UDMR members?

[Marko] There are certain discussions between supporters of opposing views, but those views merely refer to the tactics, rather than the strategy that should be adopted. Pastor Tokes' attack against the parliamentarians mentioned by you is merely one aspect of the confrontation of ideas going on within UDMR.

[Vintan] What are the issues disputed within UDMR? Are there, for instance, varying opinions related to the issue of self-determination?

[Marko] No, all UDMR members agree on that issue. That idea is also included in the program of our party. We will try to implement it by initiating draft bills and by elaborating other such documents. We will also have to establish with whom and in which way are we to hold talks and negotiate in the political struggle the UDMR is engaged in.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 16 September

WA1609163893

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Bosnian Muslims, Serbs sign cease-fire agreement; Geneva peace talks to resume ... Montenegrin President Bulatovic visits Albania ... Croatian Army to cede villages captured last week to UNPROFOR ... Continuation of Muslim-Croat fighting reported in central Bosnia ... UNPROFOR confirms massacre of Bosnian Croat villagers near Prozor.

DIPLOMATIC

MUSLIMS, SERBS SIGN ACCORD; (AFP): Bosnian President Izetbegovic, Bosnian Serb assembly chairman Krajisnik sign agreement calling for "prompt cessation of all hostilities," release of prisoners, and dismantling of concentration camps. Peace talks among three sides in Bosnian conflict to resume on 21 September in Geneva. (AU1609114193)

BULATOVIC VISITS ALBANIA (Podgorica Radio, BORBA): Montenegrin President Bulatovic calls visit to Albania "useful and substantial," urges continuing "dialogue" between leaders of both countries. BORBA says Bulatovic's assertion that he had the FRY leadership's "consent" for the visit "could be a sure signal" that Yugoslavia "wishes to establish normal relations with Tirana." (AU1609104993, AU1509123293)

MILITARY

UNPROFOR TO OVERSEE WITHDRAWAL: Zagreb Radio reports Croatian Army agreed to cede control of villages it occupied on 9 September to UNPROFOR. TANJUG claims Croats "have begun withdrawing," but are "opening fire" on UN and Serbian forces. (LD1509203893, LD1509163493)

MUSLIM-CROAT CLASHES REPORTED: Zagreb Radio reports Muslim-Croat fighting in central Bosnia two days before 18 September cease-fire deadline agreed on by Bosnian President Izetbegovic, Croatian President Tudjman. (LD1609103993)

UNPROFOR CONFIRMS MASSACRE (AFP): UNPROFOR official confirms that "at least 30" Bosnian Croat villagers were massacred near Prozor. Bosnian Croat forces said that 38 villagers, including women and children, had been killed by Muslim troops. (AU1509171293)

Kozyrev Urges Resumption of Peace Talks

AU1509192993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report by correspondent Nedzad Leko on remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in response to questions from unidentified journalists in Sarajevo on 15 September; Kozyrev remarks recorded; Kozyrev speaks in English with passage-by-passage translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[Excerpt] After his talks with Hadzo Efendic, head of the republican government, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency, and Abdulah Konjicija and Stjepan Siber. Nedzad Leko reports:

[Leko] At the end of his talks today Minister Kozyrev spoke to journalists about his impressions:

[Kozyrev] I am rather pleased with the fact that there is no shooting and shelling in Sarajevo, unlike my first visit to Sarajevo last May. We would like to encourage all sides here to use this opportunity. My feeling is that there is enough goodwill on all sides, that important moves have been made, and that peace is within reach.

However, it will require tremendous courage from the political leadership to cross this final distance toward peace. I am pleased that other people here in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic is in Geneva, sound very reasonable. The most important thing at present is that no one is counting on force any longer. The only solution is at the negotiating table.

[Leko] Journalists asked Kozyrev about the problems concerning gas supplies to Sarajevo.

[Kozyrev] As far as Russia is concerned, there is no problem. We are ready to supply gas. Gas is being supplied, but there is a problem somewhere between Russia and Sarajevo. Talks between appropriate institutions will continue. I am quite sure that, if it was up to us, there will be gas this winter. What is important is to understand that the main threat to Sarajevo and the whole country is the forthcoming winter.

[Leko] In response to a question on the real reasons for his visit to Sarajevo, Minister Kozyrev said:

[Kozyrev] The purpose of my visit here is to encourage all sides in the political sense, and to support their political agreement in the Security Council economically through the supply of gas and other humanitarian needs. And thirdly, Russia is prepared to examine specific requests for the participation of its peace troops whenever they are needed. This is the meaning of the visit by Colonel General Gromov, deputy defense minister, who is accompanying me. He is discussing all these matters with UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces], the Bosnian leadership, and the Serb representatives.

[Leko] Is the attempt to influence the Bosnian Government to continue talks also one of the reasons for your visit, journalists asked Kozyrev.

[Kozyrev] Yes. We held extensive discussions about these matters in Washington two days ago. Our views were identical that the Bosnian Government and the other two sides should be encouraged as much as possible to negotiate and not to sit and wait for some other solution, that is, a military solution, which is nowhere in sight. [passage omitted]

Deems Serbian Proposals 'Balanced'

AU1509195593 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report by Marica Lalovic from Sarajevo]

[Text] Talks between a delegation of the republic of Srpska headed by Dr. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the republic, and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who arrived in Sarajevo this morning, concluded in Lukavica at about 1700 today. The main topic of the talks was the situation in Sarajevo, as well as the destiny of the Geneva talks about the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Dr. Koljevic, one has not given up the Geneva conference. On the contrary, the visit of the Russian foreign minister is a confirmation of the fact that most suitable solutions are being sought with a view to having the package of Geneva documents signed as soon as possible.

As regards Sarajevo, the talks touched upon very specific and practical issues. It was proposed that new routes should be opened and ensured for humanitarian convoys, that free entrance into and exit from Sarajevo should be ensured, a direct contact established between the Muslim Presidency and the top state leadership of the republic of Srpska, and that one should ensure heating for Sarajevo in the coming winter, as well as fulfilling other conditions for normalizing life both in the Muslim and the Serbian part of Sarajevo.

Kozyrev pointed out that the Serbian proposals are balanced, justified, and feasible, and that he will personally talk to Butrus-Ghali so that UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] could help all these conclusions to be realized as soon as possible. Journalists have been told in Lukavica that the Russian minister today talked about these issues with the vice chairman of the Muslim government, who demanded that Sarajevo be more regularly supplied with gas that is coming from Russia.

Boban: Croats Will Not Cede Part of Adriatic Coast

LD1509201693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1931 GMT 15 Sep 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 15 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban has said that no one could sign on behalf of his people an agreement, giving access to the Adriatic Sea to a Muslim or Serb republic in the future Bosnian union.

Neum, the only Bosnian town on the Adriatic coast, and Mostar are parts of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna, proclaimed late last month, said Boban in an interview to the Croatian daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA published on Monday [13 September].

During the latest round of the Bosnia peace talks in Geneva, interrupted on September 1 due to the Muslim rejection of the peace plan, the Bosnian Croat delegation offered to the Muslim side access to an Adriatic port.

Boban called the Muslim demand 'irrational,' saying the concessions were part of a statement outside the agreement which the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats were to sign in Geneva.

He said the region of Neum was the autochthonous territory of the Croatian people, never populated by any of Bosnia's two remaining nations.

'As for a Muslim access to the sea, I have told the cochairmen (of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia) that this can only imply access to the rivers Sava and Danube, to the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea, and then through the Strait of Otranto to the Adriatic sea,' Boban added.

He said that Muslims cannot have a half or quarter of Mostar which, he said, was the capital of Herzeg-Bosna.

Mostar, the biggest town of southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, has since last May been the scene of fierce Croat-Muslim clashes.

Karadzic Meets Army Rebels; Tanks Still in Streets

AU1509205193 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] The talks between the state delegation of the republic of Srpska, led by Radovan Karadzic, and the crisis headquarters of the September 93 action are still in progress. We have not been able to obtain any details except the fact that the meeting is being held about 10 km from Banja Luka.

The sixth day of the blockade of Banja Luka has been extremely quietly. Schools, firms, banks, post offices, and other institutions were working. Tanks are still in the streets. The program of Banja Luka television is not broadcast because the transmitter on Mount Kozara is blocked.

Muslim-Croat Clashes Reported in Central Bosnia

LD1609103993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] There is still no peace in central Bosnia. The fiercest fighting overnight took place in the vicinity of Vitez where Muslim forces, reinforced by forces from Zenica, launched powerful attacks against all defense lines. At the same time, the centre of the town was shelled. Following heavy fighting, units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] succeeded in repelling all the attacks. A large number of Muslim soldiers was killed. Two HVO soldiers were killed and 11 wounded, the HVO general staff announced.

Shrapnel from Muslim shells killed 2 and wounded 11 in villages near Kiseljak.

Heavy fighting took place overnight in the area of Uskoplje where an all-out offensive by the Muslim army has been going on since yesterday morning. Following several hours during which they offered resistance and tried to halt the attacks, HVO units in some locations were forced temprorarily to redeploy to reserve positions.

Fighting around Gornji Vakuf is still in progress, the HVO general staff reports.

Muslim Residents Reportedly Forced Out of Prozor

AU1609092693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] As the press service of the Prozor war presidency reports, the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in Prozor commune is entering into its final stage.

[Word indistinct] 14 September 1993 the Ustasha forces chased another 270 Muslim residents from the town. According to the statements of the exiles, the remaining Muslim population in Prozor has been banned from holding any sort of religious services. The people tortured and subsequently killed by the ustasha's butchers were not allowed to be publicly buried with accompanying religious rites, and they were buried late at night, the press service of the Prozor war presidency reports.

UN Confirms Massacre of Croatian Villagers

AU1509171293 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 15 (AFP)—At least 30 Bosnian Croat villagers have been massacred in a village in central Bosnia, allegedly by Muslim-led Bosnian forces, a UN official said Wednesday [15 September].

The Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) put the death toll at about 38. The HVO [Croatian Defense Council], quoted by the Croatian media Wednesday, said the Bosnian

Croats were brutally killed by mainly Muslim Bosnian troops in the Croat village of Uzdol, in southern Herzegovina.

The UN official, speaking at British battalion headquarters in the central Bosnian town of Vitez, said the dead included a number of women and children and many of the victims were elderly.

One old couple, shot to death, were found still hugging to each other in a barn where they had tried to hide, the British official said. The massacre reportedly took place Tuesday morning.

Croatian television screened horrific pictures of mutilated bodies, including those of an elderly woman with a smashed skull lying dead on a bed.

The corpses of women and children who had been shot in the neck were also shown.

Mate Boban, the leader of the Bosnian Croats ordered an official day of mourning in the self-proclaimed Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna, the offical Croatian news agency HINA reported.

A statement from the Bosnian Croat presidency said about 30 houses in Uzdol—which lies between Prozor and Jablanica—were set alight by Bosnian forces who had used Croats from adjacent villages as "human shields" during their attack.

Muslims 'Forcefully Attack' Serbs Around Bihac

LD1509181893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1759 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Bihac, Sept 15 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem forces in northwestern Bosnia continued in the last 24 hours to forcefully attack Bosnian Serb civilian and military facilities on the Bihac battlefront, a local Serb military source said on Wednesday [15 September].

The source said that the Moslem forces shelled the busiest sections of the town of Krupa Na Uni (formerly Bosanska Krupa) and snipers opened fire on Serb civilian facilities and people in the areas of Pritoka and Ripca, south of Bihac.

The Serb Radio Bihac reported that the Bosnian Serb forces did not have any casualties and did not respond to Moslem attacks.

Sarajevo Radio Reports Serbian, Croatian Attacks

AU1609111393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] Central Bosnia-Herzegovina is routinely being attacked by the aggressor. The best example of this is Brcko, where the aggressor's grenades are falling regularly, his troops are regrouping, and squadrons of helicopters regularly fly on the Bjeljina-Pelagicevo route like evil mosquitoes. The helicopter link Banja Luka-Mt. Ozren-Doboj-Modrica is regularly functioning in Doboj. The Croatian side has obviously not taken the latest Izetbegovic-Tudjman agreement too seriously or [words indistinct]. Namely, the multiple rocket launchers and heavy artillery continue to pound Mostar, while howitzers are destroying Maglaj. Around Stari Vitez, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, and Busovaca, the artillery attacks are alternating with attempts of infantry breakthroughs. The roads through central Bosnia continue to be blocked.

Bihac, Cazin, and Bosanska Krupa continue to be shelled, while Gorazde and Gradacac have been encountering no peace either.

Serbs To Continue Controlling Aid Convoys

LD1509135193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1319 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Bratunac, Sept 15 (TANJUG)—A senior officer in the Bosnian Serb army on Wednesday told TANJUG that the Serb side will continue controlling the content of humanitarian convoys passing through the territory of the Bosnian Serb republic (RS), despite demands by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) command in Sarajevo that this practice should stop.

RS army chief-of-general-staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic said that on Wednesday [15 September] he had informed the UN commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen. Vere Hayes, about this.

Gen. Milovanovic said that relief aid consignments will from now on be controlled only upon entry into RS territory, thus allowing them unimpeded passage to their destinations. The convoys will be escorted by a representative of the Serb side.

At the same time, UNPROFOR combat and logistic convoys will not be subject to controls but, their leaders will be obliged to submit to the Serbs the complete documentation on each convoy.

The UNPROFOR command's surprising demand that the Serb side no longer controls humanitarian convoys can be interpreted in different ways, but its good intentions are difficult to see. The more so as the Serbs have shown and proven beyond doubt that these convoys have been used for supplying their enemies in the civil war in Bosnia (Moslems, Croats) with ammunition.

This has quite logically induced the Serb side to introduce the control of relief aid convoys, and it is certain it will not give this up.

Karadzic: Sarajevo To Be Capital of Bosnian Serbs

AU1509145793 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sept p 6

[Article by A. Hrsum: "Sarajevo: Capital of the Srpska Republic"]

[Text] Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska confirmed in a statement published in the latest issue of SRPSKO SLOVO, a paper published by the Information Center of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza, that Serbian Sarajevo was now the capital of the republic of Srpska. The government and other institutions will transfer to Ilidza and Rajlovac as soon as it is safe to do so. In response to a question about Sarajevo—whose municipalities should be placed under the control of the UN forces for a period of two years— posed by the journalist from SRPSKO SLOVO, Karadzic said:

"These municipalities are in the republic of Srpska because they are under our legislative and police authority. They belong to the city of Sarajevo, that is, to the Sarajevo region until a final agreement is reached. We Serbs would have gone as far as to exchange some territories. However, this situation also suits us. This way we will get more. Serbian territories in the city will be given to the Serbs and this will be a Serbian city.

"Sarajevo will be the capital until a definite solution is reached, when the people decide on this issue either in a referendum or in some other way. Serbian Sarajevo is comprised of Ilidza, Ilijas, Vogosce, Hadzici, and Rajlovac. However, some of the government's institutions will be in Pale."

Tensions Between Army, Police in Bihac Area

93BA1439C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
26 Aug 93 p 6

[Article by Nurija Rosic: "Armed Conflict Avoided for Now"]

[Text] Bihac—Thanks only to the good sense of the most responsible individuals in the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Service Center [CSS] in Bihac, and the bodies of government and Assembly of Bihac District, an armed conflict and chaotic situation was avoided between the Army and the police in this area.

It all began in April, when the government of Bihac District, when demands that this be done by the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] went unheeded, tried to resolve what until then had been untenable duality of government in the Bihac Security Service Center. Zijan Kadic, republic deputy who was removed as chief of the Security Service Center, had been tirelessly misinforming the MUP with the group around him, saying that laws are not being respected in Bihac District and that separatism is afoot. In addition to him, a group headed by Dr. Irfan Ljubijankic in Bihac and Mirsad Veladzic, M.A., in Velika Kladusa, now removed from power, had been in constant communication by party (SDA [Democratic Action Party]) satellite telephone with the most responsible individuals in the MUP and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that in Bihac District they had given up on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The minister of internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who did not honor the personnel appointments of Bihac District in the CSS and without any supporting arguments or consultations with the authorities of the district, appointed Enver Ramic chief of the Bihac CSS. What is more, by private satellite telephone in Velika Kladusa decisions came down concerning three other new appointments of management personnel in the Bihac CSS, accompanied by the order that intervention of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina be called upon to intervene if these appointments could not be accomplished otherwise.

Because the district's government and Assembly did not consent to removal of the management structure headed by Irfan Saracevic in the CSS and in all public security stations in Bihac, Velika Kladusa, Cazin, and Bosanska Krupa, a conflict between the Army and police was so imminent that it would have taken only one unreasonable move for it to flare up.

Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ejup Topic, president of the district Assembly, Irfan Saracevic, chief of the Bihac CSS, and deputies in the district Assembly and chiefs of public security stations, along with the most responsible representatives of the Main Command of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] of the Bihac region, managed to calm down the situation, which was tense at that time. The session of the Bihac District Assembly held at that time is considered historic, and it was held only a few hours after members of a terrorist group killed four people and seriously wounded two others in the center of the city. Among the dead were two members of the MUP from the ranks of an associate of Irfan Saracevic.

That marathon meeting lasted more than 19 hours; in it, people spoke in such a way that one could figure out who was with whom and who against whom when it turned out that a struggle was being waged for public office under the mask of a struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. The resolutions adopted made it possible to avoid conflicts between the Army and the police. It is believed here that someone wanted this conflict, that someone wanted the situation here to be the same as in central Bosnia and in other regions in Herzegovina.

All the resolutions of the session were signed by all the most responsible people for this region. It was resolved at the same time that measures would be taken for the next session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be held with all its members in Bihac in order to resolve in that way all the issues concerning personnel in the Bihac CSS.

From what has been written in OSLOBODJENJE, light was shed during the meeting on the murder of the policemen, the members of the OS [Armed Forces], and one woman civilian. One of the five killers has been apprehended, and warrants have been issued for the rest.

Tensions have subsided in the Bihac District, and the daily fight on the fronts of the Bihac region, which are being jointly defended by fighting men of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO of the Bihac region, are once again at the center of events.

UNPROFOR Mediates Cease-Fire Accord

LD1509203893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] The Zagreb-based UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] command this evening issued a statement on a cease-fire agreement reached between Croatia and the Serbian rebels through the mediating effort of UNPROFOR Commander General Jean Cot.

The Croatian representative, General Stipetic, and the Serbian representative, General Novakovic, with UNPROFOR acting as mediator, signed a cease-fire agreement today, to come into force once UNPROFOR units are deployed in the area south of Gospic in the pink zones adjacent to Sector South, the statement says. Both sides agreed to avoid any action likely to hinder the full implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

The agreement calls for the withdrawal of the Croatian forces from the villages they occupied on 9 September. Under the agreement, UNPROFOR forces will be deployed and take over the control of Serb positions and the territory from where the Croatian forces will withdraw up to the pre-9 September demarcation line, the statement says.

Under the agreement, both sides will allow UNPROFOR freedom of movement in carrying out this action. The agreement also envisages that UNPROFOR, which will have the control of the areas abandoned by the Croatian forces, will ensure that no Serbian armed forces or armed individuals occupy the areas again.

Croats Withdraw From Captured Serbian Villages

LD1509163493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, 15 Sep (TANJUG)—Croatian forces have begun withdrawing from the occupied Serbian villages of Citluk and Divoselo, Djordje Bjegovic, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina, told journalists this afternoon.

According to the agreement on cease-fire in this area, Croatian forces should withdraw by 1800.

As Bjegovic told journalists, while the Croatian forces are withdrawing from this area, they are opening fire on members of the peace forces and units of the Serb army of Krajina elsewhere. He did not specify the areas where they have opened fire.

Fighting in Northern Dalmatia Reportedly 'Reduced'

AU1509152693 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report by Danko Peric from Knin]

[Text] The Headquarters of the Serbian army of Krajina has reported that the intensity of the fighting on the northern Dalmatian battlefield has been reduced since yesterday at 1700. However, Croatian artillery positioned in the region surrounding Gospic and Otocac was not calm. Its attacks were accompanied by infantry provocations. In Kordun, the region of Turanj was attacked and one Krajina fighter was killed there. Before the cease-fire at the northern Dalmatian battlefield, tanks and howitzers had been hitting Biljane Donje, Nadin, and Skabrnja and these attacks then spread onto Gornji Baljci, Miljanica Glavica, Smiljcic, and Veljanska Kosa. About 40 shells have fallen on these regions. Since yesterday, the Krajina army has been strictly respecting the order on cease-fire and is also keeping calm in the Lika battlefield in order to make it possible for the Croatian Army to withdraw from the part of the Serbian Krajina occupied six days ago.

Units of the Serbian army of Krajina are in a state of alert lest the Croatian Army tries to violate the truce. From yesterday morning and all until last night, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], particularly the Canadian Battalion, made intensive movements. The Canadian Battalion is deployed in the region of (Medak) in the close vicinity of Divoselo and Citluk so that they could fulfill the obligation set by the Security Council within the deadline, which expires in less than three hours. Their role has been defined by Vance's plan that was adopted more than one and one-half years ago and meanwhile violated by the Croatian side several times.

Serbian Civilians Flee Attacks by Croatian Army

LD1509152493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1426 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, Sept 15—The number of refugees from the Serb villages of Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk near Gospic, who were victims of the Croatian aggression of last Thursday [9 September], continues to rise—reported the ISKRA news agency of the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) on Wednesday.

In the locality of Ploca, 700 refugees from these Serb villages have been registered, the biggest problem being sixty babies who lack the most essential food and hygienic necessities.

Divoselo, Pocitelj and Citluk are located in the territory of the R.S.K. which was formed in the Serb-populated parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, as a response to its violent secession from the former Yugoslav federation and has since May of 1992 been a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA).

The refugees say that almost all houses in the attacked villages have been razed, that a large number of Serb civilians have been massacred and that the flight of the women, children and the elderly to safer settlements was under continuous Croatian army fire from all types of weapons.

'We have virtually run away from the knife. The conduct of the Croatian Army is worse than that of Croatian ustashi in these areas during World War II,' says Petar Vracar (63).

The refugees say that the fate is uncertain of about fifty people remaining in the three attacked villages.

Tudjman Comments on Recent Clashes, Bosnia

LD1509233593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Report on interview with President Franjo Tudjman to Split-based newspaper NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA; date not given]

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has granted an interview to NEDJELJNA DALAMCIJA [DALMATIA ON SUNDAY], which the paper will publish in its next edition and from which HINA [Croatian news agency] has published several excerpts.

Asked to interpret the latest escalation in the conflict on the territory of the Croatian Republic and to explain what had provoked the Croatian armed forces to react, President Tudjman said that the Croatian counterattack had been provoked by the conduct of extremists who opposed a peaceful solution. He noted that at a time when a cease-fire agreement was about to be reached, new army units from Serbia and Bosnia were infiltrated into the UN protected areas, from where they carried out terrorist incursions.

Our military action near Gospic does not signal a change in Croatia's policy. It was merely a response to a provocation. We shall continue to adhere to our commitment, if possible and with utmost efforts, to integrate the protected area in the constitutional-legal system of the Croatian Republic through political means, he added.

We have been consistent in pursuing a policy of a peaceful solution, but by our action at Maslenica, and now in Lika, we have demonstrated that we will not tolerate any delays in resolving our communications problems or terrorist provocations by Serbian extremists.

The Croatian president noted that Croatia at some stage considered its action in Lika completed, but that the rebels had attempted a counterattack that ended in a fresh defeat for them. The extremists are now trying to draw Croatians into an all-out war, Dr. Tudjman said. Croatia will not allow itself to be provoked, he said and went on to explain how he had ordered Croatian forces not to react to the provocations designed to compromise Croatia's official policy abroad. He went on to stress that Croatia had armed forces capable of resolving the conflict unless a political solution was found. We shall do our utmost to avoid being drawn into another war, at a time when the United Nations, the EC and the United States are urging us to be extremely flexibe in the search for a peaceful solution for former Yugoslavia, President Tudjman said.

Asked for how long Croatian official policy would tolerate procrastination in arriving at a political solution to the conflict, Dr. Tudjman said that it was true that Croatia was running out of patience. The accomplishment of important tasks for our state, which, without doubt, include the liberation of the occupied areas that are still under the protection of the peace forces and their integration in the republic's constitutional-legal system, must be achieved with as few human and material losses as possible and in accordance with international circumstances. We must avoid having sanctions introduced against us as well, as that would mean postponing for several years both the country's economic recovery and tourism, the Croatian president stressed.

Asked about the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] mandate, President Tudjman said that we cannot be satisfied with the way UNPROFOR had performed its tasks, but went on to say that UNPROFOR had neither the power nor the equipment to use force to execute its task. We shall shortly set the demand that there can be no talk of extending the UNPROFOR mandate unless it starts fulfilling its task. This means that we shall seek guarantees that the cease-fire agreement and the Vance plan will be implemented. The plan provides for the disarming of Serb paramilitary formations, the restoration of all communication, and the opening of oil pipelines and electricty transmission lines. This would result in a gradual integration of the protected areas in the constitutional-legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

At the same time, we shall reiterate our stance that the Serbs in Croatia will have guaranteed all that other minorities have guaranteed under our Constitution and our constitutional law. We shall also remind the world that half of the total number of Serbs in Croatia live in the protected zones.

Having stressed that the rest of the Serbs, who live outside the protected areas, had their representatives in the Croatian Government and assembly, Dr. Tudjman said that the fact indicated that all this had nothing to do with civil and ethnic rights of some citizens of Croatia, but that it was all about an aggression by Belgrade and an organized rebellion by a section of the Serb population. We will remind the international bodies that we are ready to make it possible for the Serbs to hold elections immediately in the two districts where they are in the majority as a way of helping them to organize their self-administration.

We are even prepared, apart from the amnesty laid down by the law, to grant a new one for all those who were mobilized by force and pushed into the war—with the exception of those who committed war crimes. We will be resolute in presenting our demands before the international community and be extremely generous to Serb people in [UN] protected areas. President Tudjman said that we cannot accept the views of some international bodies—even if these are our friends—that we should wait for Croat-Serb relations to be resolved by themselves in a few years' time. Asked what Croatia would do if the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the peace forces unilaterally, the Croatian president replied that the Security Council could adopt such a decision. In any case, we will have to take this decision very seriously, but it is absolutely certain that Croatia will behave like a sovereign country. We will not allow anyone to impose on us solutions that are against our vital interests. May we warn categorically of the false nature of the claims that Croatia's position would be endangered if UNPROFOR decided not to extend the mandate. If the Security Council fails to accept our demands and the peace forces depart, extremists from protected areas would be in a much less favorable situation. The extremists can act under peace forces' protection these days. In the absence of the peace forces, those Serbs would come forward who are in favor of a peaceful solution.

Asked whether Serbs and Muslims laid any claims to the Croatian coast and whether a swap of certain coastal parts for some other strategic areas was possible—whether it was possible to give the Muslims access to the sea—Tudjman said that Neum was part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia therefore could not decide about it. He added that it was ecologically impossible to build a port there.

President Tudjman noted that the request for access to the sea made to Croatia and not to Montenegro was obviously in accordance with the Greater Serbian concept. If the Muslims were to obtain the access at Neum, Serbs would get Dubrovnik more easily, given that their conquest plans to go as far as Karlobag failed. The issue of Muslim access to the sea can be resolved by organizing a free customs zone in the port of Ploce, which we have already suggested.

Speaking about the Serb proposal to give up the tip of Prevlaka in exchange for the Dubrovnik hinterland, Tudjman said that the hinterland was Bosnian territory and that no one from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could trade with it. Should an opportunity arise in the future to discuss this, we will be prepared to examine whether it would be in our interest to cede the very tip of Prevlaka—where no human beings are living—for part of the territory that would secure broader hinterland for Dubrovnik. I would like to stress that no swap of inhabited areas will be possible—Konavli, or any other inhabited area.

Speaking about the criticism at the expense of aid to western Herzegovina, President Tudjman pointed out that we have not forgotten Croats from other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that the only solution is a union of republics and that those Croats who remained outside the Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosna would have their civil and national rights guaranteed on the basis of reciprocity. He added that the demographic survival of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be called into question in a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commenting on the possibility of Serbs asking that a solution to the Bosnian crisis be copied to Croatia, President Tudjman replied—concluding his interview for NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA—that these cases were not identical. Croatia has to resolve the problem of one minority, and no one is questioning this.

Tudjman Receives Bosnian Croat Delegation

LD1509212593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Text] In the presidential palace this evening Dr. Franjo Tudjman received a delegation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna headed by Mate Boban. President Tudjman informed the leaders of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna about an agreement that he signed with Alija Izetbegovic in Geneva yesterday. It is the common view that the agreement is in line with the interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republic of Croatia.

Both sides expressed their firm support for the agreement and its implementation. The agreement reinforces the Croatian policy's fundamental principles as a basis for overcoming the causes behind Muslim-Croat clashes and for finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the Geneva conference proposal for a union of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Organization, Activities of 112th Brigade

93BA1436C Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jun 93 pp 14-16

[Article by Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj: "St. Krsevan and 112th Defending Zadar"]

[Text] "The 112th Brigade in positions," "a thousand shells on Zadar," "Zadar is being firmly defended by combatants from the 112th Brigade"—these are only a few of the newspaper headlines concerning Zadar and the 112th Brigade of the Croatian Armed Forces [HV]. The combatants of St. Krsevan were organized as a brigade at the very beginning of the homeland war, as one of the first units of the National Guard Corps [ZNG]. The order to establish the 112th Brigade of the ZNG was dated 28 June 1991. Even then, organizational preparations were in full swing. Despite insufficient weapons, equipment, and ammunition, as early as 2 July, under orders from Corps Gen. Martin Spegelj, they occupied positions around Maslenica bridge, intending to thwart an attack on the bridge and its destruction by the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the chetniks. The mission was completed immediately in cooperation with the Police Administration of Zadar. On the very next day, the Command of the 112th Brigade reported to the ZNG Command that the 112th Brigade of the ZNG had been organized in the territory of Zadar and Biograd. Even then, the situation in the Zadar region was on the brink of open fighting between Serb paramilitary units and the JNA on the one hand and the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia on the other hand. Attacks on Croat civilians became increasingly frequent, and the JNA openly took sides with the chetniks. It was time for quick action, and the brigade command was appointed, headed by Mr. Marko Culin. The brigade comprised four battle and one active company, and its zone of responsibility covered five opstinas: Zadar, Pag, Obrovac, Benkovac, and Biograd. The siege of and attack against the town of Krusevo marked the opening of the Zadar front, and Krusevo was defended by a company of the 112th Brigade and members of the 4th Brigade. Krusevo could only be reached by sea, and because of that fishing ships from Novigrad were mobilized and the SAS factory provided the defenders with 10 ships.

At the same time, the fighting in the Zadar hinterland was growing more intense and the first active company of the 112th Brigade joined in the defense of Krusevo. The chetniks' bloody feast continued. With the help of the superior JNA technology, they occupied and burned Croat villages and expelled Croats from Obrovac and Benkovac. All the patriotic forces of Zadar invested their maximum effort into strengthening the defense forces, and in that connection the "St. John" company was founded in Policnik, together with a company in Brisevo, units on the islands, and units in Posedarje. In order to protect the Zadar waters, a unit of armed ships with "Bofors" 40 mm guns was also founded.

The Command of the 112th Brigade set up ZNG staffs and units in local communities on a volunteer basis and also founded three okrug staffs for the city of Zadar. Their main task was to blockade the barracks and organize the city's defense. In September there were renewed attacks on the towns of Jasenica and Krusevo. On 3 September, an artillery attack was carried out on the Maslenica bridge, but the 112th Brigade, the 4th Brigade, and members of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] stood their ground. The situation elsewhere on the battlefield was serious, so that a separate battalion under the command of the 112th Brigade was founded in Stankovci. The artillery attacks intensified, the city was targeted, and hospitals were full of wounded civilians and defenders, but the Croatian spirit did not knuckle under. A big problem in the city was the activity of the "fifth column," snipers and informants for the occupiers, to say nothing of the numerous military structures in the very center of the city. On 2 September, because of the enemy's enormous superiority in technology and weaponry, the town of Jasenica fell into enemy hands, which meant that Krusevo was cut off, and the forces of the Croatian defenders had to be withdrawn. In mid-September, members of the 112th Brigade, in cooperation with other units, occupied several military structures in the city: the JNA Center and the "Red House" and "Turkish House" barracks.

At the "Turkish House" barracks, the defenders uncovered weaponry belonging to the TO [Territorial Defense of] Zadar, which the JNA had taken for "safekeeping." In this way, the Zadar combatants got extremely necessary weaponry, military equipment, and tools. The situation in the city was significantly aggravated, because Zadar is a city that was systematically settled by Serb personnel, together with their families, thus creating the conditions for activity by a "fifth column," especially in the form of informants, misinformers, snipers.... The defenders of Zadar successfully put an end to that. With the fall of the "Turkish House" barracks, the Croatian Armed Forces in Zadar gained 2,500 guns of different kinds, together with military equipment and ammunition. In panic, the aggressor opened intense artillery and sniper fire from the other barracks. Zadar was also bombed from the air. The forces of the Knin corps, with a total of 100 tanks, moved on the city; an armored column advanced from the Sepurina barracks; and from the sea, ships of the "JRM" [Yugoslav Navy] carried out a rigorous naval blockade. It was only thanks to the dedication of the defenders that the enemy tanks were held back for five days on their way from Murvica to Crno.

After arduous fighting, the members of the 112th Brigade and some of the 4th Brigade were forced to withdraw. The enemy advanced as far as Bokanjac, Musapstan, and the town of Crno. The advance continued toward Dracevac, but thanks to the skill and capabilities of the defenders of Zadar, the JNA fled toward Crno and Babindub after several tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed.

Although the city was under blockade, it was clear to the enemy that it had to withdraw its personnel from the barracks. Under an agreement between civilian and military authorities and representatives of the JNA on 9 October 1991, it was agreed that the blockade on the barracks would be lifted and the people there would be withdrawn from the city. Members of the tank company and gunners with 105-mm howitzers, playing one of the critical roles in the defense of Zadar, were largely responsible for the enemy withdrawal.

The attacks on the city and on civilian structures did not stop even after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army. They alternated between air attacks and general threats, and the continual air and artillery strikes brought about the loss of the power and water supply in the city for 79 days straight. An exceptionally problematic situation, and the enormous zone of responsibility of the 112th Brigade led to the formation of the 134th Brigade, into which were incorporated the Stankovac-Benkovac Battalion and the Biograd Battalion. The 112th Brigade retained responsibility for Bibinje, Debeljak, Sukosan, Dracevac, the battlefield from Murvica to Podgradina, and locations along the Novigrad Sea. A city battalion of the 112th Brigade was also founded, there were reinforcements of weaponry and ammunition, and the Croatian defenders became increasingly effective, but the enemy did not shrink from anything. Skarbnja and

Nadin, 18 November 1991. The massacre of innocent civilians will be remembered in the Zadar region. Hundreds dead, and a large number of prisoners in Knin camps were the consequence of that major tragedy. Three days later, the Maslenica bridge was destroyed, and through that the enemy definitively revealed its strategy of cutting Croatia in two. Members of the 112th Brigade are most responsible for the fact that this plan was not realized, because they are the ones who repulsed the attack on Razanac and beyond toward the Pag bridge. There was daily artillery fire against free Croat towns in the Zadar hinterland, but the combat strength of the 112th Brigade was continually growing, and they responded adequately to every attack. One date that is exceptionally important to the entire brigade is 18 October, because that was when a mixed artillery division was founded under the command of Maj. Darko Bije of the Sukokan and Debeljak company, which joined the 4th Battalion, and reconnaissance units and units of infantry combat vehicles within the framework of an armored-mechanized company were also founded. The enemy's technical superiority was still in evidence, but each day it grew weaker. The proof of this were the numerous unsuccessful attempts by the chetniks to capture Suhovari and Palicnik, places that were a thorn in the enemy's side because they were deep inside occupied territory. After the signing of the Sarajevo cease-fire, the enemy's attacks did not stop; on the contrary, they even intensified, but there was no shift in the line of the front. St. Krsevan was protecting Zadar together with the 112th Brigade. There were also organizational improvements, so that a third Zadar brigade was also formed, the 159th Brigade of the Croatia Armed Forces, which incorporated the 4th Battalion of the 112th Brigade and a 155 mm howitzer and mortar unit, while the Maslenica Battalion joined the 112th Brigade. The Sarajevo cease-fire did not last long for the city of Zadar and vicinity.

Chetnik provocations became increasingly frequent and intense. Before long, they developed into genuine attacks. Renewed shelling, dead and wounded civilians and soldiers, houses and numerous other civilian structures in flames and smoke. This had to be stopped. A successful sabotage campaign against chetnik positions in the town of Podgradina, in which members of the 112th Brigade also participated, halted the attacks briefly. This situation was of short duration, because in early May the enemy resumed its strikes. The response came in the form of a new sabotage campaign by members of the 112th Brigade against the chetnik fortress on Kriz Mountain, from whence they were devastating Zadar. The members of the 112th Brigade in fact contributed greatly to this campaign through their strong and precise artillery fire. This halted the further Serb attempt to advance in the Zadar region. After the arrival of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], the situation calmed down a little, but there was no halt to the daily provocations, which were increasingly intense, all the way up to Operation "Maslenica."

Operation Maslenica was one of the most important events in the homeland war, because it showed that Croatia will not tolerate continuous chetnik provocations; rather, it has the strength and desire to establish Croatian authority over the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia. This was a quick and effective campaign, to which members of the 112th Brigade under the command of the experienced veteran Capt. Mladen Fuzul and the current commander of the 112th Brigade, Maj. Ante Maksan, contributed greatly. The entire brigade did not participate in the campaign, only a tactical group composed of all branches of the armed forces, from POIK [expansion not given] pioneers, communications, and infantry to heavy artillery. Rovanjska was liberated on the very first day. The reconnaissance-sabotage unit of the 112th Brigade, with the help of the antiterrorist unit of the 72d Brigade of the Military Police, got behind enemy lines and inflicted heavy losses, thus making it possible to smash the chetnik defenses on the front line of battle. Mr. Zlatko Turkovic, together with his boys Kiko, Renato, Ivica, Misa, Pavo, Buca, Pinjelic, Martinac, and others, occupied positions allowing them to dominate the entire Velebit Channel.

The campaign was well-coordinated and took place with a high level of confidence in the people involved. In order to take Velebit ourselves, we needed an extraordinary effort and success by the 112th Brigade, but first we avoided their positions on Velebit. We began with the most distant positions from the summit of the mountain, which looks out on Obrovac. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 112th Brigade, commanded by Capt. Blaze Beretin and Lt. Ivan Matulic, were the ones who made up the first line of defense of Zadar. They fought for their Zadar, for their Croatia, high on the mountain under difficult conditions. They hoped that they would soon be able to come down and return to their childhood homes in Obrovac and Benkovac Opstinas. Major support in their fighting was provided by the gunners under the expert leadership of Capt. Josip Zgela, who with his "sweethearts"—ZICs [expansion not given], howitzers, cannons, and mortars—destroyed every target with precision. These are all experienced veterans, who can hit any tank from 10 km and in all their campaigns use much less ammunition than is prescribed by military standards for neutralizing a set target. Support here was provided by a battery of antitank launch systems under the command of Zlatko Fatovic and Damir Kunac, who had been continuously in combat since 23 September 1991. They conduct training during combat, and they also applied their experience and know-how against the enemy fleet when they used a small gun off the island of Skorda to hit a "JRM" torpedo boat and inflict serious damage. Besides the POTB [expansion not given] under the command of Mladen Jelenic and Milan Beretin, a major contribution to the campaign was made by the reconnaissance unit under the command of Sulja Cepic and the pioneers under the leadership of Lt. Mladen Zagar, the commander of the pioneer company of the 112th Brigade, and the chief of pioneer services Sgt. Maj. Ivan Ivkovic. Aside from "classical" pioneer jobs, they were also trained for every pyrotechnical task, from mine laying and removal to collecting "little bells [as published]." The training of members of the brigade and of the civilian population is also of no small importance. They worked for the needs of all HV units in the Zadar region. Of course, communications between positions were maintained by signalmen who set up a complete communication network with the help of tools from the former JNA, TO, and donations, and especially responsible for this was their commander, Capt. Mile Tomic.

It is the shared desire of all of St. Krsevan's combatants that Zadar gain a professional brigade. We wish them good luck and new successes, because there is still a great deal of work ahead of us before we have liberated every foot of the Croatian state.

Members of 2d Guard Brigade Praised

93BA1436D Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jun 93 pp 4-5

[Article by Vesna Puljak: "They Tread on Dew"]

[Text] *Today, two years after its founding, having put 2,500 km behind them, we can rightly say that the members of the 2d Guard Brigade are an insurmountable bulwark against the conqueror, from Banija to Dubrovnik and from Slavonia to Zadar, just as Croats have always been in history.*

The steady, muffled sound of the mechanical step of the "Thunders," which do not portend rain but rather fill one with pride and faith, resounded through "Segest" stadium in Sisak on 3 June 1993. The reason was more than significant: the marking of the second anniversary of the founding the 2d Guard Brigade, better known under the battle name "Thunders."

The "Thunders" have a long road behind them in the war; this unit has crossed more than 2,500 km and has established the line of the front and repulsed the enemy from eastern and western Slavonia to Lika, Kordun, and Banija, and all the way to the southern Dalmatian and Zadar-Novigrad fronts. This brigade has traced its course of battle most clearly by giving Croatia the biggest and most sacred thing, giving it freedom under the same flag and with the same goal as fighters in other units. The very best sons of Croatia have perished for our dear homeland in the ranks of the "Thunders," and that is why, as Col. Drago Matanovic, the commander of the 2d Guard Brigade, emphasized as he addressed the officers, NCOs, high-ranking guests, and soldiers present, we can rightly say that our sovereignty and freedom have not been given to us; rather, our sons and daughters, our parents, and we ourselves have fought for and won these things through heroism, bloodshed, and our lives.

The foundations for the organization and training of the 2d Guard Brigade were laid back in June 1991, a time when soldiers in the 2d Guard Brigade viewed obeying all orders as an oath to the homeland. In discussing the successes achieved by this brigade in its combat history, we must stress that wherever the 2d Guard Brigade has gone, it has brought life back. Wherever the heroes of this brigade have gone, abandoned villages have repeatedly come back to life. Those who have returned to their burned-out hearths have known that once the 2d Guard Brigade occupied positions it would never abandon them again. The proof of this is Sunja, which has become a symbol of the resolve and staying power of the Croatian soldier and the Croat, determined not to abandon the soil of their ancestors. This is the heroism of the guardists, policemen, and all others who have defended the homeland with a gun in hand, but also of those who have believed in them. Further proof of this is Komarevo, the birthplace of "Banija Storm," the campaign that pushed the chetniks across the Una River. And just as Croats have been an insurmountable bulwark against conquerors in the past, today's "Thunders" have provided the same service in Sunja, Komarevo, Moscenica, Glinska Poljana, and on the fronts in Dubrovnik, Slavonia, the Sava basin, Zadar, and many other places.

Thus, as Corps Gen. Janko Bobetko, the chief of the Main Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces, said in his welcoming speech, we have no right to, nor should we, forget all those who have given their lives and imposed an obligation on us. They have obligated us to do our duty to the very end; they have obligated us to be the historic guarantee of a new age for Croatia, of freedom for the Croat nation. They have obligated us to create a high level of national awareness in our ranks and to do everything possible so that the Croat nation knows that wherever its sons are, the future is certain. They have obligated us to keep the dignity of the fallen on a pedestal, so that they are not forgotten by those whom they have left behind. Referring to the duty that all of us face, in the performance of which not one hour, not one day can be lost, Gen. Bobetko emphasized: "Everyone must prove himself to the Croat nation every day, everyone must demonstrate what he has given and is giving for Croatia and where he has tread on dew for Croatian sovereignty."

On behalf of the Zagreb Corps Region, words of welcome and congratulations were conveyed by Brig. Gen. Petar Stipetic, the commander of the Zagreb Corps Region, who said among other things: "The deadliness of your weapons has been felt by evil-doers all over our homeland. The 2,000 km that you have covered in combat are a glorious achievement that no one can deny. Unfortunately, we have not achieved everything that we wanted, but that is why we are here, ready to join with the entire Croat nation in liberating the last inch of our dear homeland." Stipetic concluded by stressing that if needed, the 2d Guard Brigade will be among the first in future battles as well.

The "Thunders," standing in formation, were also addressed by Mr. Djuro Brodarac, the zupan of Sisak-Moslavacka, who said: "You are not simply ordinary citizens of this beautiful Croatia, you are its flower, you are its honor and good name, you are proof of the high morale of the Croat nation. You who are standing before us, like all Croatian fighters, you are the guarantee that not one foot of Croatian land will remain unliberated. It is an honor for us to have the 2d Guard Brigade in our city."

Also present at the formal lineup of troops were other high-ranking guests, including former commanders of the 2d Guard Brigade, Bozo Budimir and Vinko Ukota, and officers from other guard brigades and from the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia. This was also an occasion for praise and recognition of soldiers who have distinguished themselves especially in the brigade.

Col. Drago Matanovic, the brigade commander, announced once again in his speech: "There is no other way around it: Croatian fighters with weapons in their hands will get back every foot of temporarily occupied homeland. This is confirmed and we are obligated to do so by the lives given by our fellow fighters, our wounded and invalids from the homeland war. And in the future, history will note that no one will ever rule Croatia again except someone born of a Croat mother."

Koprivnica Fighters' Activities Commended

93BA1439A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 93 pp 4-5

[Article by Mladen Pavkovic: "The Brigade Which Did Not Retreat"]

[Text] Koprivnica—The men from Koprivnica proved themselves to be excellent fighters during the homeland war. People from that region took an active part in defense back in mid-1991, and certain units of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] even earlier. Two years ago, they established the famous 117th Brigade of the Croatian Army [HV], through which about 4,000 fighting men from Koprivnica and Krizevac have passed.

"We have taken part in many battles far from Koprivnica and we have never retreated," are the words of Colonel Dragutin Kralj, the brigade's wartime commander. They made their greatest contribution on the Novska-Pakrac battlefield, where they were part of the Posavina operational group.

That brigade has also had some 50 killed and more than 100 lightly or seriously wounded. On the grounds of the garrison where the Ban Krsto Frankopan Military School is now located, a Cross of Life has been erected in memory of the men who gave their lives on the altar of the homeland to perpetually recall the victims of the insane Serbochetnik aggression.

Two years ago, precisely on 20 August 1991, the first volunteer units of police left this region for the Daruvar and Pakrac battlefield. Most of those volunteers had never before taken part in any serious wartime operation. However, in the very first skirmishes with the enemy, these young men proved themselves to be implacable fighters who were simply a scourge for the chetniks.

"First, we sent 20 men from Koprivnica to the Pakrac region who had come to us on their own," said Branko Kresonja. "They included Zvonko Panduric, Robert Glavina, Mario Magic, Zoran Ivic, and others who later fought in other units all over Croatia. I think we can be proud of those heroes. But one fighter—Drazen Takac, who is still listed as missing—did not return from that first battlefield. The MUP volunteers departed for battlefields until the beginning of 1992. However, our regular police 'held' Pakrac long before that and did everything to keep it from falling into enemy hands."

Numerous men from Koprivnica are on battlefields even today, a majority as members of the 202d Brigade of the 2d Artillery Rocket Division (led by Nenad Baric) and the 45th Combat Group, whose commander is Pero Sas. That 2d Artillery Rocket Division, which was previously called the 61st LAD [Light Artillery Division] of PZO [Air Defense], has so far brought down six enemy aircraft and one helicopter, mostly in the southern theater. They are very lucky not to have had anyone killed.

"The fighters of the 145th Combat Group waged their first battles in the Sava Valley theater precisely a year ago. After the 'discontinuation' of the 117th Brigade, that group was created and the most experienced men were included in it. Unfortunately, we have so far had five killed, one missing, and about 30 wounded," Pero Sas said.

In this city, at the moment there are several organizations caring for the fighting men from the homeland war, mainly the disabled and survivors of those killed. They are being wholeheartedly aided by certain business firms, among which we should distinguish Podravka.

"The door of this factory is always open to participants in the homeland war," said Major Mladen Sinjerec. "In the last two years, they have hired several hundred of our fighting men. I think that they serve as an example in every respect."

Soon, a memorial collection will be opened in this city as part of the museum; it will show a sizable portion of the road traveled by the fighting men of Koprivnica to liberate the homeland, which will only round out the picture of the brave men from the Drava Valley.

Goals of Croatian Christian Democratic Union

93BA1436B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 93 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Marko Veselica, chairman of the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "'Opposition Does Not Want Destruction'"]

[Text] *Our goal is for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] to become a more well-defined party. After all, we are only at the beginning of democracy. So even the Croatian Right must "get a good thrashing," must learn a lot about defining itself. The ruling party must learn too if* *it wants to be Christian democratic, says Dr. Veselica, the coordinator of the opposition parties.*

Lately, the chairman of the Croatian Christian Democratic Union [HKDU], Dr. Marko Veselica, has also been serving as coordinator of the opposition political parties. The goal of the frequent meetings of the opposition, Veselica reminds us, is to achieve a minimum consensus between the opposition and the ruling party concerning key questions of Croatian foreign and domestic policy.

"Consensus is necessary because the war in Croatia is not over yet, and even threatens to escalate. Croatia is increasingly isolated in the world community, and questions concerning the role and mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the method for transforming ownership remain open. The question is whether we want to pursue a state policy or a partisan policy, as Dr. Mate Granic sometimes does, on the state level," says Veselica.

"Croatia also needs political consensus because the existing authoritarian system has exhausted all its possibilities. We do not need divisions, but rather homogenization that will not permit individual thinking. Through political consensus, Croatia would mobilize major untapped capacities in politics, defense, and other areas."

[Podgornik] Where should consensus between the ruling party and the opposition be created?

[Veselica] There are parliamentary and extraparliamentary parties. The ruling party won the support of around 40 percent of the voters, with the opposition getting around 60 percent. However, the balance of power in the Assembly, where the HDZ enjoys absolute preponderance, was not created on the basis of the voters' disposition, but rather on the basis of electoral techniques. Such an Assembly no longer reflects the actual disposition. If everything continues as it is, conflict in Croatia will grow stronger, which would be detrimental. That is why a common purpose should be achieved in the actions of the government and the service of the Croatian state. Enormous strengths and capacities in Croatia have remained untapped.

People's Motivation Is Dropping

[Podgornik] Representatives of the party in power are responding negatively to opposition demands, noting that the HDZ won legitimacy in the elections to hold responsibility for overall policy?

[Veselica] If Croatia were a stable and free country within its prewar borders, if there were more democracy and free media, if it were not threatened by an escalation of war, and if there were not several levels of the standard of living, then these meetings of the opposition would be unnecessary. Obviously, there are various assessments of Croatia's current position. The leadership and parts of the ruling party think that everything is fine. They express a triumphalism that has no basis in reality with regard to the handling of foreign policy, defense, and the economy. It is true that Croatia has achieved some significant things, but there are also open wounds. The people are becoming politically passive and their motivation is dropping.

Internal motivation must be stimulated in Croatia. Because if negotiations with the rebel Serbs and the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories do not succeed, then Croatia must be ready for the war option. In order for Croatia to get the occupied regions back, it must achieve greater unity, greater consensus, and better use of its available strengths.

We certainly recognize the results of the election, but it is no longer enough to cite those results. The ruling party must demonstrate greater lucidity. After all, at one point it formed a government of democratic unity.

The president of the Republic is swamped by numerous decisions that he cannot surmount. It would be better if he used his reputation and constitutional position more appropriately. Executive authority should be better defined. There must also be agreement concerning the criteria for personnel selections. The idea of political suitability is being reintroduced to the military, police, diplomacy, judiciary, and public service, for example. That means that we are returning to communist positions from before 1990.

[Podgornik] Are you certain of that?

[Veselica] That is already becoming the predominant tendency, which means a slow but fatal march toward totalitarianism. This is a danger for Croatia and its people. We are aware that we cannot build an ideal democracy during war, but we must build something else—we must achieve national unity with regard to matters that are essential to the Croatian state and the fate of our nation. Let us recall the old Latin phrase that says "Unity strengthens the homeland" ("Concordia patria firmat"). Given the fact that one-third of Croatia is still under occupation, national unity today is more important than partisan interests. The establishment of Croatian sovereignty is a national interest, an interest above all other interests, and we are all jointly responsible for that. Croatia's opposition political parties are testing their maturity in this field.

For Opposition Consensus

[Podgornik] What will the opposition do if the ruling party does not agree to consensus or to a turnaround in Croatian policy?

[Veselica] The opposition does not want destruction. It wants to help make government in Croatia more effective and help it utilize all the available capacities in Croatia and beyond. I believe that there are forces in the ruling party who think similarly, and they are not insignificant. It is hard for these forces to expose themselves publicly, although they have done so partially, but they oppose the tendencies of sectarianism and exclusivism. The ruling party is not a homogeneous body. As a movement, it has had its role in the development of Croatian democracy, but the time has come for it to be redefined. Differentiation in the ruling party is necessary, and is also in the interest of Croatia.

In any case, the opposition will not carry out sabotage and destruction that is dangerous to the stability of the Croatian state. Although there are various forces in the opposition, we will try to achieve consensus.

[Podgornik] It follows from that that the opposition can achieve its goal—a turnaround in Croatian policy—if there is a split in the HDZ?

[Veselica] Our goal is for the HDZ to become a more well-defined party. After all, we are only at the beginning of democracy. So even the Croatian Right must "get a good thrashing," must learn a lot about defining itself. The ruling party must learn too if it wants to be Christian democratic. Indeed, Stipe Mesic, for example, does not agree entirely with that orientation of the HDZ. There is currently a process of fermentation going on in the ruling party, and it must reshape itself as something other than a populist conglomerate in order to respond to new challenges. If it is not capable of solving problems, it will draw Croatian society into even deeper crisis. The opposition must help bring about the process of redefining the HDZ, and it must help repel exclusivism and the unwillingness to cooperate at this difficult moment for Croatia.

[Podgornik] There are divisions in the opposition too. How do you plan to avoid them?

[Veselica] In the process of achieving agreement within the opposition, maximalist goals must be dropped. Perhaps some will drop out of the opposition, although we do not want that. After all, no one can impose certain views and methods, which the majority does not accept as an objective Croatian interest. Exclusivism is not acceptable in the opposition either.

[Podgornik] Rumor has it that the opposition will be discussing media freedom as well?

[Veselica] We are more pleased with newspapers than with television. I believe that with regard to HTV [Croatian Television] the opposition will assume a rather radical position and seek changes in the program and operation of television, professionalism and responsibility, more room for opposition views, and especially for confrontations between ideas and projects on television.

We Are Counting on the Future

[Podgornik] Has the Croatian Christian Democratic Union moved any closer to admission to the European Union of Christian Democrats [EUCD] lately?

[Veselica] Since early February we have had 160 contacts with Christian democratic and people's parties in Europe. Our party was at the EUCD congress in Bratislava and one of our members, Dr. Ivan Cesar, presented a very prominent paper and was elected to the EUCD resolutions committee. We recently organized an international Christian democratic symposium in Zagreb. Numerous officials from the EUCD and from Christian democratic parties have visited the HKDU and been interested to see how much our program, statutes, and method of operation, our positions toward the moral factor in policy, toward democracy and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are in keeping with the Christian democratic orientation. In the next few days we are expecting a visit by a high-ranking EUCD delegation, which will also visit with the HDZ. Several Christian democratic parties from Croatia can be admitted to the EUCD, as is the case with Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia.

The HKDU got 3.5 percent of the votes in the February elections. In Varazdin, where we got around 25 percent, the HKDU was the top party. In the Bjelovar region the HKDU was the number two party in four opstinas and one city. We did well in Medjimurje, Kastel, Biograd, Metkovic, Nova Gradiska, Slavonski Brod....

Christian democracy is a high-quality option that needs time for development. We are counting on the future. The HDZ has partially succeeded in shattering the HDS [Croatian Democratic Party] and the HKDU, but people from the HDZ are crossing over to us as well. For example, Bosko Siljeg from Ploce, who was a high-ranking HDZ official, Assembly deputy, and founder of the HDZ in Ploce, has joined the HKDU. In some places, the HKDU has also entered into a coalition with the HDZ, for example in Kastel, Biograd, Metkovic. We Christian democrats are not exclusivist and are always in favor of agreement if that is in the interest of our nation and our state.

[Box, p 3]

No Final Stance on Demonstrations

[Podgornik] Some of the opposition feels that it is necessary to intensify the pressure on the ruling party. What do you have to say about the statement by Bozo Kovacevic, who does not rule out the possibility of calling on the citizens to stage demonstrations?

[Veselica] That is Kovacevic's statement. We do not reject that method of political activity, but the opposition has not yet assumed a final stance on that. Besides formulating the strategic goals of Croatian policy, the opposition is certainly also thinking about how to achieve its goals. But that is a matter for further consideration and discussion.

I assume that after several weeks of discussion the opposition will put forward a document enumerating the strategic goals of Croatian policy about which we want to achieve consensus with the ruling party. We will send the document to President Tudjman, the Croatian Government, the Assembly, and the public. I think that a well-reasoned public dialogue should be initiated on these issues, without exclusivism.

Federal

Kontic Asks UN To Force Croatian Withdrawal From RSK

LD1509201493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1940 GMT 15 Sep 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, September 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic asked Wednesday [15 September] U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus Ghali to use all his authority for the Security Council to obtain immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Croatian Army from the three villages occupied in last week's attack on the republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.).

He said this would create conditions for reaching accord on absolute cease-fire and maintaining truce, something Yugoslavia supported and actively urged.

The R.S.K. was proclaimed in 1991 by Serbs in parts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia in which they make up the majority population in response to Croatia's secession. The R.S.K. was last spring declared a U.N.-protected area [UNPA] because of the ensuing clashes between Serbs and Croats, who still think of the R.S.K. as part of their territory.

The Croatian Army has twice—in late January and last week—attacked the R.S.K.. In the latest assault, it seized three villages in the R.S.K.'s 'sector south.' Kontic described this second assault on the UNPA as denial of U.N. authority.

We are convinced that the Republic of Croatia would not have opted for this act of armed aggression had the U.N. more strongly and consistently insisted on (Croatia's) fulfilling obligations stemming from the U.N. Resolution No. 802, Kontic says in the letter and explains that this resolution demands unconditional withdrawal of Croatian Army from all territories taken in the previous offensive on the R.S.K. in January 1993.

Kontic also said Croatia's armed action not only threatened peace and security in the UNPA, but also the Geneva talks on reaching a peaceful solution in the war-shattered former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav Government, the letter said, thinks that Croatia's latest armed aggression on the U.N.-protected area must not thwart extension of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate, which expires at the end of this month.

Possible failure to extend the mandate would destroy the positive results achieved so far by UNPROFOR presence and jeopardize chances of reaching a political settlement, warns Kontic's letter to Ghali.

Socialist Denies Involvement in Banja Luka Events

AU1509204993 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 Sep 93

[Interview with Radmilo Bogdanovic, vice chairman of the Federal Assembly Chamber of Republics, by Zoran Zivkovic; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Zivkovic] In its announcement issued yesterday, the Serbian Radical Party among others accused a group of Socialists headed by Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic, vice chairman of the Federal Assembly Chamber of Republics, for the blockade of Banja Luka, that is, the September '93 action. On that occasion we asked Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic if that was true.

[Bogdanovic] This is absolutely not true. To me this resembles the case when things are planted on somebody else, as the saying has it: You steal something and then shout, Catch the thief!

Who would today even think about undermining the unity of the Serbian people in these regions, that is, calling this unity into question when it is widely known that the Socialists, including me personally, were the first to set off and proffer help to the Serbs in both republics in order to enable them to defend their interests and their homes.

[Zivkovic] Among other things, the announcement mentioned a certain background of the events, the overthrow of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic of Srpska, or possibly weakening his positions before the Geneva negotiations. Is there any background to this at all?

[Bogdanovic] I personally fail to see anything like that in these demands by the crisis headquarters or to assume anything like that is at stake. I could particularly not accept or understand that somebody from outside wants now to bring discord among citizens, fighters, and warriors in the republic of Srpska and the leadership of the republic of Srpska. They need this unity today more than ever. It is not desirable at all for anybody from outside to concern themselves about them and their behavior. They should be left to withstand everything and to ensure the rule of law in that region and to have all war profiteers, criminals, and people who got rich while others were in war be punished. However, this cannot be done with anarchic gestures. This must be done through ensuring the rule of law.

What I would like to believe and hope is that the leadership of the Serbian Republic, citizens, fighters, and all well-meaning people will very soon find a way out of the crisis they are in and that they will be united along the right road again without any help from outside.

[Zivkovic] As far as I understood this, there is no background and this is the real essence of the events in Banja Luka.

[Bogdanovic] I refuse to believe that there is any background and judging from what is being said, nothing of this can be accepted unless one maliciously searches for a background. Where would that background lie when—a far as we could get from media reports—the focus is put on the struggle against the people who are not fighting on the front or are too rarely there and have taken advantage of the times to enrich themselves. If this is so, one must accept it and assume that a common ground will be found soon and that these weaknesses will be eliminated. I believe that these weaknesses will be eliminated.

Local Warlords Dictating Further Course of War

93BA1431B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 93 pp 25-27

[Article by Filip Svarm: "Rebellion of the Cannon Fodder"]

[Text] Two events marked the third anniversary of the first barricades at Benkovac and Obrovac. In Belgrade, a delegation of the republic Association of Veterans of the 1990 War and of the Association of Disabled War Veterans of Liberation Wars of Serbia and War Volunteers 1912-90 laid wreaths on the monument to the Unknown Soldier. In Knin, a group of dissatisfied fighting men from the Benkovac-Obrovac theater, after abandoning their positions with tanks, destroyed Nebojsa Djujic's little cafe (a few days before, the man had celebrated earning 2 million German marks [DM]). Those same fighting men called upon RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina] Prime Minister Djordje Bjegovic to take urgent measures to prevent lawlessness and the universal impoverishment of Serbs.

Achievements

Three years after the events that were an introduction to the series of wars on the space of the former Yugoslavia many things have changed. The joint state has fallen apart, new states have arisen, blood has been shed in rivulets, cities have been destroyed, concentration camps have been created, there has been raping, looting, and cutting of throats; what has happened, that is, is worse than even the greatest pessimists dreamed. Nevertheless, two things have remained the same: the reasons and the people which were why what happened happened. Three years later, the causes are only still deeper, and the warlords are becoming more numerous. What is more, those smaller ones, which have sprung up thanks to the small number of main ones—above all, Slobodan Milosevic—are now threatening their spiritual parents, not allowing them a respite for peaceful division of the war booty.

That is, war has its own service life. After the destruction and killing in the name of sacred national objectives, it has turned out that what sprang up behind them has a coverage that is dubious to say the least. Vladimir Lukic, prime minister of the Srpska republic, is concluding now that "if everything is allowed the Serbs in the Srpska republic, then that state has failed even before it is formed." In his words, the murderers there are freely walking the streets, they are being protected by commanders of their units, various permits are being forged and sold (most probably permits for the remaining Muslims and Croats to leave), and the government, if it is not already in a tie-up with "criminal elements," is looking on everything calmly and thus losing prestige with the people. In addition, the universal impoverishment has reached such limits that Predrag Radic, president of Banjaluka Opcina, is saying there will be serious social conflicts after October. He also says that 50,000 pensioners in Banja Luka have not been receiving a dinar for months and that 1,700 of them intend to go to the center of the city and to die there of starvation instead of their homes.

The situation is similar in the fraternal Srpska republic. Someone seems to have gotten into the head of the public that its representatives are living better than ever while people are going hungry and dying. An additional problem is that this kind of thinking has become generally accepted and, which annoys the government even more, it has been reinforced by the dissatisfied Serbs in Serbian tanks in Serbian Knin, who are fighting precisely for the Serbian cause. Mile Paspalj, president of the RSK Assembly, was very troubled, then, when he wrote an open letter to Djordje Bjegovic, who heads the executive branch in the state they have in common. Paspalj was seeking in this way a "property inventory" of every minister, assistant minister, secretaries of SUP's [secretariats for internal affairs], and security station chiefs showing what property they possess and when they acquired it. It is also important to make public how many bodyguards they have, have they been assigned an official car and why, and what members of their immediate families are employed in government bodies, the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], and other international organizations, and do they own a private business firm? The impression that everyone is bearing the difficulties of war equally is more necessary than ever before, as is the possibility of putting the question whether national interests are a cover so that the "national" leaders can acquire unlimited and absolutist power and fill their pockets on the basis of other people's troubles.

Swine and Suckling Pigs

However, as time has passed, ulterior motives have floated to the surface more and more: Suckling pigs, which earlier were not even turned on the spit, have begun to feed on human limbs. It has become clearer and clearer that it is far more essential to be in good relations with the local commanding officer than to be continuously in the trenches. It has been shown that those who called for war, but themselves never caught the smell of gunpowder, are distributing humanitarian aid, and are becoming unhealthfully fat, are dressing better and better, are driving better and better cars, and are traveling more and more frequently. The fate of their native region, whose inhabitants they called to arms so eloquently, has ceased to be important to them. It has turned out that national heroes, like people's deputy Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic, asked for millions in hard currency for their "Tigers" to capture some town, or at least use of the post office, the bank, and the police station for 48 hours. Just long enough for the local fighting people to know with whom they are dealing and what they can expect to be left for them. It also turned out that Tomislav Mercep and Zeljko Tomljenovic of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] were mainly concerned with cleansing freezers and other kitchen appliances and their owners from Serbian houses in western Slavonia (when they were lacking, Croatian houses also suited), that they were armed exclusively with short-barrel automatic weapons, and that they were killed mainly in showdowns with one another for the richer neighborhoods of the cities. All of that was not so striking—all those who had weapons could make that fact pay, and no one put any questions anyway to those others—the unarmed, frightened, and ethnically intoxicated majority.

Problems arose when everything that was to be torched had been torched, when everything that could be looted had been looted. It is well-known, that is, that soldiers do not have gainful employment, that is, that their income depends on what they steal or what people pay them. The national economies are having ever greater difficulty financing the war, and the artillery-trench warfare that is being conducted at the moment reduces looting to a minimum. That altered situation could not but have an impact on patriotism.

Colleagues

That is, it has become as clear as day that the new-old authorities are not functioning the way they should. It is becoming more and more difficult to use the war, the young age of democracy, the new state, and so on, as a justification for the lawlessness and lack of a future. What little life there is takes place thanks to smugglers who obtain some kind of goods, dealers who are buying up the last foreign exchange savings, and usurers who are paying something for family property collected over decades. The only way for it to be better is to achieve peace, but, again, this is not possible, because the authorities, self-proclaimed or elected, depend when all is said and done on the good or bad will of the local warlords. There is no end to them. There is, for instance, Major Mauzer, the master of life and death in Bijeljina; what goes through the corridor and how much will be paid for that passage depends on his whim. There is also the King of the Bridge, as the foreign journalists call a Serbian policeman on the bridge over the Drina. He takes TV cameras, still cameras, and, in general, everything that might be subversive in the Srpska republic. There are also policemen on all three sides who ambush citizens of Sarajevo for big money, looters of abbeys and monasteries (not on an ethnic basis—strictly business), smugglers of gasoline, cigarettes, and food.... Those who are familiar with the situation say that a new Golf automobile can be earned in a month "exporting" cigarettes to Cazin Krajina and so on. Their cooperation has never even been questioned. Recently, one of the Serbian warlords in central Bosnia taught a Croatian counterpart how to conduct a search of an imam's dwelling. Look only at the books, because these are educated people who write down everything, and, to be sure, they found a list of SDA [Democratic Action Party] members and DM150. The Croatian commander got the list, and the Serbian commander the marks: Everything you learn comes at a price. Then the Croatian colleague taught the Serb how to do ethnic cleansing the professional way. The two of them sat in a car and watched members of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] put 10 or so Muslims into a minivan. They were told they would be deported to Fojnica, and to take the most valuable things with them. The van set off and after a few kilometers stopped in the woods. The Muslims were told that they would have to continue on foot, and they would be led by the Croatian commander personally. He lined them up and told them to wait while he parked the car in another place. As soon as he was 10 or so meters away from the line, gun bursts resounded from the woods, and the Muslims fell to the ground. "Here, you see, that is how it is done," he told his colleague. "You get dead Muslims and everything they possess all at the same time." The Serb was quite impressed. The Serbs, being emotional, could not have thought up such things.

Stomach

The war has probably entered a phase in which its local lords are dictating how things go from here. Controlling their territory, once the possibility of looting has vanished, they turn to vacuuming away what reserves the population has through conventional Mafia black marketeering. They "grease palms" where and when it is necessary. Peace for them does not mean anything but a loss of a livelihood. The authorities, if you can call it that, in whose jurisdiction they operate are no longer able to use national-patriotic reasons to cover up the real situation, from which they themselves derive benefits. Patriotism as such does not put food in your mouth. The subjects have begun to rebel. Many inhabitants of Sarajevo do not understand why some Moco is taking them out to dig trenches by force. Is he the only interpreter of their interest, as the criminal Juko Prazina was at one time, while at the same time he is trading in human souls with the gunners on Vogosca? Likewise, Branimir Glavas is forced to write to Slobodan Milosevic and ask him to free a group of Croatian soldiers whom he ordered to cross the territory of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and blow up the bridge at Batina. Their relatives simply cannot reconcile themselves to the idea that those are higher Croatian interests. Of course, Goran Hadzic, RSK president, is seeking decisive measures against all the paramilitary groups operating there. He says that they are both in conflict with the law of his state, but also in the service of the politicians that have been removed. They did not bother him until Rade

Leskovac, i.e., Vojvoda Seselj, called for his removal with the intention of channeling the general dissatisfaction.

In the end, it turns out that interests have been bared, and their protagonists have lost their trousers. The presidents of Serbia and Croatia need peace, but provided they achieve at least some of what made their subjects fall in love with them. Because their national economies are in an ever graver state, they are trying harder and harder to agree as soon as possible. Their subordinates like Hadzic, Glavas, and Lukic are trying to convince the people that everything will nevertheless be good if they just hold on a bit more for the victory that is around the corner. In return, they are offering leveling and scapegoats like the clumsy Djujic, who was not among the many who vanished from Knin in good time. They all need peace in order to consolidate the power gained in the war by fire and the sword; now they need laws, not bombs and machine guns. "The best Serb," Lukic would say, "is the one who pays taxes." The problem comes only from those who until yesterday were obedient collaborators and who do not want to slow down so long as there is a single German mark on the territory under their control. The cannon fodder in whose name they supposedly operate is not essential to them anyway until it rebels. And it has begun to rebel, beginning with the stomach.

Serbia

Sandzak After Ban of SDA Memorandum

93BA1431A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 93 pp 30-31

[Article by Zvonko Prijovic: "The Boomerang Is Still in Flight"]

[Text] Even after the banning of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] Memorandum, that is, the demand for special status for Sandzak, nothing very essential has changed in this part of Serbia and Montenegro. Both Muslim and Serbo-Croatian greetings are still heard in the streets of Sandzak's cities, Novi Pazar continues to be the best-supplied city in Yugoslavia, and few people believe that they will be looking at one another through gun sights in these parts tomorrow or the day after.

Sulejman Ugljanin, leader of the Sandzak Muslims, is again somewhere abroad: It is said that he recently conducted talks in Geneva. His last public appearance in Novi Pazar, from which he drove away all journalists from Belgrade newspapers, was a complete fiasco, according to the stories of those in attendance. Does that mean Ugljanin is losing the upper hand in the SDA for Sandzak, and is his hard line giving way to the "softer" wing of the party, because divisions are already evident in the only political party of Sandzak Muslims? When the war ceases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will extreme individuals from the ranks of both nationalities disappear from the political scene, and will reason return to these parts—those are just some of the questions one hears these days.

Status or a State

"For provoking enmity and inciting ethnic and religious intolerance," states the justification of the judgment, the District Court in Uzice prohibited distribution of the printed Memorandum on Establishment of a Special Status for Sandzak, which the Muslim National Council of Sandzak adopted on 6 June of this year. Although inaccessible to the public following the ban, from sources close to the leaders of the SDA, we learned that this document seeks special status for Sandzak within the framework of the remainder of Yugoslavia, but all the functions of state power are granted to the "authorities of Sandzak." Those authorities would be the assembly as the legislative body, and a governor and government as the components of the executive branch.

Their jurisdiction would include the police, taxes, the judicial system, the schools, culture, exploitation of all natural resources, energy production, monitoring the banks, and issuing permits for the operation of business firms and shops. The State of Yugoslavia is left to concern itself only with protection of the environment, highways, railroads, PTT, and the electric power transmission system. It is no secret that the map of the territory over which, according to Ugljanin, the requested special status would extend, includes six Serbian opstinas (Priboj, Prijepolje, Nova Varos, Sjenica, Tutin, and Novi Pazar) and five Montenegrin opstinas (Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Rozaje, and Plav).

At the beginning of an interview with VREME, Rasim Ljajic, general secretary of the SDA, the party's top man in Ugljanin's absence, says that if Bosnia bursts along ethnic seams, the inevitable question will be why that principle should not apply to Serbia and Croatia, two states which favor the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

"We were one of the rare political parties in the former Yugoslavia that favored the preservation of Yugoslavia, because that was the optimum interest for the Muslim people. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia altogether different circumstances have come about, and this has influenced definition of our present political objectives," Ljajic said.

In answer to our objection that the Serbs constitute a majority in six of those 11 opstinas and that the Muslims possess only about one-third of the land, and also that one hears hypotheses about a possible secession, Rasim Ljajic said:

"Politics is not a set of desires, but of objectively possible solutions, especially under conditions when the strength of argument is secondary. The future development of events depends on what happens in Bosnia. The most essential thing for us is the commitment that exclusively political negotiations and dialogue resolve the status of Sandzak as a region. It is completely clear to us that in this international environment it is not realistic to expect that the present government will allow the Muslims to realize what is stated in the Memorandum."

Trade Routes

Novi Pazar, Sandzak's political and economic center, is still the champion of shopping tourism in Yugoslavia. Everything is available, and it is all quite a bit less expensive than in other cities. Scarce foodstuffs: flour, oil, and sugar, can be found without problems. The prices, of course, are in German marks. Merix detergent in the 3-kg bag costs 8 German marks [DM], and those nostalgic for the good old times can buy Faks from Osijek. Its price is slightly higher—DM10.

Even here, raids of the dealers have become more frequent in the recent past, but it is thought that the amount of foreign exchange seized is small compared to the total amount of money in circulation. At one time, one of the dealers says, several hundred thousand marks changed hands in a day. That is why in Novi Pazar there is the smallest difference between the buying and selling value of foreign exchange, and only here are all foreign currencies "valid."

It is much the same in the other cities of Sandzak. In Prijepolje, the leading merchant is Bahrija Beganovic, who owns the private firm Vocar. He was recently recognized for his successful performance by the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, the only one in the private sector. At the beginning of the war in Croatia he lost 50 metric tons of bananas in Kopar, and a trailer with a load of 22 tons was taken away from him in Djakovo.

"There is probably an end to this madness, a time when we will turn to work, business, and a better life. The government must restore order on our market, no one should be allowed to hold back goods to hike up the price," Beganovic says, adding that his cooperation with Macedonia is excellent, because it is interested in the market of Serbia and Montenegro. He says that a blow has been dealt to small tradesmen, but if it were not for them, there would be nothing for people to buy in this situation.

Serbia Entire, but Decentralized

As a response to the Memorandum and numerous problems faced by Sandzak, Sefko Alomerovic, director of the firm Merso and vice president of the European Movement in Serbia, suggests the school for interfaith understanding and cooperation, of which he is the initiator and main organizer.

A hundred or so students of theology and from other university schools in the former Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, France, and other countries will meet in Novi Pazar in August to hear lectures from some 30 distinguished theologians and other specialists in religion. The school will bring together Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, and Jews and will last two weeks.

"I am an opponent of any separatism, I favor new mergers, an entire and decentralized Serbia," Alomerovic told VREME in connection with the SDA's demands for special status. "The way Sumadija and the Morava Valley are organized, that is the way it should be done with this part of Yugoslavia. Every Muslim must respect Serbia's interest to have an outlet to the sea through Montenegro, and the historic kinship of these two nationalities must not be forgotten. I am reflecting along purely pragmatic lines, because no buffer between Serbia and Montenegro is going to be possible," Sefko Alomerovic says. In his opinion, if Sandzak were to get some kind of autonomy, it would have in Serbia a powerful enemy which in time would snuff it out.

The Way to the Brothers

Following several incidents in the border section with Bosnia and Herzegovina (the kidnapping of the Muslims from Sjeverin, the torchings and murders in the village of Kukurovici, the kidnapping of the passengers from the train in Strpci), it has been calm in Priboj in recent months. The workers at FAP [Priboj Motor Vehicle Factory] and Poliester spend more time on mandatory leave than working, salaries are paid more or less regularly, and pensioners are right now looking for three and a half tons of missing (or stolen) sugar.

Few people were disposed to talk about the Memorandum; many had not even heard of it. One pensioner said of this: "With this kind of pension, I already have a special status, I do not need another one." One of the educated people with whom we talked, who did not want his name used, said that the Muslim people has no true political leader. Only the demand for some kind of cultural autonomy makes sense, none of the rest has any chance of passing, he believes....

"Only in Serbia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is it possible to solve all the problems, but on the civil principle and if the Serbs and Muslims have the same rights. No memorandums can settle our status. If Bosnia and Herzegovina had remained in Yugoslavia, 95 percent of the Muslims would have lived in one state. That is why it would be much better for the Muslim people if the SDA conducted the policy of Dr. Mehmed Spaha's Yugoslav Muslim Organization," says Ferzo Celovic, an engineer from Priboj, who with a group of educated people organized several discussions on the topic of living together. A resolution from one of those meetings stated:

"We call upon all Serbs and Muslims in our opstina and beyond to travel as soon as possible the road from the brothers who do not know what they are doing to the road of the brothers who know what they are doing, because it is our destiny to live together as human beings in these parts, just as we have done in the past."

Doubts About Autonomy

Those familiar with the situation in Sandzak and in the Raska region say that as far as Novo Varos (with only 8 percent Muslims), Pljevlja, or Berane are concerned, the Muslims there would not even consent to a special status. The SDA has strong support only in Plav and Rozaje, but many say that the Muslims in Montenegro are turning more and more to the Liberals and Social Democrats. The Montenegrin Assembly has already rejected the Memorandum as an unconstitutional document which wants to create a state within a state and which as such is unacceptable.

Recently, in Berane a group of Muslims condemned the demand of the SDA, and a journalist from that city, Amer Ramusovic, says: "A game that is not at all harmless is being played to bring about the preconditions for war, and nationalists from other parties are claiming that their policy represents the entire Muslim people. We are doing fine in Berane: Recently, the local radio took on three people, and two of them were Muslims."

Dr. Serbo Rastoder, history professor in the School of Philosophy at Niksic University, told VREME:

"The Memorandum on the special status of Sandzak is a document representing the political will of the top leadership of one party, it is based on an obsession with nationality and the state, and it is in the spirit of the worst Balkan tradition. As such, it points toward those solutions which contain a problematical historical and ethnic argumentation absolutized to the point of nonsense. Experience shows that the victims of such a policy are the very ones in whose name it is being proposed. This is a new contribution to the history of contemporary Yugoslav ignominy, and as such it ignores elementary political reality.

"The instruments of its possible realization by the nature of things cause an inevitable conflict that deprives the initial intentions of the initiators of all meaning. So the basic question is posed: In whose interest is it? I am deeply convinced that that kind of solution is least of all in the interest of the Muslims. It can only help to strengthen those forces which once again are reaffirming the theory of 'blood and soil.' A separate question is how much support the Memorandum has anyway among those in whose name it is being presented?" Dr. Rastoder said.

Few people in Sandzak are concerned with this document except the authors of the Memorandum and the judges who banned it. Desirous of peace in Bosnia, many feel that Sandzak, along with Kosovo, has no chance of getting on the agenda of world politics. The SDA leadership expects that the "Sandzak question" will nevertheless be internationalized, in a similar way to what happened with the former Yugoslav republics. It will soon be evident whether the boomerang that was thrown in the form of the Memorandum will come back to the one who threw it or will hit someone else.

Memorandum on Sandzak Seen as Basis for Talks

93BA1442B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Aug 93 p 8

[Article by S. Bakracevic: "SDA of Sandzak Press Conference in Novi Pazar: Ljajic: Memorandum on Status of Sandzak Basis for Talks"]

[Text] *The secretary of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] of Sandzak says that the chairman of that party, Sulejman Ugljanin, has not fled, but instead is "currently in Vienna working on internationalizing the problem of Sandzak."*

Novi Pazar, 24 Aug—"Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken as much as they want, the Croats have taken as much as they can, while the Muslims have taken as much as has been given to them," concluded the secretary of the SDA of Sandzak, Rasim Ljajic, expressing his disappointment to journalists today. In his opinion, the Geneva negotiations have adopted only a modified variant of the Serb-Croat plan to partition that former Yugoslav republic. In this way, the Muslims have found themselves "between a greater Serbia and a greater but truncated Croatia, and in three separate parts, so that this Bosnia-Herzegovina is reminiscent of a dying patient who is given the wrong therapy," said Ljajic.

The secretary of the SDA of Sandzak hopes that the Muslim Assembly will reject this plan and that the Geneva negotiations will continue until a more just solution is found. The importance of the situation to Muslims, Ljajic said, is evidenced by the increasing radicalization in Serbia, where Kostunica is moving ever-closer to Seselj, and Cedomir Mirkovic, until recently a democrat, is dividing Bosnia into two parts, Serb and Croat.

Rasim Ljajic does not understand why Izetbegovic's statement on reactivating the Sandzak question (on the same status of Muslims in Sandzak and of Serbs in Croatia) is eliciting so much surprise, because "that was an electoral slogan of our party back in 1990." Ljajic believes that the Sandzak file will be reopened within the framework of the Geneva negotiations, but he assigns equal importance to talks in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]—negotiations with the Serbian and Montenegrin governments, and especially with the federal government.

"We are trying to resolve the Sandzak question within the framework of the FRY, whereby we deny the allegation that we are pursuing some sort of secessionist policy," Ljajic says. In contrast to certain earlier positions, whereby the SDA was an opposition to the opposition in Serbia, he now expresses a willingness to hold talks even with the people in power, but also with Serbian opposition parties, from the local to the highest level.

In response to a journalist's comment that the so-called memorandum on special status for Sandzak does not come across as being that peace-loving (that document calls for this region having its own constitution, its own governor, assembly, government, police, judiciary, and schooling, while the military would have to leave), Ljajic said that that document (the memorandum) is not an ultimatum, but rather only a starting point for talks. The SDA secretary also denied allegations of splits within the party (these are, he said, only "marital quarrels, but without divorce"), and said that party chairman Sulejman Ugljanin had not fled the country, but is currently in Vienna, after which he will travel to Geneva, and that he is still working on internationalizing the Sandzak problem.

Ljajic again denied the theory that Muslims were disappointed with studying in Turkey. He said that the only ones who had returned were those unable to pass the Turkish language test, as well as a few for indecent behavior, because at the very outset their attention had been drawn to the fact that "gambling, prostitution, and alcohol will not be tolerated."

Asked what he thinks about the arrest of a large number of Muslim because of weapons and ammunition, Ljajic said that he has objections here based solely on principle—why the investigation is being conducted not by an examining magistrate, but rather by state security, why the arrestees have not been allowed contact with attorneys for an entire month, and why Serb as well as Muslim homes are not being searched.

SPS Autocratic Ruling Discussed

93BA1442C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 93 p 9

[Article by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "SPS: Disobedients Always Lose"]

[Text] *Every factionalist trend is blocked in advance through the institution of "minorities," which cannot put their opinion forward as the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] position. Only the chairman's authority is unchallenged.*

All the leading parties in Serbia are dominated by leaders. Thus, the amount of "internal democracy" in Serbian parties depends more on the individual characteristics of party leaders than on statutory provisions.

Naturally, neither the opposition nor the ruling party will agree with a "platitude" expressed in this way. The charisma of the chairman, with his "frozen mandate," and the internal party hierarchy that follows in accordance with the strength of Milosevic's authority are regarded in the Socialist Party of Serbia as an exclusively positive thing. After all, at least according to SPS vice chairman Goran Percevic, there is a clear division of authorities and responsibilities in the ruling party, whereby the chairman's authority is unchallenged. The SPS bylaws allow Nebojsa Covic to "freely express his opinion or proposals, for which he cannot bear the consequences." Under Article 6 of the bylaws, however, members of the SPS whose opinion is not accepted by the majority are prohibited from publicly stating their opinion as a party position.

Specifically, the SPS allows the formation of "minorities" with regard to a specific question, and this is even regarded as "a contribution to the development of, necessary changes in, and successful implementation of SPS policy."

The thing that especially characterizes the SPS as the ruling party is its position of dictating the management personnel establishment at key public and so-called social enterprises. There are plenty of examples where, until only recently, businessmen were replaced precisely on the basis of the party line. Some of them were indirectly accused of excessive "friendliness" toward the opposition. But here too one must be cautious, because the SPS bylaws state that "members of the SPS (either officials or ordinary members, C.M.) cannot participate in political demonstrations, campaigning, petitioning, or other activities for any other party" without the consent of the governing bodies of the SPS. Thus, the advantage of the SPS lies in the developed infrastructure and flawless mechanism of coherence between the party and the state. In a party with half a million members, the "undisciplined ones" are thus already and always the losers.

This sort of plea serves to explain why examples of a classic lack of discipline within the SPS can be counted on one's fingers. The political strength of Slobodan Milosevic lies in his ability—rarely directly, and more frequently by way of several main operatives in the party leadership—to "cut through" all internal centers of power (generally involving personal disagreements) which could, potentially, engender a program-based, ideological, or some other serious confrontation in the party, or have similar consequences for the SPS.

Because of that, it is a fact that the arrested former minister Velimir Mihajlovic is the only well-known socialist who has been excluded from the ranks of his party. Recent personnel disagreements (some of which are still smoldering) among socialists from Pancevo, Kosovo Polje, Kikinda, and Pozarevac are actually not authentic examples of the solution to the problem of (the lack of) party discipline, for the simple reason that they are not covered by the provision of the bylaws that states that a member of the SPS can be excluded from the party if he acts counter to the Program and bylaws of the SPS. It is true that there is the possibility here of exclusion in the event that an SPS member "seriously violates the reputation of a party member," but such cases generally end up with these people leaving the party voluntarily.

The "deaccumulation of functions," which is the official explanation for the departure of Nebojsa Covic from the post of chairman of the Belgrade Municipal Committee of the SPS, is not, of course, institutionalized in the program documents of the SPS. It appears that this was the most typical example of a different interpretation of "party discipline," which was resolved by compromise, at least for now: Covic held on to his state function.

Seselj on Serbian Leaders

93BA1435B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 pp 13-14

[Interview with Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj by D.B.; place and date not given: "Will to Power"]

[Text] *"Everything went according to plan in front of the Serbian Assembly. I went out, they started to yell, I pulled out a pistol, and they ran about 20 meters away."*

Analysts of the political situation like to describe Vojislav Seselj as a classic example of a leader, as a person who thinks, speaks, and works like an undoubted leader and the one who makes the final decisions. Furthermore, they recall his appearing, in uniform or out of it, while touring battlefields. Those who do not like him cannot help drawing mustaches on him a la Hitler.

[Seselj] There is no tendency in the Serbian people to seek a leader. I do not think that the Serbian people have an authoritarian orientation. I think that they are definitely pro-parliamentarian, and expect more from parliament than it can do. The role of the government is underestimated in our public opinion, and parliament is overestimated. The government, not it, should solve economic and political problems.

[D.B.] Isn't Slobodan Milosevic a real example of a leader? Isn't he perceived as such?

[Seselj] Milosevic is popular as a personality. He does not have the authority to interfere in solving economic and social problems, and the people do not expect him to....

[D.B.] It is thought that Milosevic decides on everything, and that he made the decisions on war and peace, not the Serbian Assembly.

[Seselj] He did not make the decisions on war and peace. Serbia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] were not at war. Before the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the decisions were made by the Presidency. What Milosevic is doing now is trying to use the strength of his prestige to help find peaceful solutions. That is not legally binding on either Yugoslavia or Serbia, however.

[D.B.] Then why is he being invited to Geneva?

[Seselj] Because of the strength of his influence, his prestige... The West only talks with those who have influence, and not any formal position. It is just that if some decision were signed, it would be done by the Yugoslav prime minister or foreign minister.

[D.B.] And Milosevic would be a guarantor?

[Seselj] Naturally, through his prestige. I do not have any state positions, but I have more prestige than some ministers. Whether you like it or not, prestige is prestige, and it is not measured by a position, but by real political power....

[D.B.] It is thought that the intellectuals made Milosevic a leader. Some proven dissidents said that Milosevic should be supported until he achieved certain national goals, and then they would "deal" with his communism.

[Seselj] The problem is not with Milosevic, but rather with those intellectuals. In normal countries those people would not be the intellectual leadership. Gojko Nikolis became an academician through ideology, and Palavestra through Masonic ties.... The structure of those people is authoritarian. Look at Matija Beckovic. In 1989 he, the son of a chetnik officer, an anticommunist dissident, received the 7 July award, an award in honor of the partisan uprising, from Milosevic's hands.

[D.B.] Do you think that the presidential system helped Milosevic's rise in comparison with parliament?

[Seselj] No. The presidential system is not as pronounced here as it is in America or France. Milosevic is made powerful through the strength of his party and the support of the second strongest party, the Serbian Radical Party.

[D.B.] In these troubled times, after Broz as the undisputed leader, in every republic one leader is slowly emerging as the personification of his nation....

[Seselj] No, in Serbia's case that is not true. There are several leaders in Serbia today, and not one is the personification of the Serbian people. Milosevic is on top by virtue of his prestige, but there are others....

[D.B.] Are you number two?

[Seselj] The question is whether I am....

[D.B.] Milosevic one, Seselj two, Draskovic three?

[Seselj] That is the case in Serbia. Karadzic is now first in Bosnia, but there is also Krajisnik. In the Krajinas there are Martic, Bjegovic, Rade Leskovac, and Babic. In Montenegro there are Bulatovic, Acim Visnjic, Perovic, and Kilibarda has burned out.

[D.B.] What do those people have in common?

[Seselj] All politicians are characterized by three things: a will to power, a guiding idea (Draskovic changes it all the time, which still means that he has one), and a desire for fame.

[D.B.] What is the difference between you and Milosevic?

[Seselj] What we have in common is patriotism, but the difference is that he is a moderate leftist, and I am a moderate right-winger.

[D.B.] If the present party leaders left their parties, would they collapse immediately?

[Seselj] It is not impossible, but new ones would appear at once. The very question of a leader exists in both America and France. Perhaps the French Socialists would no longer exist if there were no Mitterrand. Politics requires personification. It is not a personality cult. It is important for a leader to be elected democratically.

[D.B.] According to some people, you deliberately projected your image of a decisive leader, and according to others, it is not any sort of calculation, but simply your character.

[Seselj] A person cannot make himself what he is not. In the long run, it is hard to conceal one's character.

[D.B.] There was talk about this when you pulled out a pistol at the students. According to some people, you did it deliberately in order to show a people that loves strength that you are strong. According to others, you did it spontaneously.

[Seselj] Nothing is spontaneous. I am the least spontaneous of all politicians. I knew that there was a mob outside, and I calculated how they would react and how I would. Everything went according to plan in front of the Serbian Assembly. I went out, they started to yell and insult me, I pulled out a pistol, and they ran away about 20 meters. The crowd, the mob, was cowardly, full of frustrated types....

[D.B.] Let us assume that there is a state of emergency and there is no parliament, and that you are the leader who decides everything.

[Seselj] I would never abolish parliament. It is essential; a person has to have critics....

[D.B.] The assumption is that there is no parliament.

[Seselj] Then I would restore it as soon as possible. All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. I would never be the head of a state without a parliament....

[D.B.] All right, there is a parliament. The people expect you to take steps to save them. What would you do?

[Seselj] We have a good program, economically and socially; we would establish order and peace, bring uncorrupted people to important positions....

[D.B.] Since we are talking about parliament, Brana Crncevic said that you were making a circus out of the Yugoslav Assembly.

[Seselj] I am not making a circus. He said that he was a circus performer himself. I think that he made a mistake by not being in the circus; he has no business in parliament.

[D.B.] Would a meeting among Milosevic, Seselj, and Draskovic reduce the tensions...?

[Seselj] Draskovic does not need to meet with us, but rather with psychiatrists. He made an unforgivable mistake because of his vanity and stupidity. He went to Paris for detailed examinations. It was determined there that he was physically healthy, but not mentally. The Americans, British, and Germans were informed about this, and a message came to Belgrade to remove Draskovic from the head of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement]. The action has been planned for September.

[D.B.] And how do you know this?

[Seselj] Well, I am one of the best-informed people. Don't think that I will tell you my sources, so you can use them too.

Government Blamed for Dailies' Paper Shortage

93BA1435A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 pp 20-21

[Article by Veselin Simonovic: "For Two Eggs"]

[Text] *Even if reporters listen to their minister and creatively address "the people's needs," it may happen that because of the shortage of paper, no one will notice their new image.*

On Wednesday, 18 August, the daily POLITIKA cost as much as two eggs—10 million dinars. The daily work of about a hundred reporters, printers, and editors... has been reduced to the daily output of two hens. The situation with the other capital daily newspapers is no better. At a time when everything in this country is losing real value, especially when the unit of measurement is the increasingly worthless dinar, making such comparisons is perhaps inappropriate, and certainly insulting to reporters, but it also seems useful.

What is the real value of the information that should be (although often it is not) the basic commodity sold by the newspapers, and what is their output? It is also impossible to find an answer to this question in the already described bartering of goods in kind. It is true, however, that in this country public speech, especially reporters', has never been cheaper, but also not more significant, and frequently even more dangerous. Is it even necessary to recall that before all the bullets in the former Yugoslavia, words "killed," and then all types of communication with the "enemy" peoples was cut off for us? Even telephone wires were cut on all sides, even without any sanctions and resolutions.

Politicization

That is why reporters should now also ask themselves how much they themselves are to blame for the fact that their work is less valuable than the daily output of a feathered animal. The authorities' role in this is obvious and evident. Among other things, it is due to the authorities that no production pays at this time, even producing newspapers. Admittedly, all the governments are promising that they will help those who are still producing something, but the question is whether they will also help all the newspapers and reporters.

The authorities' willingness was verified in recent days by the managements of two Belgrade dailies, BORBA and VECERNJE NOVOSTI. Faced with a shortage of paper, because Matroz was not operating, they turned to the federal government and the Commodity Reserves Directorate for help. They received help for one day, along with strong reproaches that it was the business of those firms' managements to secure the necessary raw materials and supplies, and that the Directorate did not exist in order to supply them with paper.

It is not hard to figure out why there was such a rude attitude toward BORBA, which these authorities are criticizing for a lack of patriotism, but the question is why there was any sense in treating VECERNJE NOVOSTI that way. A generalized answer to the question of how to help the press to keep from collapsing was given in BORBA by Serbian Information Minister Milivoje Pavlovic: "There is too much politicization in the newspapers, and the people are more serious—they do not want that, at least not to that extent.... The newspapers have to address the people's needs on the basis of patriotic positions...." Naturally, the authorities have always proclaimed themselves to be the only ones competent to assess what is in the people's interest. Pavlovic sees the newspapers' salvation as being in their "internal reserves—not just technical and material, but rather in the development of creative journalism, a new sensitivity to citizens' continuing needs...."

It is hard to believe, however, that the minister of information (and both governments) are so uninformed that they do not know the following fact: circulation cannot help a single newspaper survive, because it has happened for the first time in this country that by increasing circulation the daily newspapers only increase their losses.

On Wednesday, 18 August, a kilogram of paper from the Matroz public enterprise, from which four or five copies of the newspaper POLITIKA can be produced, cost 70 million dinars. That means that with a price of 10 million dinars, this firm cannot even cover the paper. The director and acting chief editor of POLITIKA, Hadzi Dragan Antic, does not conceal the fact that this is the most difficult moment for this firm since the war. The autumn will be very bad for the press, Antic says, and if nothing changes, many of the POLITIKA Company's newspapers will be liquidated.

What can be said about the other newspapers, then, if we know that at this time POLITIKA has a circulation equivalent to all the other newspapers together—between 120,000 and 140,000? The total circulation of all the capital's newspapers is thus less than 300,000, which VECERNJE NOVOSTI had until just a little over a year ago. Antic also says that POLITIKA holds the record in covering costs with income from advertisements—60 percent. BORBA says that it is managing 40 percent. The question, however, is whether there will soon be anything to advertise.

BORBA has calculated that at this time that newspaper would have to cost 50 million in order to cover basic costs, and get out of the red, as they say. Newspapers will obviously raise their price during the coming days and weeks. One more fact confirms this: in December 1992, the price of newspapers averaged 35 pfennigs, and the printing costs were 15 pfennigs, whereas that ratio today is 8:15.

Optimism

How much can newspapers then be helped by internal reserves, and how much by "creativity and sensitivity to citizens' needs" in correlation with a growth of circulation? The authorities certainly know the answer to this. The increasingly more expensive press is becoming more and more unaffordable for a large part of the impoverished population. The federal prime minister himself announced that more than half of the population was on the brink of poverty. According to Srdjan Bogosavlevic from the Federal Statistics Institute, the poorest part of the population has to allocate more than 85 percent of the family budget just for heating, light, rent, and food. For those who are better off, that percentage is about 60. Most of the population allocates 60 percent of its income for food, while it previously "ate" only 30 percent; and here is one more fact—not so long ago, the average income was as much as 1,500 German marks, and now it is below 50.

In this situation, are the authorities even willing to help the newspapers, either those who publishing this dark picture of our daily life, or those who are sowing optimism, in spite of everything, in accordance with the authorities' wishes? The authorities, who are having an increasingly harder time solving even much smaller problems, are obviously not willing to do this. Furthermore, a situation in which newspapers are reducing the number of pages, and cutting circulation even against the will of their readers, can only suit this regime, because before our close encounter with poverty, almost all households were supplied with televisions, so these authorities do not even have to be concerned about the fact that many citizens, with the present average wage, would have to work for a thousand years to save up for one new television (currently, according to Bogosavlevic, the citizens of Yugoslavia can allocate an average of only 2 percent of the household budget for durable consumer goods).

Watching the daily news on state television in recent days and weeks, an informed person cannot help but wonder what country the RTS [Serbian Radio-Television] journalists are reporting from. The authorities had sympathy for the kind of box that only spreads optimism—they turned on the electricity again. Furthermore, the authorities do not even have to be concerned about whether some citizen has the money to pay for electricity, or has perhaps already switched to five-day service. The most important thing, naturally, is that since the newspapers' influence has been marginalized, and the independent television stations have short ranges so far (and some of them will stay that way for a long time), television will be the only source of information for most of this country's citizens. Many newspaper reporters could at least wonder whether they had taken credit in vain.

Montenegro

Bulatovic-Led Delegation Concludes Visit to Albania

AU1609104993 Podgorica Radio Crne Gore Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 16 Sep 93

[Text] The Montenegrin state delegation headed by President Momir Bulatovic concluded a one-day visit to the Republic of Albania last night and have arrived in Podgorica. After the talks with their hosts, Albanian President Sali Berisha, Prime Minister Meksi, and Parliament Chairman Arbnori, President Bulatovic and Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic pointed out that the visit was very useful and substantial. We advised our hosts that dialogue on all important issues should be continued with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, President Bulatovic pointed out.

Belgrade Role Viewed

AU1509123293 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sept 93 p 2

[Report by D.V.: "Belgrade's Signals?"]

[Text] Podgorica—In Podgorica, the meeting between the Montenegrin and Albanian presidents is being interpreted as reviewing the possibility of Montenegro's secession from Serbia. President Bulatovic probably had this "prospect" in mind when, commenting on his forthcoming visit to Tirana, he said that this visit "had been orchestrated at the level of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," that is, that it had been positively assessed by the now former Greek Prime Minister Konstantin Mitsotakis.

According to Bulatovic, Montenegro wishes to "realize the possibility of local border traffic," and to intensify economic relations with Albania, both now under sanctions, and later when they are lifted.

Bulatovic warned that he did not wish his meeting with President Berisha to be used as "an alibi for using Montenegro in political duels and airing of attitudes regarding Kosovo."

If President Bulatovic himself says that he has the Yugoslav political leadership's (including Serbia's) consent to go ahead with the Tirana trip, then this could be Belgrade's sure signal—even when conveyed in this roundabout way—that it wishes to establish normal relations with Tirana.

Macedonia

Consequences of Ignoring Sanctions Viewed

AU1509153893 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 14 Sep 93 p 3

[Report by Goran Mihajlovski: "Up Is High, Down Is Deep"]

[Text] Foreign observers in Skopje assess that the rigorous closing up of the border with Serbia ten days ago is a good move by Gligorov, before his address in the UN and the new CSCE session, where discussions on the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in this European association will be resumed.

Signal

The claim of a very experienced diplomat of ours, who wanted to remain anonymous, is very interesting. He says that it is not true that the causes for the repeated unsuccessful attempts at admission in the CSCE should be only the opposition of Albania or the unsolved problem with Greece about the name. For him, it is very significant that it was the United States, which had several times insisted on our admission to the CSCE, who did not join the discussions at the last session and remained silent after the Albanian veto and the support for Greece and Cyprus in refusing the request. This is considered as an important signal for the Macedonian leadership, which is in principle enjoying the support of the U.S. administration, to think over about breaking the sanctions.

For several months, especially after the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN, the state has been visited by hundreds of journalists and television teams, regularly sending their filmed reports on the lines of trucks at the Tabanovce border crossing. One of the representatives of the CSCE mission stated the following on one occasion: "We do not control them, they control us." Regardless of the fact that the authorities turned a blind eye, as if the sanctions did not apply to us, the observers daily sent telegrams to the commission on implementation of sanctions in New York, noting the exact number of cargo vehicles crossing the border in both directions. This could not be ignored; thus, many influential CSCE countries who were fully on our side until recently, for example Germany and Austria, were very angry because of the behavior of the Republic of Macedonia.

Statements

In the Foreign Ministry you can hear that the inconsistent respect for the sanctions had negative repercussions on the negotiations with Greece. They say: "When you go to negotiate, you must have a strong argument to hit on the table. And you cannot hit if you are not clean."

Foreign Minister Vranko Crvenkovski often complained during the summer that "the damages that the Republic of Macedonia is suffering due to the sanctions are absolutely incomparable to the damages felt in any other country" and he asked for "a division of the burden in a joint action with the United Nations, because our participation in the economic part is much greater than any other UN member's."

Premier Vranko Crvenkovski also repeated countless times that "our basic interest is to have the war stopped on the territories of former Yugoslavia and therefore our vital interest is to give support to anything that might stop the war, including the sanctions." But one thing is what the politicians said, which controvened the picture on the northern border crossings, and the completely different statements of the foreign officials and comments in the Western media. When British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd arrived in June, he spent a great part of the discussions at the news conference explaining things like: "We have an understanding for the damages suffered by Macedonia, but the sanctions must be respected."

Threats

Recently, and especially after the arrival of the U.S. troops within the UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] peace forces, the visits of congressmen, senators, and military officers from the United States became more frequent. Cautious readers of the announcements issued after their meetings with representatives of the state authorities could hear the tone of a certain excuse or justification for the open disrespect for the sanctions, always accompanied by the known: "Our damage amounts to 1.8 billion dollars, we ask for compensation as a mechanism envisaged by the UN Charter." However, sources close to the government say that the discussions were not very "smooth," as it looks like in the announcements. Allegedly, just before the "sudden" closing of the northern border to cargo traffic, the leadership was warned that "you will lose three times more than you got in the past 15 months by breaking the sanctions if you do not start implementing Security Council Resolution 820 immediately."

Foreign observers in Skopje, but also journalists who have recently visited here, unambiguously say that "by 'disrespecting' the Security Council resolution we lost all the support we enjoyed while struggling for admission to the United Nations." An officer of the Foreign Ministry, who wished to remain anonymous, says that "what we earned with the wise European policy and peace safeguarding, we lost just after being accepted into the United Nations, showing ourselves as a country immature for membership in the world organization, because it does not respect the decisions of the Security Council!"

The last hit arrived recently, from the CSCE observers commission chief, Norman Anderson, who "hit" the leadership of the Republic of Macedonia in a broadcast on Macedonian Television stating: "You, as a country in a transitional phase to market economy, have problems in the economy even without the sanctions against Serbia, but a much greater sin is that, by going on with the old logic of economizing, linked to the Serbian market in the first place, you are not even trying to restructure your economy and you just continue with the old habits you used to have under socialism."

Favor

It seems that, once again, it was the Americans who did President Gligorov the greatest favor. The letter of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, about which a lot was speculated, was not denied by anyone. The threat—delivered by a great power—that Macedonia might also be hit by sanctions if it goes on in the old manner, was welcomed in settling down the accounts in which some government and parliament members were involved, together with the powerful boards of directors of the old social companies which "cannot go on without Serbia." Even now the telephones are constantly ringing in the Customs Department, in the Internal Ministry, and in the Foreign Ministry Economic Section, urging for permission for "some cargo vehicle loaded with cheese, meat products, or milk." Many still have the idea that this will last for only some ten days, and then we shall continue to sell to Serbia at double the price the oil we buy from Greece, but—there is no coming back.

As a confirmation of this there was the statement of the State Department spokesman Michael Macurio: "The United States is supporting the promptness of President Gligorov for the implementation of the international obligations, and we also understand the sacrifices suffered by every country joined in the implementation of the sanctions."

President Gligorov, a man of great political experience and high international rating achieved in the past two years as president of an independent state, will certainly not take the risk and gamble with the confidence of the sole great power in the world. Especially not now, when he succeeded in bringing in its troops, as a kind of a guarantee for the independence of Macedonia on the most troubled border.

It is clear to everybody that direct compensation for the damages due to the sanctions will not come true. However, there are other ways to assist Macedonia. Minister Douglas Hurd spoke about the assistance of Great Britain in Macedonia's approach to the world's banks and financial institutions. In relation to Christopher's letter, there is a possibility mentioned for an engagement of the United States concerning the 120 million dollars debt, which was transferred to Macedonia as a successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is no secret that the United States can exercise the greatest pressure over our southern neighbor to open up the borders—of course, if we deserve that with our conduct. Especially because signals have arrived saying that

Greece would be the first to welcome, with the utmost promptness, the possible public accusations against Macedonia for breaking the sanctions, in order to remain with "a clean face" in front of its allies, and then lower once again the ramps on the border crossings.

There is no dilemma in the state circles not involved in "the shadowy" games with Serbia. They say: "What do you prefer, to drink more expensive milk, or to line up for gas and freeze beside cold radiators?" Those constantly breaking the sanctions have never seen lines at gas stations.

Winter Heating Problems Anticipated

93BA1424B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 p 20

[Article by S. Dzahula: "So Far, Not a Gram of Fuel Oil"]

[Text] Last year there were no major problems for Rum residents, at least with respect to heating, but this heating season will certainly not be like the previous one. Although the end of August is approaching, heating is an equation with several unknowns, according to the Stambeno [Housing] Public Enterprise, which heats as many as 1,700 apartments in the city with its boiler rooms. On two occasions, the executive council of the Rum municipal assembly, which keeps track of this enterprise's operation, has discussed the preparations for the upcoming heating season at meetings. According to Stambeno's acting director, Ljubomir Delic, there have been no preparations at all.

Specifically, even though there were plans to start buying four tanks of fuel oil, so far not a gram of this fuel has been bought, and there is no encouraging news from Naftagaspromet, through which fuel oil was previously bought at considerably more favorable prices. So far heating is not a priority, and whether it will be and when is at least so far a question without an answer. Naturally, there is also another possibility, purchasing fuel oil from private businessmen, but for "high" foreign exchange prices, and so then the question is who would be able to pay for such considerably more expensive heating. Thus, the dilemma is now whether to buy expensive fuel oil or to wait for state fuel oil, but time is passing. It is precisely for that reason that Stambeno is not sending bills to the customers for its services, so that inflation would not devalue that money. It is also planning to talk with bankers about obtaining appropriate loans to have money when there is an opportunity to buy fuel oil.

Stambeno should soon also define alternatives for heating and payment terms, so every present customer will recalculate whether he can afford it or not. Whoever cannot will have to seek another method of heating this winter, with many people noting that those who were previously heated by Stambeno will be in a privileged position.

Vojvodina

Functioning of Coalition Government in Novi Sad

93BA1442A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 93 pp 25-26

[Article by Petar Ignja: "Autumn Comes Early"]

[Text] *When I amicably asked Mr. Crnjanin whether he believes that the socialists can get anything going, he laughed sweetly.*

It has been nine months since the elections and the big surprise that took place in Novi Sad: The radicals carried off a victory here, but not a big enough one to form a municipal government on their own. They entered a coalition with the socialists, and to this very day they have attempted to portray this alliance to the public as normal (everything is running, only patriots remain), as if there are no disagreements whatsoever. The socialists, used to sharing power with no one, have continued to behave in their old manner, and regardless of their electoral defeat the public has had the impression that they continue to run the show. Like during the committee days.

It comes as no surprise that the committee days are still going on, but the sudden rise of the radicals in, of all places, Novi Sad was a surprise. Here is what Milorad Crnjanin, the chairman of the Serbian Radical Party Committee for Southern Backa has to say about that:

"The victory of the Serbian Radical Party in Novi Sad could have been a surprise only to those who did not follow the preparations and work of this party since the May elections and who are not familiar with the thinking and feelings of the Serbs in Vojvodina. After the May elections, our party had seven committee seats, but after the December elections it had 24. In Novi Sad it entered into a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia based on the 50-50 principle, so that in this way the radicals got the post of mayor and the socialists got the post of prime minister of the municipal government. The number of members of the government was also identical, and based on the division of cabinet departments there was also a division of public enterprises and institutions, so that the radicals got culture and education, transportation and communication, urban planning, and municipal administration," says Crnjanin.

"(It is important to bear the following in mind as well: The Serbian Radical Party also won this election precinct for the republican Assembly, and a coalition government on the opstina level was set up in the opstinas of Temerin and Zabalj, while there is also a representative of the radicals in the opstina government of Beocin. I provide information for southern Backa as the chairman of the Serbian Radical Party's regional Committee for Southern Backa.)"

On the provincial level, the post of vice chairman of the Vojvodina Assembly went to radical Srdjan Komazec;

Slavoljub Jovanovic is a minister without portfolio in the provincial government, while a Serbian Radical Party candidate became the director of Novi Sad's DNEVNIK, but the post of chief and responsible editor remained in socialist hands.

"We are aware of the fact that in the coming period it will be difficult for any party in this region to form a government on its own, and that already parties must get used to coalitions, but not at any price; rather, these must be coalitions that can move forward," says Crnjanin.

Big Differences

There are big differences between the economic and social programs of the Serbian Radical Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia, but as far as municipal government is concerned, they are being bridged by agreement, and there have been no major problems; where problems have emerged, they have been due to deep-rooted views held by individuals who cannot reconcile themselves with the fact that they must share part of the pie of power, whereby after the pie is divided up the portion in the other side's hands looks much bigger. And better.

It will not be easy to make some changes, because individual institutions are financed by both the republic and the city, while power is on the republican level.

Recently, the Matica Srpska [cultural society] has not lived up to Serb expectations. At least a large share of them. An institution that must be firmly linked to the Serb nation, wherever it might be, should, through its reputation (scientific, artistic), use all its "connections" to see to it that the truth about the suffering of the Serb nation, and in the Serb nation, breaks through the media blockade. Why has the Matica Srpska not sent letters and photographs at least once a month to all its friends and associates around the world, to institutes and academies and all friends with whom it has had several decades of cooperation? Where and when has the Matica Srpska spoken up? The question arises: To whom does the Matica Srpska belong, and whom does it serve? This is a question that Mr. Crnjanin is raising publicly.

When he said a little earlier that his party will not enter into a coalition with other parties at any price (in order to preserve bare power with their combined forces, for example), but will only do so with those who are moving forward, the writer of this article asked Mr. Crnjanin, amicably (as an old war buddy), whether he really believes that the socialists are a party that can get anything going, much less move forward. Mr. Crnjanin, who up to then had been very serious, an austere conversation partner, suddenly brightened up, laughed sweetly, and as far as I can remember, mentioned autumn.

An early autumn, which we all expect (my Dunja...), and some people are lucky, others are not.

Eternal Virtues

Living and working in Novi Sad—above all else this means having a job involved with culture. Anyone can see Novi Sad culture with the naked eye (only one example: People line up to get on the city buses and everyone excuses himself). Even the communists failed to break the people of Novi Sad of their habits. What is the state of culture in the Serbian Athens today? Radmila Vojnovic, a member of the Executive Committee of the Novi Grad city in charge of culture and education, discussed this for our magazine.

"The Serbian Radical Party captured power in Novi Sad, which surprised the ill-informed, but this was part of the inexorable process of national and cultural integration of our nation on the ruins of Tito's Yugoslavia. Let us recall: At the end of the 1980's in the Serbian Athens, for the first time since 1941, the people raised the big question of the renewal of their state from Prizren to Subotica, from Negotinska to Knin Krajina. In 1988, a powerful, popular 'no' reverberated out of Novi Sad to the post-World War II disintegration of Serbdom in the form of 'federalism, republics, and provinces.'"

"The story continues... In the last century, Novi Sad, together with Sremski Karlovci, engendered a national, cultural elite, and despite the Austro-Hungarian occupation founded and nourished many cultural institutions (the SNP [Serbian National Theater], the Matica Srpska). Here, the 'Austro-Hungarian national state idea' was rejected and the spiritual epicenter of the movement for unification of the Serbian motherland was created. This fall, this major political and cultural anniversary will be marked by, among other things, the raising of a monument to Jasa Tomic, a radical leader, who presided over the Grand Assembly of Serbs upon unification. Now, 75 years later, the people of Novi Sad have confirmed the '1918 election results.' Under a state of siege, despite the brutal threats and extortion by the Western democracies, we have refused to capitulate. The Quisling and separatist parties suffered a debacle in the elections, despite the material and media policy of the West.

"The eternal virtues of our ancestors have been returned to the cultural and spiritual foundations of Novi Sad (the Serbian name is Stara Bistrica)," Ms. Vojnovic told us. "Truth, freedom, and justice have been returned. This election represents a living link with all past generations. With the vanquished of 1389, the heroes of Cegro and Mojkovac, of the Salonika front, and with those who yelled 'better war than a treaty.' The dead souls of our ancient and modern places of execution, of all the Towers of Skulls and Jasenovaces, voted; our Serbian Armed Forces from the western fronts of the Fatherland also voted. This election is binding."

Serbian Geostrategy

The Serbian Radical Policy is running cultural policy in Novi Sad. Its goal is to halt the collapse of culture and education, despite the galloping destitution. Given the exhausted budget, the word is appropriate.

The patronage of a vital part of the economy, which amid synchronization by the municipal government is giving money to cultural institutions and schools.

Selective reduction of the network of cultural institutions (their staffs and office space, through cutbacks resulting from a reexamination of the inherited situation). Some institutions, relics of the past ideological epoch, will be shut down, while others will adjust to spending with modest revenues from the state budget.

The new cultural policy supports the initiative to found a Serbian Institute for Geostrategic Research in Novi Sad. This is also true of the realization of the good intention that the city be the location of the Russian, Greek, Armenian, and Cypriot cultural-economic consulates. It is intended that attention be focused in the coming period on the city's museums, the Institute for the Protection of Monuments, and the Historical Archives (on the historic presence of the Slavic-Serbian element in our region).

Thus far, it appears, greater attention has been devoted to studying the history of non-Slavic elements.

She also mentions an integral strategy for environmental protection of the old city lake, as well as of the sacred spaces of our churches and cemeteries. To put it more simply (in a more Serbian fashion), this involves mitigating and correcting the urbanist inheritance of communist rule, which includes, besides the love affair with Soviet boxy gray architecture, the destruction of churches and the shattering of bells.

Next will be the renovation of everything old, with emphasis on protecting the urban matrix of the center city.

In radical style, Radmila Vojnovic says that the cultural and spiritual rebirth of Novi Sad is impossible without the help of Novi Sad University.

U.S. Scholarship Recipients

"From the seemingly chaotic situation at the University, a new intelligentsia is emerging, ready to share the good and the bad with its people. Part of the intelligentsia (corrupted U.S. scholarship recipients, former party executors) has demonstrated a lack of understanding and scorn for its own people. Today, they—like the believers in K. Poper's Open Society, are pouring new democratic wine into their old ideological machines," says Ms. Vojnovic.

True. That is probably true. But it is also true that the party of the former party executors continues to rule today, thanks to the artificial respiration being provided by the Serbian radicals. Without the radicals and their support, the party of the former party executors would be like soup without noodles.

The radicals want to look to the future. The symbolic foundation for their hope and faith in a cultural renaissance is the movement centered around the publication INDEKS, whose message is this: It is obvious that new generations of students are coming to replace their Brozian-communist professors and to tell the world that our future is Serbhood and democracy.

When the Vojvodina radicals mention the tradition of radicalism in Serbian Vojvodina, they are not thinking only of Jasa Tomic and of the love that they, on the other side of the Danube, felt for Pasic and unification with Serbia. From time immemorial. They would say that Vojvodina radicals are different from others. They are middle-class, not fiery radicals. How much they can do today is hard to say (party leader Vojislav Seselj decides everything), but Seselj will soon see that collusion with the communists will work only in places where awareness of the 6th Lika Brigade still prevails, and that this policy of the radicals in Vojvodina is doomed for failure, because the 6th Lika Brigade is a synonym for communist arrogance and lack of culture, the source of compulsory farm delivery quotas, the destruction of Vojvodina churches, and the plucking out of the beards of Vojvodina Orthodox priests.